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Abstract in English 
In many developing countries, agricultural cooperatives constitute a major vehicle that can be 
used to enhance the adoption of new agricultural technologies and output marketing among 
smallholder farmers. Despite the efforts made by the Chinese government to accelerate the 
systematic promotion of agricultural cooperatives, cooperative participation rate remains 
significantly low. Understanding and identifying the constraints and incentives that influence 
smallholder farmers’ decisions to join agricultural cooperatives and evaluating the economic 
impact of cooperative membership can provide significant evidence to policy makers for further 
agricultural policy design, aimed at enhancing sustainable agricultural development and 
improving rural household welfare. However, very few studies have empirically examined the 
impact of agricultural cooperative membership on the adoption of technologies and farm 
performance of smallholder farmers in China. The dissertation attempts to fill in the research 
gaps by providing a comprehensive understanding of how agricultural cooperative is 
systematically correlated with the system of food production and marketing in China. The 
empirical analyses are based on a dataset collected from 481 apple farmers in Gansu, Shaanxi 
and Shandong provinces, where covered the majority of apple orchards in China.    
The study first examines the determinants of cooperative membership and the impact of 
cooperative membership on investment in organic fertilizer, farmyard manure and chemical 
fertilizer using a recursive bivariate probit model that accounts for endogeneity of cooperative 
membership and selection bias. Second, the causal link between agricultural cooperative 
membership and adoption of integrated pest management technology is analyzed by employing 
an endogenous switching probit model to address the issue of selection bias. Meanwhile, a 
treatment effects model is employed to analyze the impact of integrated pest management 
technology adoption on apple yields, net returns and agricultural income. Third, this study 
examines the impact of cooperative membership on household welfare, measured by apple 
yields, net returns and household income. An endogenous switching regression model that 
accounts for selection bias is employed in the analysis. In order to understand the profitability 
of a number of different investments in apple production, this study also analyzes the impact of 
agricultural cooperative membership on return on investment. Finally, the determinants of 
marketing contract choices including written contracts, oral contracts and no contracts, as well 
as the impact of marketing contracts on net returns from apple production in China are analyzed. 
In particular, a two-stage selection correction BFG approach is employed to conduct the 
empirical analysis. On the basis of the BFG estimation, this study also uses an endogenous 
switching regression model to analyze the causal effect of written contract choice on net returns 
IX 
from apple production and a propensity score matching technique to estimate the causal effects 
of oral contract choice on net returns from apple production.  
The empirical results show that agricultural cooperative membership exerts a positive and 
statistically significant impact on the probabilities of investing in soil-improving measures such 
as organic fertilizer and farmyard manure, but does not significantly influence the likelihood of 
investing in chemical fertilizer. The estimates also reveal that cooperative membership exerts a 
positive and significant impact on the adoption of integrated pest management technology, and 
integrated pest management technology adoption has positive and significant effects on apple 
yields, net returns and agricultural income. With respect to household welfare and investment 
profitability, the results reveal that cooperative membership exerts a positive and statistically 
significant impact on apple yields, farm net returns and household income, and small-scale 
farms tend to benefit more from cooperatives than medium and large farms. Also cooperative 
membership tends to exert a positive and significant impact on the return on investment. The 
further estimations show that selling apples primarily through cooperative organizations have 
positive and statistically significant impacts on net returns of both written and no contract users, 
but positive and insignificant impact on that of oral contract users. In particular, written 
contracts increase apple farmers’ net returns, while oral contracts exert the opposite effect. On 
the factors that influence farmers’ decision to join agricultural cooperatives, the findings show 
that education, household size, farm size, labor input, asset ownership and access to credit exert 
positive and significant effects on the choice of cooperative membership. 
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Abstract in German 
In vielen Entwicklungsländern stellen landwirtschaftliche Genossenschaften ein zentrales 
Instrument dar, welches die Annahme neuer landwirtschaftlicher Technologien und den 
Produktionsabsatz kleinbäuerlicher Betriebe fördern kann.  Trotz der Bemühungen der chine-
sischen Regierung, die systematische Förderung von landwirtschaftlichen Genossenschaften zu 
beschleunigen, verbleibt die Beteiligungsrate an Genossenschaften gering. Das Verständnis und 
die Identifikation von Hemmnissen und Anreizen, welche kleine landwirtschaftliche Betriebe 
in ihrer Entscheidung, einer landwirtschaftlichen Genossenschaft beizutreten, beeinflussen und 
die Bewertung des ökonomischen Einflusses dieser Mitgliedschaften können Ent-
scheidungsträgern signifikante Anhaltspunkte für agrarpolitische Strategien zur Steigerung 
einer nachhaltigen landwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung sowie zur Wohlfahrtssteigerung von 
ländlichen Haushalten liefern. Derzeit liegen jedoch wenige Studien vor, die den Einfluss der 
Mitgliedschaft in landwirtschaftlichen Genossenschaften auf die Annahme von Technologien 
und die rentabilität von kleinbäuerlichen Farmen in China untersuchen. Die Dissertation 
unternimmt einen Versuch, die Forschungslücken zu füllen, indem ein umfassendes 
Verständnis darüber vermittelt wird, wie landwirtschaftliche Genossenschaften systematisch 
mit dem System der Nahrungsmittelproduktion und des -absatzes in China korrelieren. Den 
empirischen Analysen liegt ein Datensatz von 481 apfelproduzierenden Landwirten der 
Regionen Gansu, Shaanxi und Shandong, in denen der überwiegende Anteil des chinesischen 
Apfelanbaus stattfindet, zugrunde. 
Die Studie untersucht zunächst unter der Verwendung eines rekursiven, bivariaten Probit-
Modells, welches Endogenität von Genossenschaftsmitgliedschaften und Selektionsver-
zerrungen berücksichtigt, die Determinanten von Genossenschaftsmitgliedschaften, sowie 
deren Einfluss auf das Investitionsverhalten in organische, chemische und Wirtschaftsdünger. 
Im nächsten Schritt wird der kausale Zusammenhang zwischen Mitgliedschaft in einer 
landwirtschaftlichen Genossenschaft und der Annahme von integrierten Pflanzenschutz-
systemen (Integrated-Pest-Management) analysiert. Hierbei findet ein endogenes Switching-
Probit-Modell Anwendung, um Selektionsverzerrungen entgegenzuwirken. Drittens untersucht 
die Studie, unter Verwendung eines endogenen Switching-Regressions-Modells, welches 
Selektionsverzerrung berücksichtigt, den Einfluss von Genossenschaftsmitglied-schaften auf 
die Wohlfahrt der Haushalte, gemessen an Apfelerträgen, Nettorenditen und Haushalts-
einkommen. Um die Effizienz verschiedener Investitionsmöglichkeiten in der Apfelproduktion 
zu erfassen und zu verstehen, untersucht diese Studie außerdem den Einfluss von 
landwirtschaftlichen Genossenschaftsmitgliedschaften auf die Kapitalrendite. Abschließend 
XI 
werden die Einflussfaktoren auf Entscheidungen über Vermarktungsverträge, einschließlich 
schriftlicher und mündlicher Verträge und der Abwesenheit von Verträgen, und der Einfluss 
von Vermarktungsverträgen auf die Nettoerträge der Apfelproduktion in China untersucht. Für 
die Durchführung der empirischen Analyse wird dabei auf einen zweistufigen, 
selektionskorrigierenden BFG Ansatz zurückgegriffen. Basierend auf der BFG Schätzung 
verwendet die Studie des Weiteren ein endogenes Switching-Regressions-Modell, um den 
Kausalzusammenhang zwischen der Entscheidung für schriftliche Verträge und der 
Nettorenditen aus der Apfelproduktion zu analysieren. Eine Propensity-Score-Matching-
Methode wird angewandt, um den Zusammenhang zwischen der Entscheidung für mündliche 
Verträge und der Nettorenditen der Apfelproduktion zu schätzen.  
Die empirischen Ergebnisse belegen, dass die Mitgliedschaft in einer landwirtschaftlichen 
Genossenschaft einen positiven und statistisch signifikanten Einfluss auf die Wahr-
scheinlichkeit ausübt, Investitionen in bodenverbessernde Maßnahmen wie die Verwendung 
von biologischen oder Wirtschaftsdüngern zu tätigen. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit in chemische 
Dünger zu investieren wird hingegen nicht signifikant beeinflusst. Zudem ergeben die 
Schätzungen, dass Genossenschaftsmitgliedschaften einen positiven und signifikanten Einfluss 
auf Annahme von Integrated-Pest-Management Technologien haben. Hinsichtlich der Wohl-
fahrt von Haushalten und der Effizienz von Investitionen, geben die Ergebnisse Aufschluss 
darüber, dass Genossenschaftsmitgliedschaften einen positiven und statistisch signifikanten 
Einfluss sowohl auf die Ernteerträge, die Nettorenditen, als auch das Haushaltseinkommen 
haben, und dass kleine landwirtschaftliche Betriebe dazu tendieren, in größerem Ausmaß als 
mittelgroße oder große Höfe von einer Genossenschaft zu profitieren. Darüber hinaus hat eine 
Genossenschaftmitgliedschaft einen positiven, signifikanten Einfluss auf die Kapitalrendite 
(Return On Investment). Weitere Schätzungen ergeben, dass der vorwiegende Verkauf von 
Äpfeln über genossenschaftliche Organisationen einen positiven und statistisch signifikanten 
Einfluss auf die Nettorenditen von Landwirten hat, die schriftliche oder keine Verträge nutzen. 
Bei Nutzern von mündlichen Verträgen ist der Einfluss auf die Nettorenditen zwar auch positiv, 
aber nicht statistisch signifikant. Insbesondere schriftliche Verträge erhöhen die Nettorenditen 
apfelanbauender Landwirte, während mündliche Verträge einen gegenläufigen Effekt auf-
weisen. In Bezug auf die Determinanten, die einen Landwirt in seiner Entscheidung, einer 
Genossenschaft beizutreten, beeinflussen, kann gezeigt werden dass Bildung, Haushaltsgröße, 
Hofgröße, Arbeitsaufwand, Vermögensbesitz und der Zugang zu Krediten einen positiven und 
statistisch signifikanten Einfluss auf die Entscheidung über eine Genossenschaftsmitgliedschaft 
nehmen. 
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Chapter 1      General Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and Problem Setting 
In most developing countries, the smallholder farmers are facing a range of problems in agro-
food production and marketing such as lack of production and marketing information and lack 
of voice in decision-making. Thus, government programs have emerged to help smallholder 
farmers benefit from modern agricultural production and marketing. Among them, agricultural 
cooperatives, which constitute a major vehicle to improve the performance of smallholder 
agricultural producers, have been promoted. Agricultural cooperatives offer members a wide 
range of services and opportunities. Providing market information, facilitating smallholder 
farmers’ participation in decision-making at all levels, and negotiating better terms of trade in 
contract farming and inputs purchase are a few examples (World Bank 2006; Zheng et al. 2012). 
Given the important role of agricultural cooperatives in supporting smallholder farmers’ 
agricultural production and marketing, the promotion of cooperative organization has 
increasingly attracted attention of donors, governments and researchers in developing countries 
(Abebaw and Haile 2013; Deng et al. 2010). 
Previous studies have analyzed the impact of cooperative membership on the investment in 
static inputs such as chemical fertilizers (Abebaw and Haile 2013; Verhofstadt and Maertens 
2014b). Crop yields normally increase with higher rates of application of yield-enhancing 
measures such as chemical fertilizer, yields may decline over time due to soil degradation, if 
no organic material is added to the soil (Abdulai et al. 2011). Therefore, investment in organic 
inputs that build up the soil structure plays an important role in mitigating the negative impact 
of soil degradation on crop yields and the environment. Thus, there is a need to look at how 
cooperative membership influences smallholder farmers’ investment in soil-improving 
measures such as organic fertilizer and farmyard manure. 
In addition to analyzing the impact of cooperative membership on the adoption of chemical 
fertilizers, previous studies have also examined the impact of cooperative membership on the 
adoption of chemical pesticides with respect to pest management (Abebaw and Haile 2013; 
Verhofstadt and Maertens 2014b). Although the enhanced pesticide use due to cooperative 
membership may increase crop yields, the overuse or misuse of chemical pesticides has caused 
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a range of environmental and food safety problems. For instance, Calvin et al. (2006) noted that 
farm households in China depended on the heavy use of chemicals to deal with the pest pressure, 
which challenges the food safety supply. Thus, it is significant to facilitate the adoption of 
alternative pest management technology that is less harmful to the environment and human 
health. Existing evidence has suggested that the adoption of integrated pest management (IPM) 
technology significantly lowered pesticide use, saved production costs and maintained farm 
productivity for adopters (Carrión Yaguana et al. 2015; Dasgupta et al. 2007; Fernandez-
cornejo 1996). Some studies have revealed that agricultural cooperatives have the potential to 
improve the safety and quality of the products of members through technical assistance (Jin and 
Zhou 2011; Moustier et al. 2010; Naziri et al. 2014). Given the fact that agricultural cooperative 
enhances technology adoption and food safety and quality and IPM adoption minimizes 
pesticide use, it is significant to understand whether cooperative organizations can promote the 
adoption of IPM technology. 
Several studies have evaluated the impact of cooperative membership on smallholder market 
participation, crop price, farm income and poverty reduction (Bernard and Spielman 2009; 
Bernard et al. 2008; Fischer and Qaim 2012; Francesconi and Heerink 2011; Ito et al. 2012; 
Verhofstadt and Maertens 2014a; Wollni and Zeller 2007; Yang and Liu 2012). Most 
researchers found modest positive impacts of cooperative participation on farm outcomes of 
interest, using various measures and econometric approaches. However, farm income can only 
provide a partial picture of income effects, because higher farm income may be realized by 
reallocating resources from other important economic activities occasioned by the choice of 
cooperative membership (Kabunga et al. 2014; Rao and Qaim 2011). Moreover, focusing on 
the impact on farm income may be misleading and leas to spurious conclusions, since there are 
also differences in the aspects of output levels, prices and costs of variable inputs. It is therefore 
necessary to examine the impacts of cooperative membership on crop yield, net returns, 
household income and return on investment, which are more accurate and comprehensive to 
reflect the benefits of membership in agricultural cooperatives.  
Marketing contracts play a vital role in linking smallholder farmers to advanced supply chains 
(e.g., supermarkets, restaurants, processors, and international markets), and leading to rural 
income growth and poverty reduction (BlandonHensonand Cranfield 2009; Mangala and 
Chengappa 2008; Miyata et al. 2009). Several studies have examined the nature and 
determinants of the choices of different types of marketing contracts (Abdulai and Birachi 2009; 
Guo and Jolly 2008; Jia et al. 2012; Katchova and Miranda 2004; Sartwelle et al. 2000). In the 
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situation with different types of marketing contracts available, farmers choose the most 
appropriate one to maximize their net returns from crop production. Thus, it is significant to 
understand the linkages between different marketing contract choices and farm net returns. In 
the crop supply chain, farmers may choose agricultural cooperative as a primary marketing 
channel to maximize farm profit. However, the knowledge on how cooperative membership 
affects farmers’ net returns and decisions on the choice of marketing contracts is currently 
lacking in the literature.   
Agricultural cooperative membership is not randomly distributed among farming households. 
Farmers choose to join the cooperatives themselves. Therefore, in examining the impact of 
cooperative membership, many of previous studies have employed propensity score matching 
method to address the issue of selection bias, assuming that cooperative members and 
nonmembers are systematically different only in observed characteristics (e.g., age, education, 
farm size, and asset ownership). However, unobserved characteristics (e.g., farmers’ innate 
abilities, motivations to improve soil conditions and supply food to meet food safety standards) 
may also simultaneously influence farmers’ decisions to choose cooperative membership and 
outcomes of interest. Ignoring such factors tends to produce biased estimates of the impact of 
cooperative membership on the adoption of technologies and farm performance. Hence, there 
is a need to analyze the impact of cooperative membership by addressing the sample selection 
bias issue accounting for both observable and unobservable factors. 
The present dissertation attempts to fill in those research gaps and contribute to the literature 
by examining the impact of cooperative membership on the adoption of agricultural 
technologies and farm performance of smallholder apple farmers in China. Apple farmers are 
considered as an interesting case in this dissertation, since apple is an important fruit historically 
cultivated in China. Although apple production and marketing plays a critical role in improving 
the livelihoods of farming households, small-scale farmers are facing difficulties in adopting 
agricultural technologies and benefiting from output marketing. The agricultural policy design 
aimed at enhancing agricultural performance and rural household welfare requires 
understanding the impact of agricultural cooperatives on technology adoption and farm 
performance of smallholder farmers.  
In the next section, background information about China’s agricultural sector, apple production 
and marketing, and agricultural cooperatives is presented.  
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1.2 Background 
1.2.1 The Profile of China  
China, officially the People’s Republic of China (PRC), is located in the east and middle of 
Asia and on the west shore of the Pacific, which covers a land area of about 9.6 million square 
kilometers and a sea area of about 4.73 million square kilometers, with a mainland coastline 
about 18 thousand kilometers. The territory of China lies between latitudes 18° and 54° N, 
and longitudes 73° and 135° E. China is bordered to the east by Korea (Dem Rep), the Yellow 
Sea, and the South China Sea; to the south by Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, 
India, Bhutan, and Nepal; to the west by India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Kazakhstan; to the north by Russia and Mongolia. 
The climate in China differs from region to region because of the country’s highly complex 
topography. There are primarily four seasons including spring, summer, autumn, and winter. 
Summer and winter in China have a subtropical climate and the temperatures can reach 
extremes, and spring and autumn are very pleasant periods in almost all the regions. 
 
Source: National Administration of Surveying, Mapping and Geoinformation of China 
Figure 1.1 Map of the People’s Republic of China 
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China is the world’s most populous country. The population is about 1.35 billion and is growing 
at a rate of 19% between 1990 and 2012 (CSA 2013). It has 34 provincial-level administrative 
units including 23 provinces, 4 municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing), 5 
autonomous regions (Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Ningxia and Xinjiang) and 2 special 
administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macau). It is officially reported that there are 56 
nationalities living in China, and Han Chinese account for more than 90% of the total population. 
The languages and customs in other groups such as Mongolians, Uyghurs, Zhuang, Miao, and 
Bai are quite different from those of the Han. Standard Chinese, which is also referred to as 
“Mandarin”, is the official language of China. 
Beijing and Shanghai are the two best known cities in China. Beijing is the capital, which is 
well-known for its mixture of ancient culture and modernization. The ancient culture is 
represented by the Great Wall, the Forbidden City, and the Summer Palace. It is a political, 
educational, and cultural center, with light industries (science, technology and research) 
dominating over mass manufacturing. Shanghai is the undisputed largest and wealthiest city in 
China, which features a combined culture of East and West. Shanghai has the largest and busiest 
port in terms of containers and cargo tonnage, with a grand business district, two large airports 
(Pudong and Hongqiao), the world's fastest train (the Maglev), and a network of elevated 
highways. 
1.2.2 Overview of Agricultural Sector in China 
 
                   Source: Compiled from the data of China Statistical Abstract 2013 
Figure 1.2 Sectional contribution of China’s GDP in 2012 
 
 Agriculture is at the heart of China’s rural economy, and most rural people rely on agriculture 
for their livelihoods. It contributed about 10.08% of GDP in 2012, while industries and services 
Agriculture
10.08%
Industries
45.27%
Services
44.65%
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sectors contributed 45.27% and 44.65%, respectively (see Figure 1.2). Agriculture is still by far 
the most important sector of China’s economy, employing over 257 million workers. In 2012, 
about 33.60% of the Chinese labor force was involved in agricultural sector, and the labor force 
distributed to industries and services accounted for 30.30% and 36.10%, respectively (see 
Figure 1.3). 
In China, around 47.43% of the population lives in rural areas, who are directly or indirectly 
dependent on agricultural activities for their livelihoods (CSA 2013). Despite the recent rapid 
increase of Chinese income, rural income falls far behind urban income. In 2012, per capita 
rural disposable income was 7,917 yuan, only one third of its urban counterpart of 24,565 yuan 
(CSA 2013). The Chinese government has encouraged farmers to grow higher-valued 
agricultural products to raise rural incomes. 
 
              Source: Compiled from the data of China Statistical Abstract 2013 
Figure 1.3 Sectional contribution of China’ labor force employment in 2012 
China has 12.172 million hectares of arable land, but it is burdened with a fifth of the world's 
population and insufficient resources. The average size of Chinese farm is less than 0.5 ha, 
which is much smaller than other Asian developing countries such as India (1.5 ha), Thailand 
(3.4 ha), and South Korea (1.5 ha) (Fan and Chan-Kang 2005). Even so, China is among the 
most affected countries in the world in terms of the extent, intensity and economic impact of 
land degradation (Bai and Dent 2009). Land degradation is a serious threat to food production 
and rural livelihoods. Only 1.3 million square meters’ land is suitable for agricultural 
production. Since the land degradation will directly influence the potential and productivity, 
more yield-enhancing inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides and irrigation water are needed to 
Agriculture
33.60%
Industries
30.30%
Services
36.10%
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maintain or enhance the productivity, which result in higher production costs. The government 
has attempted to enhance smallholder farmers’ investment in soil-improving measures to 
mitigate the negative impact of soil degradation on crop yields and the environment. 
In China, around 75% of cultivated land is used for grain crops. Rice and wheat are the two 
most important crops. The majority of rice is grown in Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan provinces, 
in the Zhujiang delta, and the south of the Huai River. Wheat is grown in almost all parts of 
China. Crops like millet and corn are also grown in various places in China. Potatoes are also 
considered as an important part in China’s agricultural production, and various species of 
potatoes have cultivated in the country. Oil seeds are also cultivated in a large quantity and are 
often exported as well. 
 
Output/million tons 
Banana 11.56 
Apple 38.49 
Citrus 31.68 
Pear 17.07 
Grape 10.54 
Pineapple 1.29 
Jujube 5.89 
Persimmon 3.42 
Watermelon 70.71 
Muskmelon 13.32 
Other Fruits 36.61 
Total output 
240.57 
Source: Compiled from the data of China Rural Statistical Yearbook 2013 
Figure 1.4 Major fruits produced in China in 2012 
In China, fruit sector is one of the most important parts in agricultural sector. Due to 
geographical and climate advantages, and its importance to human health and nutrition, the fruit 
production has been increasing. The fruit cultivation area in China rose from 8.93 million 
hectares in 2000 to 12.14 million hectares in 2012, while output grew from 62.25 million tons 
to 240.57 million tons over the same years (CRSY 2001, 2013). Apple and watermelon have 
the largest production quantities. In 2012, 38.49 million tons of apples and 70.71 million tons 
of watermelons were produced in China, accounting for 29% and 16% of the total fruit output, 
respectively (see Figure 1.4). Other commonly produced fruits are pear, grape, muskmelon, 
citrus, pineapple, persimmon and jujube. 
Banana
5% Apple
16%
Citrus
13%
Pear
7%
Grape
4%
Pineapple
1%
Jujube
3%
Persimmon
1%
Watermelon
29%
Muskmelon
6%
Other Fruits
15%
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1.2.3 Apple Production and Marketing in China 
China is by far the largest apple producer in the world. About 76.38 million tons of apples were 
grown worldwide in 2012, 38.49 million tons in China, 4.11 million tons in U.S.A and 2.89 
million tons in Turkey. It can be seen in Figure 1.5, apples produced in China, U.S.A and Turkey 
account for 50.40%, 5.38% and 3.78% of the world’s total output in 2012, respectively. 
Uzbekistan ranks fifteenth in terms of apple output, contributing 1.07% of the world’s total 
apple production. In terms of varieties, Fuji is the primary apple variety in China, with 
production area accounting for 70% of apple production. Fuji apple was developed in Japan in 
the 1930s and was popularly grown in many countries since then, given its nutritious value. 
Other commonly cultivated apple varieties in China include Delicious, Golden Deli, Gala and 
Jiaona Jin. Apple consumption occupies a more and more important place in China. According 
to the data released by Helgi library, the per capita consumption of apples grew from just 14.6 
to 21.3 kg per year between 2008 and 2012. China’s population is rapidly urbanizing and apple 
consumption fits into this changing lifestyle that emphasizes convenience.  
 
Data source: Compiled from the data of FAO 
Figure 1.5 Top 15 apple producing countries by total output in 2012 
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In recent years, the amount of land for apple production has been increasing in China. The 
agricultural land covered by apple orchards had expanded to 2.4 million hectares by the end of 
2012, which accounted for 49.66% of the world’s total apple areas cultivated (see Figure 1.6). 
The land used for apple production in China is significantly higher than other major apple 
producing countries such as U.S.A, Turkey, Poland, India, and Italy. For instance, the land used 
for apple cultivation in India was 0.32 million hectares, ranking the second among the major 
apple producing countries in the world. However, it only accounts for 13.39% of China’s total 
apple areas.  
 
Source: Compiled from the data of FAO  
Figure 1.6 Top 15 apple producing countries by area harvested in 2012 
Apples are grown in many regions across China. The main apple production areas are Bohai 
Gulf region (Shandong, Liaoning and Hubei provinces) and Northwest Loess Plateau region 
(Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan and Gansu provinces) due to the favorable climate conditions there. 
More than half of the country’s apple orchards was located in Shaanxi, Gansu and Shandong 
provinces, having an orchard area of 645.2, 283.9 and 279.6 thousand hectares respectively in 
2012 (see Figure 1.7). Apples play an important role in improving rural incomes in Gansu, 
Shaanxi and Shandong provinces where local governments place high importance on apple 
production. For instance, Yantai government in Shandong province published the “Guidelines 
on Facilitating the Upgrade of Apple Industry” on February 21, 2014, with the aim of promoting 
Fuji varieties and facilitating high density planting systems. In particular, the guidelines 
encourage standardized apple production and promote land transfers to consolidate the 
production. In Shaanxi province, the government issued “Shaanxi Fruit Regulations” on May 
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1, 2014, aimed at addressing fruit quality issues. The regulations allow local authorities to 
establish fruit production standards and call for the establishment of fruit testing and traceability 
system.  
 
Area cultivated 
(thousand hectares) 
Shaanxi 645.2 
Gansu 283.9 
Shandong 279.6 
Hebei 235.7 
Henan 178.8 
Shanxi 150.7 
Liaoning 139.0 
Xinjiang 83.9 
Yunnan 40.6 
Ningxia 39.8 
Jiangsu 34.3 
Sichuan 32.9 
Inner Mongolia 18.1 
Anhui 15.5 
Jilin 13.6 
Other regions 39.7 
Total areas 2231.1 
Source: Compiled from the data of China Rural Statistical Yearbook 2013 
Figure 1.7 Top 15 apple producing provinces by area cultivated in China in 2012 
However, due to the differences in soil and climate conditions, the total apple output varies 
among those regions. For instance, although Gansu ranks the second largest in terms of apple 
orchard areas, the total apple output only ranks the seventh among major apple producing 
regions, showing a relatively low productivity (See Figure 1.8). Although Shaanxi, Gansu and 
Shandong provinces have better conditions for apple production relative to other areas, they are 
obviously different in terms of agro-climates and agro-food market environments, resulting in 
different levels of apple productivity and profitability. For instance, Shandong is a coastal 
province with favorable annual rainfall, and farmers there produce several types of cash crops 
including pears, peaches, cherries, peanuts, corns, and apricot. In contrast, Gansu and Shaanxi 
are inland provinces and characterized by low rainfall and poor infrastructure, and farmers there 
only grow corns and potatoes as extra income sources.  
1.78
0.61
0.69
0.81
1.47
1.54
1.78
1.82
3.76
6.23
6.75
8.01
10.56
12.53
12.72
28.92
0.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 25.00 30.00
Other regions
Jilin
Anhui
Inner Mongolia
Sichuan
Jiangsu
Ningxia
Yunnan
Xinjiang
Liaoning
Shanxi
Henan
Hebei
Shandong
Gansu
Shaanxi
Share of apple area cultivated (%)
Chapter 1 General Introduction 
11 
Output/thousand tons 
Shaanxi 9,651 
Shandong 8,710 
Henan 4,367 
Shanxi 3,752 
Hebei 3,115 
Liaoning 2,634 
Gansu 2,488 
Xinjiang 821 
Jiangsu 601 
Ningxia 489 
Sichuan 488 
Anhui 387 
Yunan 322 
Jilin 167 
Heilongjiang 151 
Other regions 347 
Total areas 38,491 
Source: Compiled from the data of China Rural Statistical Yearbook 2013 
Figure 1.8 Top 15 apple producing provinces by output in China in 2012 
Although apple production in China has a compelling advantage in terms of growing areas and 
total output, apple farmers’ participation in domestic and international markets is severely 
constrained as a result of market imperfection, information asymmetry, and high transaction 
costs. In particular, apple export rate remains below 4% since 1981, and the potential for 
expansion is large (see Figure 1.9). Several factors such as low yields, inadequate cold storage 
and packing plant capacity, high pesticide residues, and phytosanitary problems prevent apple 
exports to some high-income markets such as European countries and the United States (Miyata 
et al. 2009). The main markets for Chinese apples are Southeast Asia and Russia.  
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Source: Compiled from the data of FAO 
Figure 1.9 Apple export rate from 1981 to 2012 in China 
 
1.2.4 The Role of Agricultural Cooperatives in China 
According to the definition of International Labor Organization, a cooperative is an autonomous 
association of women and men, who unite voluntarily to meet their common economic, social 
and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically controlled 
enterprise. Agricultural cooperatives enable farmers to realize economic benefits that they 
could not otherwise achieve alone.  
In China, the systematic development of agricultural cooperatives is supported by the 
government. In 1998, a directive was issued by the State Council to support the agricultural 
cooperatives that were voluntary organizations established by farmers themselves. In 2002, the 
Ministry of Agriculture developed a pilot project with 100 agricultural cooperatives throughout 
the country, and provided them with marketing information, technical assistance and 
management training. In 2007, the Law of Farmers’ Professional Cooperatives was 
promulgated, with the aim of facilitating the development of agricultural cooperatives, 
standardizing organization and behaviors of them, protecting legal interests of cooperatives and 
members, and fostering the growth of agriculture and rural economy. As a new institutional 
innovation, agricultural cooperatives in China are expected to promote higher incomes for its 
members, to enhance access to modern supply chains and technology adoption, and to help 
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
A
p
p
le
 e
x
p
o
rt
 r
at
e 
(%
)
Chapter 1 General Introduction 
13 
lower production and marketing costs (Zheng et al. 2012). 
Agricultural cooperatives play an important role in food production and marketing. They can 
help improve smallholder farmers’ bargaining power in the marketplace and reduce costs by 
pooling capital. Through cooperatives, farmers can achieve economies of scale by reducing the 
unit costs of inputs and services. Moreover, agricultural cooperatives can provide technical 
assistance to their members and collectively purchase production inputs for their members, 
contributing to a reduction in transaction costs and an increase in farm income. Agricultural 
cooperatives enable farmers to participate in high value supply chain, particularly in fresh 
produce markets. Even so, cooperative membership participation rate remains low in the 
country. 
In addition to the provision of production and marketing services, another interesting emerging 
role that agricultural cooperatives play is the enhancement of agro-food safety and quality. 
Enhancing the small-scale farmers’ participation in the growing domestic and global markets 
for safer food can reduce rural poverty (Weinberger and Lumpkin 2007; World Bank 2008). 
With rapid income growth, the food consumption is shifting from staple grains toward high-
value commodities such as meat, fish, dairy, and fruit and toward processed foods (Minot and 
Roy 2007). Farmers are facing good opportunities if they can supply safer food to both domestic 
and international markets. The role of cooperatives in enhancing food safety and quality has 
been discussed in previous studies (see Jia et al. 2012; Moustier et al. 2010; Narrod et al. 2009). 
In combination with the domestic agricultural practice and food safety situation, the 
government proposed organic food standard, green food standard and pollution-free food 
standard, aims at meeting domestic and international requirements for quality and safety 
products (Yu et al. 2014). The government is encouraging the adoption of food safety and 
quality standards by agricultural cooperatives to ensure improved quality of the foods produced. 
The certified agricultural cooperatives are responsible for guiding and supervising their 
members to produce products in accordance with the corresponding food safety standards.  
1.3 Objectives of the Study  
The present study attempts to analyze the impact of membership of agricultural cooperatives 
on the adoption of technologies and farm performance of apple farmers in China. The specific 
objectives of the study are:  
 To analyze the factors that influence farmers’ decisions to join agricultural cooperatives; 
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 To examine the impact of cooperative membership on investment in soil-improving
measures such as organic fertilizer and farmyard manure, as well as yield-enhancing
measure such as chemical fertilizer;
 To illustrate the causal relationship between cooperative membership and adoption of
integrated pest management (IPM) technology, as well as examine the impact of IPM
adoption on apple yields, net returns and agricultural income;
 To evaluate the impact of cooperative membership on apple yields, net returns and
household income;
 To estimate the impact of agricultural cooperative membership on return on investment;
 To understand the factors that influence farmers’ decisions to choose different types of
marketing contracts used in apple supply chain, as well as analyze the causal relationship
between the marketing contract and net returns from apple production;
 To draw policy recommendations to improve the status of apple production and marketing
based on the findings, and thus enhance rural income and reduce poverty in China.
1.4 Significance of the Study 
Since the present study is the first study to provide the comprehensive understanding of the 
relationship between agricultural cooperatives and apple production and marketing in China, 
the findings of this paper could contribute important implications for policy-makers in their 
effort to develop sustainable agriculture and improve rural household welfare. The information 
from this study can significantly contribute to the literature on the impact of cooperative 
membership. The findings from this dissertation can assist policymakers in their efforts to 
design and implement polices, laws, regulations and projects that take the needs and concerns 
of smallholder farmers into consideration. 
The role of agricultural cooperatives in influencing farmers’ decisions to adopt agricultural 
technologies with respect to soil-improving measures and integrated pest management 
technology also has important implications for policy makers. On one hand, soil erosion and 
desertification are considered two most serious environmental degradation problems in China, 
which impact adversely on environmental sustainability and productivity of apple production. 
On the other hand, only 3% of apples produced in China is exported due to pesticide residue 
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issue. The existing evidence has shown that agricultural cooperative can facilitate farmers’ 
adoption of yield-enhancing measures such as chemical fertilizers and pesticides, and it has 
potential to improve farmers’ food safety performance. Thus, understanding how agricultural 
cooperatives influence farmers’ adoption of soil-improving measures and product safety-
enhancing technology can help adjust the role of agricultural cooperatives in enhancing 
sustainable and environmentally-friendly agricultural production.  
The issues whether agricultural cooperative can increase rural household welfare are also 
relevant to food policy decisions. If agricultural cooperative has a pro-poor impact, it can attract 
and motivate more farmers without the membership to join agricultural cooperatives, and 
policies and programs to support the development of cooperative organizations could be 
justified on equity grounds. If not, the policymakers would be better to allocate resources to 
other agricultural development strategies. 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
Chapter 1 of the dissertation gives general introduction, chapter 2 to chapter 6 are a collection 
of five journal articles, and chapter 7 presents conclusions and policy implications. Specifically, 
chapter 2 develops a dynamic model to show how membership in agricultural cooperatives 
influences smallholder farmers’ decisions to invest in soil-improving and yield-enhancing 
measures such as organic fertilizer, farmyard manure and chemical fertilizer, as well as 
empirically examines the impact of cooperative membership on investment in those measures. 
Chapter 3 presents a conceptual framework to show the link between agricultural cooperative 
membership and IPM adoption. It also empirically examines the causal relationship between 
cooperative membership and IPM adoption, as well as assesses the impact of IPM adoption on 
apple yields, net returns and agricultural income. Chapter 4 assesses the impact of cooperative 
membership on apple yields, net returns, and household income. Chapter 5 analyzes how 
membership in agricultural cooperatives affects return on investment of smallholder apple 
farmers. Chapter 6 investigates the determinants of marketing contract choices including 
written contracts, oral contracts and no contracts, as well as examines the impact of marketing 
contracts on net returns from apple production in China. The last chapter summarizes the results 
and suggests policy implications based on the findings in the dissertation.  
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Abstract 
In this article, we develop a dynamic model to show how membership in agricultural 
cooperatives influences smallholder farmers’ decisions to invest in soil-improving and yield-
enhancing measures. We then use farm-level data from three provinces in China to empirically 
examine the impact of cooperative membership on investment in organic fertilizer, farmyard 
manure and chemical fertilizer. A recursive bivariate probit model that accounts for 
endogeneity of cooperative membership and selection bias is employed in the empirical 
analysis. The empirical results are largely consistent with the theoretical specification, and the 
findings show that cooperative membership exerts a positive and statistically significant impact 
on the probabilities of investing in soil-improving measures such as organic fertilizer and 
farmyard manure, but does not significantly influence the likelihood of investing in chemical 
fertilizer. The findings also reveal that farm size, asset ownership and access to credit tend to 
significantly influence the probability of a farmer joining a cooperative and the likelihood of 
investing in soil quality measures. 
Keywords: Agricultural cooperative; Investment; Soil quality; Impact assessment; China 
JEL codes: C83; F61; J54; P52; Q01 
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2.1 Introduction 
In many developing countries, agricultural cooperatives constitute a major vehicle that can be 
used to improve smallholder agricultural performance, particularly through services that 
enhance the adoption of new agricultural technologies, sustainable farm practices, and output 
marketing. Several studies have highlighted positive and significant impacts of cooperative 
membership on farm income and profits, producer prices and output market participation (e.g., 
Bernard and Spielman 2009; Hellin et al., 2009; Ito et al., 2012; Wollni and Zeller 2007; 
Vandeplas et al., 2013; Chagwiza et al., 2016). To the extent that output marketing efficiency 
is promoted by improved investment in agricultural production, an understanding of the effect 
of cooperative membership on investment decisions of smallholder farmers should be as 
important as that of the effect of cooperative membership on marketed output. However, little 
effort has gone into investigating how cooperative organizations influence the adoption of 
agricultural technologies by smallholder farmers. In particular, although land degradation due 
to soil erosion and loss of soil quality has been identified as one of the most serious ecological 
and economic problems facing developing countries (Rozelle et al. 1997; Pender et al. 2001; 
Antle and Diagana 2003), the issue of whether agricultural cooperative can help facilitate 
farmers’ investment in sustainable land management practices has been overlooked. 
Land degradation does not only contribute to a reduction in crop yields, but also increases crop 
production costs in the long-run (Barbier 2000; Rozelle et al. 1997). Thus, from a sustainable 
agriculture perspective, investment in soil improvement measures is an inevitable choice for 
smallholder farmers facing land degradation problems. Empirical evidence using micro-level 
data indicates that investment in soil improvement measures helps increase farm productivity 
(Byiringiro and Reardon 1996; Ersado et al. 2004; Holden et al. 2009).  
Some studies have analyzed the impact of cooperative membership on investment in static 
inputs such as pesticides and chemical fertilizers (Abebaw and Haile 2013; Verhofstadt and 
Maertens 2014). In their investigation of the impact of cooperative membership on adoption of 
agricultural technologies in Ethiopia, Abebaw and Haile (2013) found that agricultural 
cooperatives have a positive and significant impact on application of chemical fertilizers such 
as Dibasic Ammonium Phosphate and Urea. A recent study by Verhofstadt and Maertens (2014) 
on Rwanda also found a positive and significant relationship between agricultural cooperatives 
and adoption of chemical fertilizer. Although crop yields normally increase with higher rates 
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of application of yield-enhancing measures such as chemical fertilizer, yields may decline over 
time due to soil degradation, if no organic material is added to the soil. Given the importance 
of investing in organic inputs that build up the soil structure and naturally replenish nutrients in 
the soil, examining the impact of cooperative membership on investment in soil-improving 
measures such as organic fertilizer and farmyard manure would definitely provide significant 
information for agricultural policy design. 
Agricultural cooperative membership is not randomly distributed, but farmers choose to belong 
to cooperatives themselves. Therefore, in their efforts to examine the impact of cooperative 
membership on outcomes of interest, the studies mentioned above employed propensity score 
matching (PSM) model to address the issue of selection bias (Abebaw and Haile 2013; 
Verhofstadt and Maertens 2014). However, the PSM model addresses the issue of selection bias 
by controlling for only observable factors, which is a well-known shortcoming of the model 
(Dehejia and Wahba 2002). Within the context of heterogeneous populations, farmers with 
similar observed characteristics (e.g., age, education, household size and farm size) might have 
different levels of innate abilities and motivations to improve soil conditions. Such 
characteristics cannot be observed directly, but they may significantly influence farmers’ 
decisions of choosing cooperative membership and investing in cultivated land simultaneously. 
Hence, addressing the issue of selection bias should also take into account unobserved factors. 
Moreover, the past studies mentioned above did not attempt to systematically develop a 
coherent theoretical framework that links cooperative membership to investment in soil quality 
and yield-enhancing measures. 
This study contributes to the literature on agricultural cooperatives and soil investment 
decisions by developing a dynamic model that relates cooperative membership to investment 
in soil quality measures. We identify conditions under which cooperative membership helps in 
reducing costs and enhancing investments in soil quality measures. We also employ farm-level 
data of 481 households from major apple producing provinces including Gansu, Shaanxi and 
Shandong of China to examine the factors influence farmers’ decisions to join cooperatives, 
and the impact of cooperative membership on investment in organic fertilizer, farmyard manure 
and chemical fertilizer. We use a recursive bivariate probit model to account for selection bias 
that arises from both observed and unobserved heterogeneities (Thuo et al. 2014; Vall Castello 
2012).  
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The rest of the article is structured as follows. In the next section, we present the theoretical 
framework and analysis from the model developed in the study. We then outline the empirical 
specification, and then proceed to describe the data used in the empirical analysis. This is 
followed by a presentation of the empirical results. The final section presents some concluding 
remarks. 
2.2 Theoretical Framework  
The theoretical framework presented in this article analyzes the link between the decision to 
join an existing agricultural open-membership cooperative and to invest in soil-improving 
measures. Let    denote the outcome of the decision to join a cooperative or not, where 1   
indicates the farmer joining and 0   not joining. Given that current investment decisions tend 
to affect the evolution of soil quality over time, we analyze the decision problem of an 
individual farmer within a dynamic context. Household and farm-level characteristics are 
specific for each farmer and include variables like age, education, household size, farm size, 
asset ownership, and soil types. Following the concept of the so-called location or address 
models (Fulton and Giannakas 2013), we consider that household and farm-level characteristics, 
which form the basis of an index, denoted by  , are specific for each farmer. Let the index be 
scaled such that it is distributed over the interval [0,1] , with 0  indicating the characteristics 
with the lowest, and 1   having the highest effect on the net returns of production.1  
We assume that the farmer cultivates a unit of land and combines investment in soil-improving 
and yield-enhancing measures such as organic fertilizer and farmyard manure ( )O t , and 
chemical fertilizer ( )M t , which is considered as a yield-enhancing input, where t indicates 
calendar time.2 To simplify the analysis, we also assume that farmers do not change their status 
of cooperative membership from the initial period to the end of the planning horizon T . 
The quality of the agricultural product is a distinctive characteristic and influences the price P
that farmers can obtain for their product. However, the production of higher quality is more 
                                                          
1 Let the lowest and the highest values of the unscaled index be denoted by l and h, respectively. Hence, the lowest 
and highest values of the scaled index   are given by     0l l h l    and     1h l h l   , respectively. Any in 
between value i  of the unscaled index is transformed by the equation     (0,1)i l h l   to the scaled index.  
2 Organic fertilizer refers to commercial products that farmers can purchase in the market, and farmyard manure 
refers to the manure fertilizer that is either from the family yard or bought from livestock farms. 
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costly, as it requires employing more inputs and following a more stringent production protocol. 
To focus on the fundamental characteristics of the driving forces, we consider only high and 
low qualities as characteristics of the products. Let the high quality product be indicated by H  
and the low quality one by L , and the associated prices by HP  and LP , respectively. The 
agricultural production function per unit of land,   , j ,jY L H   can be specified as a function 
of soil-improving and yield-enhancing inputs  O t , yield-enhancing input ( )M t , soil quality 
( )S t  and the household and farm-level characteristics  . This is given as 
      , , ; , ,jY O t M t S t j L H  . To simplify notation, we suppress for the remaining part of 
the text the information ,j L H , whenever no unambiguity can arise. We assume that the 
function  jY  is strictly concave in the arguments O , M , S  and additive separable in O  and 
M , because these two inputs are in the short-run nearly perfect substitutes with respect to 
production. Consequently, the cross derivative with respect to these variables is equal to zero. 
The costs of production of nonmembers of the cooperative are denoted by the functions
    , ; j O t M tC  . Given a higher productivity index, the same amount of output can be 
produced with less fertilizers or manure. Thus, we assume that the production costs and the net 
returns index are negatively related, i.e.,  ; 0jC   and that  ; 0
jC   .
3  
Widespread empirical evidence shows that members of agricultural cooperatives may have a 
relative advantage over nonmembers with respect to production efficiency, as well as input and 
output market operations (Abebaw and Haile 2013; Hendrikse and Bijman 2002; Vandeplas et 
al. 2013). These benefits may include lower search costs for input and output markets; better 
bargaining position for lower input and higher output prices; screening of the market partners 
in the presence of asymmetric information with respect to quality of the inputs, and better access 
to credit and management information. In particular, a number of studies have shown that 
agricultural cooperatives play a significant role in supplying markets with high quality products 
(e.g., Moustier et al. 2010; Naziri et al. 2014). We therefore assume that farmers with 
cooperative membership have lower productions costs over a wide range of  . Let us denote 
the cost function of members of the cooperative by  ;jCO  . The difference between the cost 
                                                          
3 Throughout the text the subindex of a function by a variable indicates the partial derivative of the function with 
respect to the variable. 
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functions    ; ;j jC CO     represents the individual share of the cooperative benefits that 
members of the cooperative with characteristics   can realize exclusively as members. Without 
loss of generality, we only consider cooperative benefits resulting from cost savings, and not 
from premium sale prices. It is significant to mention that a different formulation of the 
theoretical model would not alter the results of the analysis, since the magnitude of the 
cooperative benefits is the determining factor for the farmer’s participation decision and not the 
origin of the benefits.   
As indicated previously, being a member of a cooperative does not only bring along advantages, 
but also a number of obligations. These may include paying an annual fixed fee, following a 
stricter and more expensive production protocol, as well as being subjected to frequent 
contacts/controls in order to ensure that members meet the quality standards laid down by the 
cooperative.4 The population of farmers is heterogeneous and the farmer’s household and farm-
level characteristics,  , follow a distribution function ( )  . We consider that farmers whose 
value of   is below a threshold j incur lower production costs, if they are members of the 
cooperative. Beyond this limit value, we assume that the potential of the farmer’s net returns is 
so high that being a member of a cooperative does not lead to any reduction in the costs of 
production, i.e., for 
j   we have     ; ; ,j jCO C      and for j   we have  
   ; ;j jCO C    . Based on the introduced notation, the net returns function for low and 
high quality production is given by: 
       ; ; 1 ;j j j jP Y CO C            (2.1) 
As an illustration, we present the evolution of the returns and cost functions  ; ,H jP Y 
   ;  and ;j jC CO     with changes in  𝜃 in Figure 1. It is assumed that both types of cost 
functions are linear in ( )O t  and ( )M t , so that ,j jO OC CO  and ,
j j
M MC CO  depend exclusively on
 . Without loss of generality, we focus our analysis on the production of high quality products 
                                                          
4 The obligations of cooperative members in developing countries including China may be different from that in 
Western countries. For instance, in the United States, cooperative members are expected to contribute equity or 
risk capital in proportion to their patronage and are recipients of the surplus or residual claims in proportion to 
their patronage, and they must meet specific qualifications that are stated in the cooperatives’ bylaws (Gijselincks 
et al., 2014). 
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and base our graphical analysis on the specification of the cost functions, given by 
  ( ) ( )j j jC O t M t     with , 0    and 0   . The cost function of the 
members of the cooperative has the same mathematical structure but, as formulated above, its 
value is greater or lower than ( )jC  . Consequently, Figure 2.1 reflects the cost function of high 
quality producing cooperative members,  ;HCO   and the cost functions of low and high 
quality producing nonmembers;  ;LC   and  ;HC  , respectively. The analysis of the cases 
of low quality, or of qualities in between low and high is identical to the discussed case of high 
quality.  Figure 2.1 shows that low quality farmers with characteristics L   do not break 
even, and thus production of low quality is only profitable for nonmembers if L  . Similarly, 
Figure 2.1 also shows that high quality producing nonmembers only make profits if their 
individual characteristics are at least as high as H . For cooperative members, Figure 2.1 
demonstrates that they make profits if their characteristics are at least as high as 
H
C  . However, 
if the characteristics are higher than 
H
C  , cooperative members still make profits but less than 
nonmembers. It would therefore be optimal for farmers producing high quality to join the 
cooperative if their characteristics fall within the range of ,H HC C     . Within this range, the 
individual net returns of members are higher than those of nonmembers. The dotted area in 
Figure 2.1 indicates the share of the cooperative net returns that accrue to its members with 
characteristics ,H HC C      , while the striped area shows the net returns that are realized by 
all farmers independently whether they belong to the cooperative or not. It is important to note 
that the dotted area in Figure 2.1 does not illustrate the aggregate cooperative benefits because 
the density function    has not been specified so far and thus, the number of farmers with 
,H HC C       is not known. Given that the specification of the distribution function     does 
not provide any additional insights for the purposes of this study, we do not provide this 
specification here.5   
                                                          
5 If the total number of farmers was given by N , every farmer had a different  , and if the density function was 
given by 1 / N , the dotted area in Figure 2.1 would correspond approximately to the total aggregate cooperative 
benefits.   
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Drawing the returns and cost functions differently would yield distinct results. Depending on 
the location of the values , , ,L H H HC C     ,  situations could emerge where it is beneficial for 
none of the farmers, or for all the farmers to join the cooperative.  Thus, Figure 2.1 presents an 
intermediate case and is consistent with our empirical analysis, where we observe segmentation 
with respect to the decision to join or not to join.  
After analyzing the decision to join or not to join an existing cooperative, we now examine how 
cooperative membership impacts on investment in soil-improving and productivity-enhancing 
measures. For this purpose, it is significant to note that the continuous application of organic 
fertilizer or farmyard manure improves the soil quality over time, while the application of 
chemical fertilizer, considered as a static input, does not influence soil quality directly, but 
indirectly through the withdrawal of nutrient by crop harvest. Thus, we assume that the 
application of organic inputs improves soil quality by the factor 𝛼𝑂 and the harvest reduces soil 
quality by the factor 𝛼𝑌, with 𝛼𝑂 , 𝛼𝑌 > 0. Hence, the evolution of the soil quality over time can 
be represented by: 
Figure 2.1 Returns and cost for farmers of type   
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        , , ; O YS O t Y O t M t S t     , with   00S S  (2.2) 
where ?̇?  denotes the operator d dt  and 0S  is the given soil quality at time 0. To avoid 
additional notation, we assume that the soil quality is initially identical for all farmers. The 
parameter 
Y  represents the decrease in soil quality in proportion to the harvested output 
resulting from soil degradation in the absence of any soil-improving investment. 
It is assumed that farmers maximize their farm net returns over the planning horizon T . We 
assume that the present value of the soil quality at the end of the planning horizon is given by 
(T)(T, )eS   , where   represents the value of the intertemporal discount rate. The farmer’s 
decision problem with characteristics   is then given by: 
           
    
 *
, ,  
0 0 1
, , ; , ;
 J max
(1 ) , ;
H HT
t T
HO M
P Y O t M t S t CO O t M t
e dt S T e
C O t M t
 

  
   
 
  
  
     
  (2.3) 
subject to , 0O M   ,  0,1    , and  ;O YS O Y      , with   00, S S    
where the Lagrange multipliers 0  and 1  are associated with the lower and upper limit of the 
decision variable   and O , Y are as defined earlier. To simplify notation, we suppress the 
argument t  of the variables O , M , S , unless necessary for an unambiguous notation. 
Equation (2.3) indicates that households maximize the discounted farm net returns over the 
planning horizon. 
 The definition of the current value Hamiltonian of the farmer’s decision problem yields: 
   
 
0 1, , ; ( , ; ) 1 ( , ; )
( , , ; )
H H H
O Y
H P Y O M S CO O M C O M
O Y O M S
      
   
     
 
(2.4)  
The first-order conditions for an interior solution with respect to 𝑂, 𝑀 are given by: 
   1 0H H HO O O O O Y OH P Y CO C Y            (2.5) 
 1 0 H H HM M M M Y MH P Y CO C Y         (2.6) 
Chapter 2 The Role of Agricultural Cooperatives in Promoting Sustainable Soil Management 
Practices in Rural China 
29 
0 1 0 
H HH CO C           (2.7) 
  HS Y S SH Y P Y           (2.8) 
  0,   0O YS O Y S S       (2.9)   
The variable   is defined as a continuous variable in the interval  0,1 , but since the 
Hamiltonian (𝐻) is linear in  , the optimal value is given at the boundary of the domain of  . 
If the net returns are strictly positive, the maximization of 𝐻 requires choosing 1  , and if not, 
it is optimal to choose 0   . Hence, the possible solution is either to join, or not to join a 
cooperative. Finally, the transversality condition requires that     /TT dS T e dS  . The 
solution to equation (2.8), 𝜆(𝑡) which determines the shadow value of the soil quality at time t, 
is given as: 
 
 
    0
u
y S
t
T Y d
H
S
t
t e P Y u du T
   
 
 
     (2.10) 
Equation (2.9) indicates that the reduction in soil quality resulting from agricultural production 
can only be compensated by applying soil-improving measures such as organic inputs. The 
solution to equation (2.9) is given by: 
         0
0
,  
t
O YS t S O Y O M d          (2.11) 
As mentioned above the initial soil quality   0 0S S  is identical for all farmers, i.e., it is 
identical for both cooperative members and nonmembers. Let the steady state value of the soil 
quality be denoted by S . Given that soil quality is likely to evolve over time, we further 
assume that the soil quality (t)S  at a specific time 𝑡 is not identical for the two groups of 
farmers, due to different optimal investment behaviors in the long-run. Note that when the soil 
quality is above a threshold denoted by CS , the soil-improving measure O  and yield-enhancing 
measure M  are substitutes with respect to S . We consider that economically viable 
agricultural production requires that CS S , and therefore we assume that the variables O  and 
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M are substitutes, i.e.,  0MSY  , 0OSY  , for CS S . In this case, an increase in S  decreases the 
marginal productivity of O  and M . Given these assumptions, we now show graphically in 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 farmers’ short-run and long-run investment behavior determined by the 
first-order conditions in equations (2.5) and (2.6).    
 
As shown in Figure 2.2 (continuous lines), the solution to equation (2.5) demonstrates that the 
efficient level of organic inputs 
COO  applied by cooperative members will be higher than the 
efficient level by nonmembers, 
NCO . With respect to the optimal investment behavior of 
farmers in the long-run, we analyze it for the cases where 0 S S
   and 0 S S
 , where S  
denotes the value of the steady state equilibrium of soil quality. For the case of 0 S S
 , it is 
optimal for farmers to build up soil quality over time so that   0 S t S  . However, for, 0 S S
   
it is optimal to reduce soil quality so that   0 S t S   holds. Given the situation that farmers 
build up soil quality 0(t) SS  , an increase in (t)S  decreases the marginal productivity   OY t . 
Thus, the curve  H O O Y OP Y Y     shifts to the left as indicated by the discontinuous line 
in Figure 2.2. Therefore, it is optimal for farmers to reduce the level of organic inputs over time 
so that 
CO COO O   and  NC NCO O . For the case where it is optimal to reduce   S t , i.e.,
Figure 2.2 The optimal level of organic fertilizer applied by farmers with and 
without cooperative membership given the farm characteristics   and different 
level of soil quality 
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  0 S t S , a decrease in  S t  will decrease the marginal productivity   OY t . Thus, it is 
optimal for both cooperative members and nonmembers to increase the level of organic inputs. 
This case is not shown in Figure 2.2 in order to make the Figure more tractable.  
 
By solving equation (2.6), Figure 2.3 shows that it is more efficient for cooperative members 
and farmers with characteristics  ,  H HC C      to apply more chemical fertilizer, 𝑀
𝐶𝑂, than 
nonmembers, NCM . On the other hand, if the characteristics of nonmembers are fulfilled, i.e.,
 ,  H HC C     , it would be beneficial for farmers not to join cooperatives, and the applied 
amount of chemical fertilizer NCM  is below the amount of fertilizer applied by members. The 
qualitative attributes of the transitory behavior for the optimal level of chemical fertilizer are 
identical to the ones of organic inputs and can be obtained by the same arguments for an increase 
or decrease in (t)S  . However, for the same reason as in Figure 2.2, these cases are not shown 
in Figure 2.3.  
The theoretical analysis generally reveals that farmers whose household and farm-level 
characteristics fall within the range of  ,  H HC C      are better off joining the cooperative and 
investing in soil-improving measures than those whose characteristics do not fall within this 
Figure 2.3 The optimal level of mineral fertilizer applied by farmers with and 
without cooperative membership given the farm and household characteristics 
and the same level of soil quality 
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specified range. Thus, farmers may self-select into cooperatives depending on their 
characteristics.  
Our analytical results are consistent with the empirical results reported by Verhofstadt and 
Maertens (2014) who found a positive and significant impact of cooperative membership on 
the use of chemical fertilizer. However, to what extent this positive impact is due to changes in 
the household and farm-level characteristics  , and to what extent it is due to the cooperative 
membership, has received little attention in the previous literature. A change in the household 
and farm-level characteristics can be interpreted in different ways. One way would be to 
interpret them as completely immovable, so that an analysis of a change in   explains 
behavioral changes between farmers with different  . However, we do not follow this line of 
argument and consider the household and farm-level characteristics to a certain degree variable 
and interdependent. Obviously, some characteristics like education or the size of the farm will 
not vary with the outcome of the farmer’s decision to join or not to join a cooperative. However, 
other characteristics like access to credit, access to expertise or networking capabilities are 
likely to increase with a change in the characteristic of being a member of a cooperative. Thus, 
it is possible to interpret changes in the farmer’s characteristics with changes in the farmer’s 
input and investment decisions.   
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 have shown that the impact of the cooperative membership on the 
production intensity. We now show the impact of changes in the household and farm-level 
characteristics and its interaction with the cooperative membership. In order to disentangle the 
effects of the two underlying forces on the farmer’s investment behavior, we conduct a 
comparative static analysis. For this purpose, we consider the soil quality as given, in order to 
concentrate on the effect of an increase in   on the optimal amount of chemical fertilizer 
*( )M    and organic inputs *( )O  of the members of a cooperative. As detailed in the Appendix 
1, the calculations show that an increase in the household and farm-level characteristics may 
magnify, moderate or even reverse the intensification of the production intensity resulting from 
joining the cooperative. The precise results depend on the signs and magnitude of the changes 
in marginal productivity and in the marginal costs in relation to the cooperative benefits. The 
signs of MY   and  OY  and their magnitude cannot be determined on theoretical grounds. The 
index   encompasses a wide range of factors and depending on the particular situation of each 
farmer, different factors may be most influential for the determination of the value of  . Thus, 
if for some farmers, education or the size of the farm is most influential for the determination 
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of  , one can imagine that , ,I IY M O  is strictly positive, i.e.  and M O are complements with 
respect to  . On the other hand, if the soil quality is the most important factor for the calculation 
of the index, it seems reasonable to assume that  and M O are substitutes with respect to  , i.e., 
0, ,I IY M O   .  
Despite the indeterminacy with respect to the magnitude of  and IIY C  and the sign of IY  , the 
analysis in the Appendix 1 allows the identification of three situations that govern the farmers’ 
behavior with respect to production intensity and relate them with the cooperative membership 
effect. Yet, the relative importance of each of these three situations is important for policy 
analysis and can only be evaluated empirically, given a specific population of farmers located 
at a concrete region. The empirical part of the study addresses this issue. 
2.3 Empirical Specification 
As indicated in the theoretical model, the soil investment decision of the farmer is determined 
by the expected farm net returns. However, the expected farm net return is unobservable, since 
it is subjective. What is observed in the data is the farmer’s decision to invest or not to invest. 
Let 
*
ikR  represent the unobserved or latent variable, the observed variable ikR  can be used to 
represent a household’s decision to invest in soil-improving measures (R 1)ik  , or not to invest
(R 0)ik  . Following the maximization problem outlined in equation (2.3), the unobserved 
variable would be positive, if the conditions *J O   and *J M   are all positive. Moreover, 
equations (2.5) and (2.6) imply that the farmer’s decision to invest in organic inputs and 
chemical fertilizer is influenced by the choice of cooperative membership, as well as household 
and farm-level characteristics.  
It is worth mentioning here that the application of farmyard manure is not sufficient to maintain 
soil quality due to missing markets in most locations. Hence, farmers normally depend on 
investment in organic fertilizer, or combine farmyard manure with organic fertilizer to improve 
the soil quality. Although organic fertilizer and farmyard manure are considered together and 
denoted as (t)O  in the theoretical framework, the two inputs will be analyzed separately in the 
empirical analysis. Given that the main goal of the empirical analysis is to examine how 
cooperative membership i  and the household and farm-level characteristics i  influence the 
investment decisions of farmers, we express farmers’ investment decisions as a latent variable 
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function6: 
*
ik i i ikR      ， 1ikR    if 
* 0ikR    (2.12) 
where ikR  is a binary indicator variable which equals 1 if the household i  chooses to invest in 
a particular type of soil-improving and yield-enhancing measure (i.e. organic fertilizer (k 1) , 
farmyard manure (k 2) , and chemical fertilizer (k 3) ), if the expected farm net returns 
*(R )ik  to investment is positive, and 0 otherwise; i  is a dummy variable for the choice of 
cooperative membership;   and   are parameters to be estimated; and ik  is an error term 
assumed to be normally distributed. 
In line with our theoretical model, a household chooses to belong to a cooperative, if the 
expected farm net returns derived from cooperative membership 
*
1( )i  are greater than that 
derived from non-membership
*
0( )i . Households are then assumed to choose to join 
cooperatives if the difference in farm net return is positive, i.e. 
* * *
1 0 0i i i     .
7  However, 
*
i  cannot be directly observed, but can be expressed as a function of observed elements in the 
following latent variable function: 
*
i i iZ    , 1i   if 
* 0i     (2.13) 
where i  equals 1 if a household is a member of a cooperative, and 0 otherwise; iZ  represents 
a vector of factors that influence farmers’ decisions to choose to belong to a cooperative;   is 
the parameters to be estimated and i  is the error term assumed to be normally distributed and 
zero mean.  
If the same unobservable factors (e.g., farmers’ innate ability and motivation to improve soil 
quality by virtue of cooperative organization) influence both the error term ( )i  in the 
                                                          
6 It is significant to note that i , which is used to denote household and farm-level characteristics, is an index in 
the theoretical section, but a vector in the empirical specification.    
7 This is in line the with previous studies that have assumed that the farmer’s decision to choose to belong to a 
cooperative is based on a comparison between the utility derived from choosing cooperative membership and the 
utility derived from not choosing the membership (Abebaw and Haile 2013; Ito et al. 2012). 
Chapter 2 The Role of Agricultural Cooperatives in Promoting Sustainable Soil Management 
Practices in Rural China 
35 
cooperative membership choice equation and the one ( )ik  in the investment equation, 
selection bias occurs, resulting in a correlation of the two error terms in the two specifications, 
such that ( , )i icorr     . In this case, any standard regression technique such as probit or 
logit model applied to estimate equation (2.12) produces biased results when 0  . Thus, 
rigorous assessment of the effect of cooperative membership on investment decisions of 
farmers should take into account the endogeneity of the cooperative membership variable.  
Although endogenous switching probit (ESP) model suggested by Lokshin and Sajaia (2011) 
is an option to estimate the average treatment effects of cooperative membership on the 
probabilities of investing in soil investment measures to control for both observable and 
unobservable heterogeneities, it fails to estimate the marginal effects of cooperative 
membership and other controlling variables on investment measures. Given our interest in 
estimating both the marginal effects and average treatment effects of cooperative membership 
on investment in soil-improving and productivity-enhancing measures, this study employs a 
recursive bivariate probit (RBP) model as an empirical strategy (Vall Castello 2012; Lanfranchi 
and Pekovic 2014). The RBP model estimates the cooperative membership choice equation and 
the investment equation simultaneously, using full information maximum likelihood (FIML) 
approach.  
In estimating the RBP model, the variables in the vector i  in equation (2.12) and iZ  in 
equation (2.13) are allowed to overlap. However, to identify the bivariate probit, we need at 
least one exclusion restriction, i.e., an additional instrumental variable, that explains the 
probability of choosing to belong to a cooperative but that is not correlated with the outcome 
variabls. In this study, the presence of a cooperative in a farmer’s village of residence is used 
as an identifying instrument.8 As noted by Deng et al. (2010), one of the primary reasons for 
low cooperative membership rate in China is due to the absence of agricultural cooperatives in 
many villages. Thus, the presence of a cooperative in a village is justifiably related to the choice 
of cooperative membership, but should not influence the investment decisions of farmers.  
                                                          
8 In China, a farmer can choose to either join a cooperative in the village of residence, or join a cooperative in a 
different village, town or county. In this study, the randomly selected members either have the membership in 
village cooperatives or cooperatives in towns or counties. We expect that farmers are more likely to join a 
cooperative if a cooperative is present in the village of residence. 
Chapter 2 The Role of Agricultural Cooperatives in Promoting Sustainable Soil Management 
Practices in Rural China 
36 
We also estimate the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT), using the method proposed 
by Chiburis et al. (2011) to provide a better understanding of the causal effects of cooperative 
membership on the likelihood of investing in soil quality and yield-enhancing measures. The 
ATT is calculated using the following expression: 
 
1
1
Pr(Y 1) 1) Pr(Y 0 1)
N
ik i ik ii
ATT
N


 

         (2.14) 
where N  denotes the total sample for the treated; Pr(Y 1) 1)ik i   represents the predicted 
investment probability for cooperative members in an observed context, while 
Pr(Y 0) 1)ik i  represents the predicted probability that a farmer belonging to a cooperative 
(in a counterfactual context) will not invest.  
2.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics    
The data used in the analysis are from a household survey of apple farmers conducted in Gansu, 
Shaanxi and Shandong provinces in China between September and December 2013. We 
selected apple farmers in those provinces as the focus of our analysis for a number of reasons. 
First, although China produces around half of the world’s total apple output (FAOSTAT), the 
majority of apple orchards are primarily in the Bohai Gulf region (Shandong, Liaoning and 
Hubei provinces) and Northwest Loess Plateau region (Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan and Gansu 
provinces). In particular, more than half of the country’s apple orchards are located in Gansu 
(12.72%), Shaanxi (28.92%) and Shandong (12.53%) (CRSY 2013). Apple production plays 
an important role in determining smallholder farmers’ livelihood in the surveyed regions. 
Second, soil erosion and desertification are considered two of the most serious environmental 
degradation problems in China, which impact adversely on environmental sustainability and 
productivity of apple production. Soil erosion in China’s Loess Plateau region, including Gansu 
and Shaanxi, is cited as one of the most severely degraded areas in the world, with over 60% of 
its land subjected to soil degradation (Hou et al. 2014; Rozelle et al. 1997). Hence, facilitating 
investment in soil quality measures among smallholder apple farmers can help enhance apple 
productivity and promote rural economic growth in the long-run.  
Considering our interests in analyzing the impact of cooperative membership on apple farmers’ 
soil-improving and yield-enhancing investment decisions, we focus on cooperatives specialized 
in apple production and marketing in this study. These cooperatives are located either in farmers’ 
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village of residence or in other places (towns or counties), but they share similar attributes in 
helping members across different provinces. The cooperatives’ behaviors are regulated by the 
national law on Farmers’ Professional Cooperatives. In the surveyed regions, farmers are 
intensively producing apples on their cultivated land. Among other things,  the cooperatives 
assist members in orchard management approaches (e.g., pruning, branch drawing), efficient 
use of both organic and chemical fertilizers for sustainable soil management, efficient use of 
pesticides for pest management and apple quality control, and collectively purchasing inputs at 
reasonable prices. They also provide members with marketing information (e.g., prices, 
channels) with the aim of enhancing members’ participation in output markets.9  
A multistage sampling procedure was used to select 208 cooperative members and 273 
nonmembers. First, Gansu, Shaanxi and Shandong provinces were purposively selected due to 
the intensive apple production in these provinces. Second, we selected representative districts 
with significant apple output in each province. In particular, Jingning county in Gansu, 
Luochuan county in Shaanxi, and Qixia and Laiyang cities in Shandong were selected. Third, 
six agricultural cooperatives were randomly selected from these districts. Fourth, three villages 
affiliated to each cooperative in the selected district were randomly selected. Finally, around 
25-30 households including both cooperative members and nonmembers in each village were 
randomly selected. A structured questionnaire was used to collect information from households 
with and without cooperative membership, with specific purpose of interviewing household 
heads. The questionnaire covered a range of topics including socioeconomic and farm-level 
factors (e.g., age, education, household size and farm size), soil characteristics, financial 
situation (e.g., access to credit), as well as asset ownership (e.g., rotary cultivator and livestock).  
The dependent variable used in the analysis refers to the farmer’s choice of cooperative 
                                                          
9 Agricultural cooperatives in China usually provide members with both production and marketing services, 
although they do not fully supply inputs to members, or purchase members’ farm produce due to loose management 
structures. Moreover, they provide very little help with respect to credit facilities to its members (Deng et al. 2010).  
In comparison, cooperatives in the United States are classified by responsibility and function (marketing, supply, 
processing, bargaining and service) (Gijselincks et al., 2014). For instance, U.S. agricultural service cooperatives 
provide farmers with a wide variety of services including credit, utilities, insurance, irrigation and others, while 
agricultural marketing cooperatives emphasize the marketing of farm products supplied by their members. With 
respect to food production and marketing, members in the U.S. transact with a cooperative by buying materials 
and inputs or selling raw materials (Gijselincks et al. 2014). 
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membership, which takes the value of one, if a farmer had cooperative membership, and zero 
otherwise. The questionnaire also includes dichotomous dummy variables that indicate whether 
farmers apply any of the soil-improving and yield-enhancing measures such as organic fertilizer, 
farmyard manure and chemical fertilizer. Given that the focus of this study is to examine how 
cooperative membership influences farmers’ decisions to invest in cultivated land while 
controlling for other exogenous variables, we draw on the existing literature on cooperative 
membership to identify explanatory variables (Ito et al. 2012; Abebaw and Haile 2013; Bernard 
and Spielman 2009; Marenya and Barrett 2009; Chagwiza et al. 2016). Table 2.1 presents 
descriptive statistics for the selected variables. 
Table 2.1 Definition of variables and descriptive statistics   
Variable  Definition Mean (S.D.) 
Dependent variables 
Membership  1 if farmer is a cooperative member, 0 otherwise 0.43 (0.50) 
Organic fertilizer 1 if farmer applies organic fertilizer, 0 otherwise 0.84 (0.37) 
Farmyard manure 1 if farmer applies farmyard manure, 0 otherwise 0.28 (0.45) 
Chemical fertilizer 1 if farmer applies chemical fertilizer, 0 otherwise 0.93 (0.26) 
Organic material 1 if farmer applies organic fertilizer and/or farmyard 
manure, 0 otherwise 
0.87 (0.34) 
Organic fertilizer 
expenditure 
Expenditure on organic fertilizer (yuan/100/mu)a 5.53 (4.75) 
Chemical fertilizer 
expenditure 
Expenditure on chemical fertilizer (yuan/100/mu) 9.36 (5.81) 
Net returns Apple gross revenue minus variable costs 
(yuan/1,000/mu) 
7.54 (3.91) 
Independent variables 
Age  Age of farmer (years) 48.63 (10.25) 
Education  Years of formal education of farmer 7.60 (2.87) 
Household size  Total number of household members 4.33 (1.44) 
Farm size  Total farm size of apple orchard (mu) 5.07 (3.24) 
Farming vehicle 1 if farmer owns farming vehicle, 0 otherwise 0.92 (0.28) 
Rotary cultivator 1 if farmer owns rotary cultivator, 0 otherwise 0.53 (0.50) 
Access to credit  1 If farmer is not liquidity constrained, 0 otherwise 0.53 (0.50) 
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Sandy soil 1 if land has sandy soil, 0 otherwise 0.38 (0.49) 
Clay soil 1 if land has clay soil, 0 otherwise 0.45 (0.50) 
Loam soil 1 if land has loam soil, 0 otherwise 0.17 (0.37) 
Livestock 1 if farmer raises livestock, 0 otherwise 0.23 (0.42) 
Irrigation 1 if farmer has access to irrigation facilities, 0 
otherwise 
0.61 (0.49) 
Road condition  1 if farmer reports that road condition from orchards 
to village/market is good, 0 otherwise 
0.60 (0.49) 
Tree age Age of fruiting apple trees (years) 15.45 (6.56) 
Tenure security 1 if farmer perceives that land will be readjusted 
within five years, 0 otherwise 
0.48 (0.50) 
Shandong  1 if farmer resides in Shandong province, 0 otherwise 0.43 (0.50) 
Gansu  1 if farmer resides in Gansu province, 0 otherwise 0.17 (0.37) 
Shaanxi  1 if farmer resides in Shaanxi province, 0 otherwise 0.40 (0.49) 
Village cooperative 1 if there is a cooperative in farmer’s residing village, 
0 otherwise 
0.09 (0.28) 
Note: a 1 mu=1/15 hectare; 1$=6.14 yuan.  
Age and education are two important proxies for human capital. As noted by Schultz (1982), 
human capital increases people’s abilities to perceive, interpret and respond to new events. 
Previous studies have found that both age and education have positive impacts on farmers’ 
decisions to choose cooperative membership (Bernard and Spielman 2009; Chagwiza et al. 
2016). We expect similar influences of these variables on the likelihood of cooperative 
membership. Sufficient labor availability is required for participating in direct cooperative 
activities (Abebaw and Haile 2013), so we expect a positive link between household size and 
cooperative membership choice. Larger farm size contributes to lower average fixed costs of 
cooperative membership. Consistent with previous studies (Ito et al. 2012), farm size is 
expected to have a positive impact on cooperative membership.  
With regards to physical assets, transportation costs and household wealth, previous studies 
have shown that ownership of radio, ox, cattle, and farm equipment exerts positive impacts on 
the probability of cooperative membership (Bernard et al., 2008; Abebaw and Haile 2013). In 
this study, we use ownership of farming vehicle, rotary cultivator and livestock, and access to 
convenient road as proxy variables for ownership of physical assets, transportation costs and 
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household wealth, and expect similar positive impacts on cooperative membership choice. 
Although agricultural cooperatives can distribute technologies to farmers, the efficiency of 
technology use (e.g., absorption rate of fertilizer) depends on irrigation conditions. Thus, access 
to irrigation is expected to increase the probability of cooperative membership.  
With technical assistance of cooperatives for sustainable soil management, farmers may 
maintain or enhance crop productivity. Thus, cooperative membership may be correlated with 
soil quality of cultivated land. We include soil quality dummies in the analysis to account for 
soil conditions. In different plantation periods of apple trees, the requirements of orchard 
management technology may differ. Nevertheless, we expect that farmers cultivating fruiting 
young trees will be more likely to choose cooperative membership for the purpose of obtaining 
yield-enhancing technology. A number of studies have shown that land tenure security 
influences farmers’ decisions to invest in soil-improving measures (Gao et al, 2012; Rao et al. 
2016; Ma et al. 2013; Abdulai and Goetz 2014). We therefore expect a positive relationship 
between tenure security and investment in soil-improving measures. Finally, a set of location 
dummies are included to account for unobserved agro-climate and socioeconomic 
heterogeneities among the sample districts.  
It can be observed from the Table 2.1 that 43% of farmers had cooperative membership. Mean 
use rates for the soil-improving measure outcome variables range from 28% for farmyard 
manure to 84% for organic fertilizer, while the mean use rate for chemical fertilizer variable is 
93%. The average age of household head was almost 48.63 years, whereas the mean number of 
years of schooling was about 7.6 years. Farmers in the sample are smallholders with an average 
farm size of 5.07 mu. We also present in Table 2.4.A1 in Appendix 2 a comparison of the mean 
characteristics between cooperative members and nonmembers. The figures show that 
cooperative members tend to be more likely to invest in organic fertilizer and farmyard manure, 
and also obtained higher farm net returns than nonmembers. However, since cooperative 
membership was not randomly assigned to farmers, a rigorous assessment of the impact of 
cooperative membership on investment in soil-improving and yield-enhancing measures needs 
to account for possible selection bias that may arise from unobserved factors (e.g., Thuo et al. 
2014; Vall Castello 2012).  
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2.5 Results and Discussion 
The primary interest of this study is to investigate how cooperative membership and other 
household and farm level characteristics affect farmers’ decisions to invest in soil-improving 
and yield-enhancing measures. Before presenting the results for the Recursive Bivariate Probit 
(RBP) model, we will first present the estimates from a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit 
(SUBP) model and the goodness-of-fit test for the justification of the RBP model.  
2.5.1 Results for SUBP Estimates and Goodness-of-fit Test 
The main reason for estimating the SUBP model is to ascertain whether the decision to choose 
cooperative membership is correlated with the outcome variables through unobserved 
heterogeneities, and whether these two decisions are substitutes or complements (Thuo et al. 
2014; Amare et al. 2012). The SUBP model estimation requires that cooperative membership 
variable is left out in the investment equation. Results for three groups of model specifications 
are reported in Table 2.5.A2 in Appendix 2. The P-values for the null hypothesis that   in 
models 1-3 (three outcome variables) are all significantly different from zero, indicating that 
the unobserved heterogeneities of both decisions are correlated. These findings suggest that the 
probability that a farmer chooses to belong to a cooperative is related to the probability of 
investing in soil-improving and yield-enhancing measures through unobserved effects captured 
in the model’s error terms. That is, unobserved effects such as farmers’ innate abilities and 
motivations to improve soil quality are not captured by the data, but may have an indirect 
influence on farmers’ decisions to join a cooperative and invest in soil-improving and yield-
enhancing measures. Moreover, the sign for   is positive in Models 1 and 2, suggesting that 
cooperative membership and investment in organic fertilizer and farmyard manure are 
complementary decisions (Huth and Allee 2002; Thuo et al. 2014). By contrast, as pointed out 
by Thuo et al. (2014), the negative sign for  in Model 3 indicates that cooperative 
membership and investment in chemical fertilizer are substitutes in terms of decisions.  
Note that maximizing the joint density of the observed dependent variables in RBP model does 
not guarantee a good fit (Chiburis et al. 2012). We therefore run both Murphy's (2007) score 
test and Hosmer-Lemeshow's (1980) test, using the methods proposed by Chiburis et al. (2011) 
to check misspecification of the RBP model. In particular, the null hypothesis of the Murphy’s 
score test is that the error terms in equations (2.12) and (2.13) are bivariate standard joint normal, 
and the null hypothesis of the Hosmer-Lemeshow test is that the sample frequency of the 
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dependent variables is the same as the sample frequency of the fitted probabilities of 
observation subgroup. The results are presented in Table 2.6.A3 in the Appendix 2. The P-
values are all not significant at the 10% level in the three groups of model specifications, 
indicating that the null hypothesis of normality is not rejected, confirming the validity of the 
RBP model. 
2.5.2 Results for RBP Estimates 
The estimates of the determinants of cooperative membership and its impacts on soil-improving 
and yield-enhancing measures using RBP model are presented in Table 2.2.10 As indicated 
previously, the FIML approach jointly estimates the cooperative membership choice equation 
and three soil investment equations, respectively. The results for the three model specifications 
are presented in Table 2.2. The lower parts of Table 2.2 show that all estimated correlation 
coefficients 𝜌𝜀𝜇 in Models 1-3 are significantly different from zero, indicating the presence of 
selection bias arising from unobserved factors. In particular, the negative correlation 
coefficients 𝜌𝜀𝜇  indicate negative selection bias, suggesting that farmers having lower 
probabilities of investing in organic fertilizer, farmyard manure and chemical fertilizer are more 
likely to choose to belong to cooperatives. Moreover, the results of the Wald tests for 0   
in Models 1-3 are significantly different from zero, indicating that the null hypothesis that the 
cooperative membership variable is exogenous can be rejected. That is, farmers are jointly 
making decisions to choose to belong to a cooperative and investing in soil quality and yield-
enhancing measures.  
In the sections below, we first discuss the determinants of cooperative membership based on 
the first-stage estimates of the RBP model. The second-stage estimates of the RBP model that 
examine the impact of cooperative membership on farmers’ decisions to invest in organic 
fertilizer, farmyard manure and chemical fertilizer are then discussed. Finally, the estimates for 
the marginal effects and average treatment effects on the treated of cooperative membership are 
presented. 
                                                          
10 The estimates of multivariate probit model also show that the likelihood ratio test of the join significance of the 
correlation coefficients of error terms accept the null hypothesis that there is no correlation between the three 
investment specifications, suggesting it is more efficient to estimate the impact of cooperative membership on 
investment in organic fertilizer, farmyard manure and chemical fertilizer separately using RBP model. The results 
are presented in Table 2.7.A4 in Appendix 2. 
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Determinants of Cooperative Membership and Investment Decisions 
The results from the first-stage estimates of the RBP model, which show the determinants of 
farmers’ decisions to choose cooperative membership, are presented in the second, fourth and 
sixth columns in Table 2.2. Given that the variables having the same name show similar signs 
and significance levels in the three model specifications, we have chosen to discuss the results 
from the cooperative membership choice equations in Models 1-3 together. In the three 
specifications, the coefficients of the education variable are positive and significantly different 
from zero, suggesting that well-educated farmers are more likely to join cooperatives, a finding 
that is in line with the results reported by Bernard and Spielman (2009), who found that the 
probability of choosing cooperative membership is increased by 8% if the household head is 
literate. The household size variable is also positively and significantly associated with the 
choice of cooperative membership in all three models, indicating that larger households with 
more labor endowments are more likely to choose to belong to a cooperative.  
Consistent with the finding from Ito et al. (2012), farm size tends to increase the probability of 
being a cooperative member. Asset ownership such as having farming vehicle and rotary 
cultivator appears to increase the probability of joining cooperatives. The results in Table 2.2 
show that farmers’ decisions to choose cooperative membership are also related to soil quality. 
Specifically, farmers cultivating land on sandy soil and loam soil are more likely to be 
cooperative members. Road condition also appears to be an important determinant of 
cooperative membership choice. Tenure security appears to be an important determinant of 
cooperative membership. In particular, farmers who perceive that land will be adjusted within 
five years are less likely to choose cooperative membership. Relative to the reference province 
(Shaanxi), farmers living in Gansu are more likely to join cooperatives.  
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Table 2.2 The RBP model estimates for the impact of cooperative membership on investment in organic fertilizer, farmyard manure and chemical 
fertilizer 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 Membership Organic fertilizer  Membership Farmyard manure  Membership Chemical fertilizer 
Membership  1.550 (0.272)***  1.313 (0.398)***  0.378 (0.428) 
Age 0.08 (0.007) -0.002 (0.009) 0.011 (0.008) 0.002 (0.010) 0.010 (0.008) -0.027 (0.011)** 
Education 0.047 (0.026)* 0.002 (0.027) 0.051 (0.027)* 0.014 (0.032) 0.056 (0.028)** -0.056 (0.030)* 
Household size 0.105 (0.050)** -0.163 (0.059)*** 0.115 (0.052)** -0.119 (0.068)* 0.114 (0.053)** 0.023 (0.077) 
Farm size 0.099 (0.027)*** -0.057 (0.028)** 0.095 (0.026)*** 0.011 (0.033) 0.100 (0.026)*** 0.094 (0.045)** 
Farming vehicle 0.749 (0.263)*** 0.564 (0.295)* 0.755 (0.258)*** 0.596 (0.309)* 0.765 (0.269)*** 0.244 (0.373) 
Rotary cultivator 0.293 (0.130)** 0.467 (0.182)** 0.320 (0.131)** 0.522 (0.183)*** 0.307 (0.130)** 0.174 (0.209) 
Access to credit 0.169 (0.130) 0.380 (0.156)** 0.209 (0.129) 0.381 (0.175)** 0.221 (0.130)* 0.155 (0.177) 
Sandy soil 1.382 (0.373)*** 0.059 (0.390) 1.309 (0.362)*** -2.466 (0.457)*** 1.583 (0.420)*** 0.240 (0.428) 
Loam soil 0.374 (0.192)* 0.757 (0.299)** 0.387 (0.195)** 0.518 (0.221)** 0.437 (0.200)** 0.423 (0.313) 
Livestock 0.062 (0.191) 0.001 (0.226) 0.092 (0.193) 0.444 (0.224)** 0.124 (0.192) -0.371 (0.212)* 
Irrigation 0.192 (0.145) 0.378 (0.189)** 0.150 (0.146) 0.559 (0.225)** 0.164 (0.143) 0.317 (0.184)* 
Road condition 0.416 (0.154)*** 0.037 (0.174) 0.399 (0.159)** 0.192 (0.219) 0.417 (0.158)*** 0.227 (0.250) 
Tree age -0.017 (0.012) 0.017 (0.014) -0.016 (0.012) 0.025 (0.016) -0.015 (0.012) -0.001 (0.018) 
Tenure security -0.445 (0.143)*** 0.229 (0.161) -0.448 (0.146)*** 0.078 (0.187) -0.437 (0.145)*** 0.352 (0.218) 
Shandong -0.019 (0.406) -0.050 (0.397) 0.014 (0.408) 0.010 (0.395) -0.227 (0.443) -0.279 (0.484) 
Gansu 0.488 (0.268)* 0.087 (0.295) 0.501 (0.279)* 0.732 (0.335)** 0.466 (0.269)* -0.453 (0.339) 
Village cooperative 0.956 (0.237)***  0.974 (0.244)***  1.006 (0.241)***  
Constant -3.509 (0.565)*** -0.255 (0.731) -3.729 *** -2.751 (0.826)*** -3.822 (0.594)*** 1.835 (0.801)** 
𝜌𝜀𝜇 -0.763 (0.141)*** -0.530 (0.255)** -0.734 (0.155)*** 
Log-likelihood -424.197 -412.288 -360.022 
Wald test of 𝜌𝜀𝜇=0 8.886***, with Prob= 0.003 2.775*, with  Prob=0.096 7.731***, Prob = 0.005 
ATT 0.459 (0.187)** 0.225 (0.091)** 0.080 (0.116) 
Sample size 481 481 481 
Note: Asterisk *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The reference region is Shaanxi and the reference 
soil type is clay soil. ATT refers to average treatment effects on the treated, which is estimated by equation (2.14). 
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The results regarding the impacts of cooperative membership on investment in soil-improving 
measures are presented in the third and fifth columns in Table 2.2. The estimates show that 
cooperative membership has a positive and statistically significant impact on the probabilities 
of investing in organic fertilizer and farmyard manure.11 The other coefficient estimates in the 
third and fifth columns in Table 2.2 show that investments in organic fertilizer and farmyard 
manure are also affected by several other factors. The coefficients of the household size variable 
are negative and significantly different from zero in the organic fertilizer and farmyard manure 
specifications, suggesting that larger households are less likely to invest in soil quality measures. 
Although larger household size normally results in increased labor endowments, it could also 
result in reduced financial resources to purchase organic fertilizer and farmyard manure for soil 
improvement. Farmers cultivating larger farms appear to be less likely to invest in organic 
fertilizer. This is possible, because as farm size increases, it becomes less feasible for farmers 
to meet the organic fertilizer requirement of the land (Abdulai et al., 2011). The asset ownership 
such as farming vehicle and rotary cultivator tends to increase the probabilities of investing in 
soil-improving measures. The variable for access to credit is positive and significantly different 
from zero in the soil quality outcome equations, suggesting that farmers who are not liquidity 
constrained are more likely to invest in organic fertilizer and farmyard manure. Sufficient credit 
enables farmers to purchase organic fertilizer from the markets and farmyard manure from 
livestock farms.  
The soil variables appear to have differential impacts on the probabilities of investing in soil-
improving measures. In particular, the variable for sandy soil has a negative and significant 
impact on the probability of investing in farmyard manure, while the variable for loam soil has 
positive and significant impacts on the likelihood of investing in both organic fertilizer and 
farmyard manure. These findings probably suggest that farmers tend to invest more in fertile 
soils such as loam soils, and less in sandy soils. Access to irrigation facilities tends to have 
significant and positive effects on investment in organic fertilizer and farmyard manure. Raising 
livestock tends to increase the likelihood of investing in farmyard manure. There is a well-
functioning manure market in the surveyed areas, such that farmers are able to buy and sell 
                                                          
11 Given that organic fertilizer and farmyard manure are substitutes with respect to soil management practices, we 
also estimated a specification that combined both into one variable. The results are presented in Table 2.8.A5 in 
the Appendix 2, and show that cooperative membership has a positive and significant impact on the probability of 
investing in organic material. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this to us. 
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manure from the markets. Hence, possessing livestock is not a sufficient condition for 
investment in manure (Abdulai and Goetz 2014). The results also reveal that location fixed 
effects may be significant in explaining differences in investment decisions of farmers. In 
particular, farmers located in Gansu appear to be more likely to invest in in farmyard manure.  
The estimates of the impact of cooperative membership on investment in chemical fertilizer are 
presented in the last column of Table 2.2. The results show that cooperative membership has a 
positive but insignificant impact on the probability of investing in chemical fertilizer. Among 
other factors that influence chemical fertilizer investment, the variable representing age is 
negative and significantly different from zero, suggesting that older farmers are less likely to 
invest in chemical fertilizer, a finding that is consistent with the results of Marenya and Barrett 
(2009) for Kenya. Education variable is also negative and significantly different from zero, 
indicating that more educated farmers are less likely to invest in chemical fertilizer, a finding 
that contrasts with the results reported by Asfaw and Admassie (2004) for Ethiopia. However, 
the negative relationship between education and investment in chemical fertilizer is not 
implausible in our case, given the fact that some surveyed cooperatives are involved in food 
safety practices. Thus, it is possible that educated farmers who aim at increasing their market 
sales through improved product quality are more likely to be food safety oriented cooperative 
members, resulting in a lower probability of investing in chemical fertilizer. The farm size 
variable is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that farmers having larger farms are 
more likely to invest in yield-enhancing measures such as chemical fertilizer. This is probably 
because larger farm size represents wealth, such that wealthier farmers can better afford 
chemical fertilizers. The negative coefficient of livestock variable suggests that farmers raising 
livestock are less likely to invest in chemical fertilizer, while access to irrigation facilities tends 
to increase the likelihood of investing in chemical fertilizer.  
Given the high application rates of both organic fertilizer and chemical fertilizer, we also 
analyzed the impact of cooperative membership on expenditures on organic fertilizer and 
chemical fertilizer using a Tobit model.12 We employ a two-stage residual inclusive (2SRI) 
approach suggested by Rivers and Vuong (1988) to address the endogeneity of cooperative 
membership. In the first-stage of 2SRI, the cooperative membership variable is specified as a 
function of all other explanatory variables including the instrumental variable used in the RBP 
                                                          
12 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this to us. 
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model. In the second-stage regression, the residual predicted from the first-stage estimation is 
included as an additional regression in the expenditure equation. The results, which are 
presented in Table 2.9.A6 in the Appendix 2, show that cooperative membership does not 
significantly affect expenditures on organic and chemical fertilizer.  
Marginal Effects and Average Treatment Effects 
Given that the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables in Table 2.2 cannot be directly 
interpreted, we calculate the marginal effects to provide a better understanding about the 
magnitudes of the coefficients. We are particularly interested in the marginal effects of variables 
that influence farmers’ soil investment decisions, so the marginal effects from first-stage 
estimation of RBP model are not presented for the sake of brevity. The results are presented in 
Table 2.3. The estimates of marginal effects reveal that being a cooperative member increases 
the probabilities of investing in organic fertilizer by 31.4% and farmyard manure by 29.5%, 
respectively. Among other variables, the results show that farmers with larger household size 
are 3.6% and 2.4% less likely to invest in organic fertilizer and farmyard manure, respectively. 
Farmers with access to credit are 8.5% and 7.6% more likely to invest in organic fertilizer and 
farmyard manure, respectively. Moreover, farmers cultivating land with sandy soil are 40.9% 
less likely to invest in farmyard manure. Access to irrigation increases the probabilities of 
investing in organic fertilizer, farmyard manure and chemical fertilizer by 8.7%, 10.5% and 
3.8%, respectively.  
With respect to the theoretical part of this study it is significant to mention that the marginal 
effects of the empirical study represent average values of the 𝜃 discussed in the theoretical 
section. In light of this interpretation, the results of the empirical analysis support the theoretical 
findings that cooperative membership tends to favor investment in yield-enhancing and soil 
improving measures.  
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Table 2.3 Marginal effects of RBP model estimation on the marginal probability of 
investing in organic fertilizer, farmyard manure and chemical fertilizer (in %) 
Variables Organic fertilizer Farmyard manure Chemical fertilizer 
Membership 0.314*** 0.295*** 0.042 
Age -0.0004 0.0004 -0.003** 
Education 0.0004 0.003 -0.006* 
Household size -0.036*** -0.024* 0.003 
Farm size -0.013** 0.002 0.011** 
Farming vehicle 0.156* 0.088* 0.032 
Rotary cultivator 0.105** 0.103*** 0.020 
Access to credit 0.085** 0.076** 0.018 
Sandy soil 0.013 -0.409*** 0.026 
Loam soil 0.126** 0.126** 0.039 
Livestock 0.0001 0.102** -0.049* 
Irrigation 0.087** 0.105** 0.038* 
Road condition 0.008 0.038 0.027 
Tree age 0.004 0.005 -0.0001 
Tenure security 0.051 0.016 0.040 
Shandong -0.011 0.002 -0.033 
Gansu 0.019 0.190** -0.065 
Sample size 481 481 481 
Note: Asterisk *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The reference region 
is Shaanxi and the reference soil type is clay soil. 
To the extent that marginal effects only estimate partial effects of cooperative membership on 
investment in soil-improving and yield-enhancing measures in the case of changing cooperative 
membership variable from zero to one, we also follow Chiburis et al. (2011) to estimate the 
ATT to provide a better and more comprehensive understanding of the effects of cooperative 
membership on investment decisions of smallholder farmers. As suggested by Chiburis et al. 
(2011), we used 199 bootstrap replications in each of our simulations to reduce sampling noise. 
Unlike the mean differences presented in Table 2.4.A1 in the Appendix 2, these ATT estimates 
account for selection bias arising from the fact that members and nonmembers are 
systematically different in terms of both observed and unobserved characteristics. The results 
are presented in the lower part of Table 2.2. Our findings show that the causal effect of 
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cooperative membership was to significantly increase the probabilities of investing in organic 
fertilizer by 45.9% and farmyard manure by 22.5%. However, no statistically significant impact 
was found for cooperative membership on investment in chemical fertilizer. Although the RBP 
model estimation reveals some differences in the magnitudes of the marginal effects and 
average treatment effects of cooperative membership, both reveal highly positive and 
statistically significant impacts. As pointed out by Lanfranchi and Pekovic (2014), these 
differences are expected, since they are calculated based on two different evaluation parameters. 
In particular, the marginal effect shows how the probability of investing in a particular soil 
quality measure changes as the cooperative membership variable changes from zero to one, 
while ATT measures the causal effect of cooperative membership on the investment probability. 
2.6 Conclusion  
Although agricultural cooperative is considered to be an important institutional arrangement 
that enhances agricultural production and marketing, empirical evidence on the link between 
cooperative membership and adoption of agricultural technologies is quite scarce in the 
literature. To bridge this gap, this article contributes to the literature by examining the impact 
of cooperative membership on investment in soil-improving and yield-enhancing measures 
such as organic fertilizer, farmyard manure and chemical fertilizer. Specifically, we developed 
a dynamic model to show how cooperative membership and household and farm-level 
characteristics impact on farmers’ decisions to invest in soil-improving and yield-enhancing 
measures. We then used survey data from apple producing households in Gansu, Shaanxi and 
Shandong provinces in China to examine the impact of cooperative membership and household 
and farm-level variables on investment in these soil-improving and productivity-enhancing 
measures. A recursive bivariate probit model was used to address the issue of selection bias that 
arises from both observed and unobserved heterogeneities.  
The theoretical analysis provides a model that illustrates the influence of household and farm-
level characteristics on a farmer’s decision to join or not to join an agricultural open-
membership cooperative. Moreover, it identifies two situations where farmers with cooperative 
membership are more likely to invest in soil-improving and yield-enhancing measures than 
those without membership. Finally, the theoretical analysis characterizes a third situation where 
members of a cooperative are less likely to invest in yield-enhancing and soil-improving 
measures than nonmembers. The econometric estimates revealed that a number of factors tend 
to drive farmers’ decisions to join contemporary agricultural cooperatives, including education, 
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household size, farm size, asset ownership such as farming vehicle and rotary cultivator, and 
road condition. With respect to the investment decisions, our findings showed that cooperative 
membership tend to positively and significantly impact on investment in organic fertilizer and 
farmyard manure, but no statistically significant impact on investment in chemical fertilizer. 
Furthermore, access to credit was found to increase the propensity to invest in soil quality 
measures. 
Our findings generally confirm the significant role of agricultural cooperatives in facilitating 
adoption of soil-improving measures among smallholder farmers, which actually enhance 
environmental sustainability and agricultural productivity. This suggests that the government 
should step up its efforts to encourage smallholder farmers to join cooperatives. In addition to 
building up farmers’ apple production capacities with sustainable input use, agricultural 
cooperatives can also enhance farmers’ access to inputs and output markets by reducing 
transaction costs involved. Therefore, enhancing the development of agricultural cooperatives 
is of great importance in promoting rural development and poverty alleviation policies. 
Moreover, given the crucial role of access to credit and irrigation facilities in facilitating 
investment in soil quality measures, it is apparent that policies that improve farmers’ access to 
credit and accelerate the development of rural infrastructure such as irrigation system would 
help enhance investment in soil-improving measures, and contribute to sustainable agriculture. 
Despite the interesting theoretical and empirical findings, the study still has some limitations, 
which could be considered in future research in the area. While we found that agricultural 
cooperatives increase the probabilities of investing in organic fertilizer and farmyard manure, 
little is known on whether cooperative members are more cost and profit efficient than 
nonmembers with respect to agricultural technology adoption. In addition, it is still not clear 
how agricultural cooperatives influence the soil investment decisions of farmers cultivating 
other products, since this study focuses on apple farmers in China due to a limited survey budget.  
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Appendix 1 
Comparative static analysis: 
We start out by determining the determinant of the Hessian Matrix H  of the first-order 
conditions (5) and (6) that is given by13: 
( ) 0
0
0 ( )
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   (2.15) 
where the positive sign is the result of the previous assumptions that the production function 𝑌 
is strictly concave and additive separable in 𝑀 and 𝑂. Application of Cramer’s rule yields: 
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To analyze equations (2.16) and (2.17) in more depth we need to determine the signs of: 
 
 
 0
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O Y O O
M Y M M
H P Y CO
H P Y CO
  
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
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  
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    (2.18) 
The indeterminacy of the signs of the equations (2.16), (2.17) and (2.18) results from the fact 
that the sign of , ,IY I M O   cannot be determined unambiguously.  Depending on the sign of 
IY   and the magnitude of IY  and ICO  , we can isolate three situations which are depicted in 
Figure 2.4.A1 which is based on equation (2.18) . In order to simply notation but without loss 
of generality we concentrate on the case of mineral fertilizer. Let us assume that the index 
increases from 1  to 2 . The first case considers an increase in 0MY   . Hence, an increase in 
                                                          
13 Without loss of generality we suppress the superscript H (high quality) of the equations (2.5) and (2.6) in order 
to simplify notation.  
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  shifts the function    1,Y MP Y    to the right so that it is given by
   2, ,with 0Y M MP Y Y    . Likewise the cost function  1,MCO   shifts downward so 
that the new cost function is given by  2,MCO  . As a result of these two shifts, the optimal 
amount of fertilizer increases from 
1
COM  to 
2
COM . The second case considers an decrease in 
0MY   . Hence, an increase in   shifts the function    1,Y MP Y    to the left so that it is 
given by    2, ,with 0Y M MP Y Y    . Provided that the cost function  1,MCO   shifted 
downward and were given by  2,MCO  , then it would be optimal to increase the optimal 
amount of fertilizer from 
1
COM  to 
3
COM . For the third case we consider the situation where the 
cost function  1,MCO   shifted downward but only up to  2,MCO  , then it would be optimal 
to decrease the optimal amount of fertilizer from 
1
COM  to 
4
COM . Apart from the three cases, 
Figure 2.4.A1 also show the increase in input use as a result of the cooperative membership. It 
is driven by the reduction of the costs from  1,MC   to  1,MCO   which in turn leads to an 
increase in mineral fertilizer from 
1
NC
M  to 1
CO
M . According to Figure 2.4.A1, this increase can 
be magnified (case 1 or 2) or moderated (case 3). The case where the increase from  
1
NC
M to  
1
CO
M  as a result of the cooperative membership is more than offset by the decrease in mineral 
fertilizer as a result of an increase in   is not shown in Figure 2.4.A1 in order to keep it 
trackable. As presented in the main text, the previous discussion can be summarized in the 
following way: 
*
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Summarized briefly, these results show that it is optimal for famers to increase the use of 
inputs/investment if the farmer’s characteristics reinforce the marginal productivity with 
respect to M  and O , i.e., 0IY   . Since an increase in   leads to a reduction in 
Chapter 2 The Role of Agricultural Cooperatives in Promoting Sustainable Soil Management 
Practices in Rural China 
53 
, ,jICO I M O  and to an increase in , ,
j
IY I M O , it is unambiguously optimal to intensify 
production. On the other hand, if the decrease in the marginal productivity is in absolute terms 
less than the decrease in the costs, it is optimal for farmers to produce only slightly more 
intensively. However, if the farmer’s characteristics moderate the marginal productivity with 
respect to M and O , i.e., 0IY   , and the decrease in the marginal productivity is in absolute 
terms greater than the decrease in the costs, then it is optimal for farmers to produce less 
intensively.  
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Figure 2.4.A1 The optimal level of mineral fertilizer applied by farmers that 
are cooperative members given an increase in the characteristics from 1   to
2 , with 2 1    
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Appendix 2 
Table 2.4.A1 Mean differences in characteristics between cooperative members and 
nonmembers 
Variables  Members (208) Nonmembers (273) Diff. 
Age  48.45 (0.66) 48.77 (0.66) -0.326 
Education  8.05 (0.17) 7.27 (0.19) 0.781*** 
Household size  4.57 (0.10) 4.14 (0.08) 0.433*** 
Farm size  5.51 (0.24) 4.73 (0.18) 0.778*** 
Farming vehicle 0.96 (0.01) 0.88 (0.02) 0.079*** 
Rotary cultivator 0.63 (0.03) 0.46 (0.03) 0.177*** 
Access to credit  0.57 (0.03) 0.51 (0.03) 0.067 
Sandy soil 0.44 (0.03) 0.34 (0.03) 0.093*** 
Loam soil 0.20 (0.03) 0.15 (0.02) 0.051 
Livestock 0.27 (0.03) 0.20 (0.02) 0.068* 
Irrigation 0.64 (0.03) 0.59 (0.03) 0.058 
Road condition 0.70 (0.03) 0.52 (0.03) 0.185*** 
Tree age 14.96 (0.46) 15.83 (0.39) -0.871 
Tenure security 0.41 (0.03) 0.53 (0.03) -0.126*** 
Shandong  0.45 (0.03) 0.41 (0.03) 0.042 
Gansu 0.20 (0.03) 0.14 (0.02) 0.063* 
Village cooperative 0.14 (0.02) 0.04 (0.01) 0.095*** 
Organic fertilizer 0.92 (0.02) 0.78 (0.03) 0.147*** 
Farmyard manure 0.38 (0.03) 0.21 (0.02) 0.175*** 
Chemical fertilizer 0.89 (0.02) 0.96 (0.01) -0.062*** 
Organic material 0.94 (0.02) 0.82 (0.02) 0.117*** 
Organic fertilizer expenditure 6.60 (0.32) 4.71 (0.29) 1.897*** 
Chemical fertilizer expenditure 8.81 (0.40) 9.79 (0.35) -0.976* 
Net returns 8.65 (0.30) 6.69 (0.20) 1.963*** 
Note: Asterisks * and *** denote significance at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
Chapter 2 The Role of Agricultural Cooperatives in Promoting Sustainable Soil Management Practices in Rural China 
56 
Table 2.5.A2 Estimation results of SUBP model for joint decisions of cooperative membership and soil investments  
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Variables Membership Organic fertilizer  Membership Farmyard manure  Membership Chemical fertilizer 
Age 0.010 (0.008) 0.004 (0.010) 0.009 (0.008) 0.004 (0.010) 0.010 (0.008) -0.028 (0.012)** 
Education 0.054 (0.027)** 0.025 (0.031) 0.052 (0.027)* 0.035 (0.033) 0.055 (0.028)** -0.053 (0.032)* 
Household size 0.109 (0.053)** -0.132 (0.068)* 0.106 (0.052)** -0.078 (0.072) 0.111 (0.0525)** 0.038 (0.080) 
Farm size 0.098 (0.026)*** -0.008 (0.032) 0.098 (0.027)*** 0.054 (0.030)* 0.099 (0.026)*** 0.113 (0.052)** 
Farming vehicle 0.775 (0.255)*** 1.022 (0.296)*** 0.777 (0.258)*** 0.949 (0.286)*** 0.782 (0.263)*** 0.369 (0.320) 
Rotary cultivator 0.309 (0.130)** 0.739 (0.167)*** 0.307 (0.130)** 0.699 (0.173)*** 0.308 (0.130)** 0.240 (0.202) 
Access to credit 0.215 (0.130)* 0.561 (0.165)*** 0.208 (0.130) 0.497 (0.171)*** 0.215 (0.129)* 0.189 (0.185) 
Sandy soil 1.312 (0.365)*** 0.739 (0.366)** 1.330 (0.367)*** -2.097 (0.472)*** 1.520 (0.392)*** 0.428 (0.378) 
Loam soil 0.411 (0.193)** 1.083 (0.299)*** 0.410 (0.193)** 0.732 (0.205)*** 0.423 (0.195)** 0.504 (0.348) 
Livestock 0.121 (0.193) 0.086 (0.256) 0.127 (0.192) 0.532 (0.227)** 0.126 (0.192) -0.380 (0.226)* 
Irrigation 0.142 (0.144) 0.557 (0.185)*** 0.167 (0.145) 0.633 (0.216)*** 0.164 (0.144) 0.362 (0.196)*  
Road condition 0.403 (0.159)** 0.283 (0.185) 0.411 (0.158)*** 0.398 (0.210)* 0.416 (0.159)*** 0.306 (0.243) 
Tree age -0.014 (0.012) 0.016 (0.015) -0.014 (0.012) 0.027 (0.016)* -0.016 (0.012) -0.003 (0.018) 
Tenure security -0.450 (0.146)*** 0.001 (0.174) -0.452 (0.147)*** -0.131 (0.184) -0.441 (0.145)*** 0.326 (0.230) 
Shandong 0.0002 (0.405) -0.004 (0.442) -0.018 (0.402) -0.032 (0.417) -0.172 (0.423) -0.312 (0.491) 
Gansu 0.490 (0.272)* 0.404 (0.324) 0.469 (0.269)* 0.963 (0.327)*** 0.472 (0.271)* -0.440 (0.362) 
Village cooperative 0.888 (0.243)***  0.846 (0.239)***  0.997 (0.242)***  
Constant -3.734 (0.581)*** -1.428 (0.721)** -3.684 (0.578)*** -3.706 (0.745)*** -3.790 (0.587)*** 1.713 (0.878)* 
𝜌𝜀𝜇
′  0.208 (0.110)* 0.257 (0.110)** -0.581 (0.090)*** 
Log-likelihood -427.230 -414.937 -360.259 
Wald test: 𝜌𝜀𝜇
′ =0 3.395*, with Prob=0.065 5.042***, with  Prob =0.005 24.077***, Prob=0.000 
Sample size 481 481 481 
Note: Asterisk *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The reference region is Shaanxi and the reference 
soil type is clay soil. 
Chapter 2 The Role of Agricultural Cooperatives in Promoting Sustainable Soil Management 
Practices in Rural China 
57 
Table 2.6.A3 Goodness-of-fit tests for RBP model 
Groups Murphy's score test Hosmer-Lemeshow test 
Membership and organic fertilizer use chi2(9) =11.52 with 
Prob > chi2 =0.2419 
chi2(9) =29.22 with 
Prob > chi2 =0.1089 
Membership and farmyard manure use chi2(9) =2.64 with 
Prob > chi2 =0.9767 
chi2(9) =12.57 with 
Prob > chi2 =0.9229 
Membership and chemical fertilizer use chi2(9) =5.59 with 
Prob > chi2 =0.7804 
chi2(9) =20.11 with 
Prob > chi2 =0.5146 
Membership and organic material use chi2(9) =14.53 with 
Prob > chi2 =0.1048 
chi2(9) =17.95 with 
Prob > chi2 =0.6521 
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Table 2.7.A4 Multivariate probit estimates for determinants of soil investments 
Variables Organic fertilizer Farmyard manure Chemical fertilizer 
Membership 0.404 (0.183)** 0.531 (0.189)*** -0.989 (0.232)*** 
Age 0.003 (0.010) 0.002 (0.010) -0.028 (0.013)** 
Education 0.021 (0.031) 0.026 (0.033) -0.043 (0.034) 
Household size -0.149 (0.069)** -0.103 (0.072) 0.070 (0.086) 
Farm size -0.022 (0.032) 0.040 (0.031) 0.152 (0.054)*** 
Farming vehicle 0.958 (0.297)*** 0.846 (0.300)*** 0.623 (0.343)* 
Rotary cultivator 0.714 (0.170)*** 0.655 (0.177)*** 0.362 (0.221) 
Access to credit 0.550 (0.166)*** 0.472 (0.173)*** 0.274 (0.192) 
Sandy soil 0.605 (0.380) -2.344 (0.480)*** 0.829 (0.390)** 
Loam soil 1.041 (0.300)*** 0.681 (0.210)*** 0.619 (0.364)* 
Livestock 0.064 (0.257) 0.496 (0.231)** -0.358 (0.243) 
Irrigation 0.538 (0.189)*** 0.626 (0.221)*** 0.443 (0.215)** 
Road condition 0.238 (0.187) 0.340 (0.213) 0.505 (0.267)* 
Tree age 0.018 (0.0151) 0.029 (0.016)* -0.009 (0.020) 
Tenure security 0.054 (0.178) -0.056 (0.185) 0.208 (0.248) 
Shandong -0.022 (0.443) -0.021 (0.420) -0.376 (0.495) 
Gansu 0.354 (0.320) 0.925(0.333)*** -0.404 (0.393) 
Constant -1.205 (0.742) -3.393 (0.767)*** 1.331 (0.931) 
Cross-equation correlations  
𝜌𝑂𝐹 -0.082 (0.110) 
𝜌𝑂𝐶 -0.068 (0.137) 
𝜌𝐹𝐶  0.005 (0.127) 
Log-likelihood -398.256 
Likelihood ratio test: 
𝜌𝑂𝐹 = 𝜌𝑂𝐶 = 𝜌𝐹𝐶 = 0 
0.669,  with Prob=0.881 
Sample size 481 481 481 
Note: Asterisk *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The reference region 
is Shaanxi and the reference soil type is clay soil. 
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Table 2.8.A5 The RBP model estimates for the impact of cooperative membership on 
organic material 
Variables Membership Organic Material 
Membership  1.551 (0.278)*** 
Age 0.008 (0.007) 0.003 (0.009) 
Education 0.045 (0.026)* 0.035 (0.029) 
Household size 0.107 (0.050)** -0.204 (0.062)*** 
Farm size 0.102 (0.026)*** -0.063 (0.029)** 
Farming vehicle 0.735 (0.261)*** 0.749 (0.314)** 
Rotary cultivator 0.300 (0.129)** 0.455 (0.189)** 
Access to credit 0.170 (0.128) 0.432 (0.165)*** 
Sandy soil 1.320 (0.368)*** -0.284 (0.411) 
Loam soil 0.344 (0.197)* 0.401 (0.317) 
Livestock 0.015 (0.202) 0.109 (0.268) 
Irrigation 0.200 (0.145) 0.561 (0.210)*** 
Road condition 0.414 (0.153)*** 0.121 (0.182) 
Tree age -0.018 (0.012) 0.020 (0.015) 
Tenure security -0.443 (0.143)*** 0.120 (0.168) 
Shandong 0.065 (0.408) 0.032 (0.420) 
Gansu 0.523 (0.272)* 0.362 (0.323) 
Village cooperative 0.992 (0.233)***  
Constant -3.487 (0.573)*** -0.652 (0.815) 
𝜌𝜀𝜇 -0.830 (0.118)*** 
Log-likelihood -396.347 
Wald test of 𝜌𝜀𝜇=0 9.887***, with Prob= 0.002 
ATT 0.456 (0.142)*** 
Sample size 481 
Note: Asterisk *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. The reference region is Shaanxi and the reference soil type is clay soil. ATT refers to average 
treatment effects on the treated, which is estimated by equation (14). 
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Table 2.9.A6 Tobit model estimation of impact of cooperative membership on 
expenditures of organic fertilizer and chemical fertilizer  
Variables 
Organic fertilizer 
expenditure 
Chemical fertilizer 
expenditure 
Membership 0.151 (0.217) -0.184 (0.175) 
Age 0.007 (0.003)* 0.006 (0.003)** 
Education 0.013 (0.012) -0.008 (0.010) 
Household size -0.007 (0.027) 0.016 (0.020) 
Farm size -0.040 (0.015)*** -0.012 (0.012) 
Farming vehicle -0.030 (0.130) 0.163 (0.107) 
Rotary cultivator 0.094 (0.061) 0.131 (0.051)** 
Access to credit 0.010 (0.065) -0.025 (0.054) 
Sandy soil 0.306 (0.167)* 0.257 (0.163) 
Loam soil 0.233 (0.118)** -0.039 (0.078) 
Livestock 0.094 (0.091) 0.127 (0.067)* 
Irrigation -0.143 (0.0662)** 0.121 (0.056)** 
Road condition 0.133 (0.086) 0.130 (0.065)** 
Tree age -0.005 (0.005) 0.003 (0.005) 
Tenure security 0.090 (0.059) 0.082 (0.052) 
Shandong 0.290 (0.175)* -0.756 (0.174)*** 
Gansu -0.080 (0.127) -0.450 (0.100)*** 
Residual (membership) 0.029 (0.100) 0.063 (0.079) 
Constant 5.682 (0.278)*** 6.423 (0.236)*** 
Sigma 0.554 (0.023)*** 0.483 (0.017)*** 
Sample size 481 481 
Note: Asterisk *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
The reference region is Shaanxi and the reference soil type is clay soil. 
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Abstract  
Despite widespread evidence of health and environmental benefits associated with integrated 
pest management (IPM) technology, the adoption rate of this technology remains significantly 
low. Using survey data from a sample of 481 apple households, this paper employs an 
endogenous switching probit model that accounts for selectivity bias to analyze the impact of 
agricultural cooperative membership on farmers’ decisions to adopt IPM technology. The 
impact of IPM adoption on farm performance indicators such as apple yields, net returns and 
agricultural income is also investigated using a treatment effects model to address the sample 
selection problem. The empirical results show that cooperative membership exerts a positive 
and significant impact on the adoption of IPM, a finding that is consistent with our theoretical 
analysis. In addition, IPM adoption has positive and significant effects on apple yields, net 
returns and agricultural income. Generally, our findings indicate that agricultural cooperatives 
can be a transmission route in the efforts to facilitate IPM technology, and increased IPM 
adoption tends to improve the economic performance of farm households. 
Keywords: IPM Adoption; Agricultural Cooperatives; Farm Performance; Endogenous 
Switching Probit; Treatment Effects Model; China  
JEL Classification     C52 · J54 · Q56 
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3.1 Introduction 
While pesticide use has increased agricultural production and productivity, its use, overuse and 
misuse have caused negative externalities on human health and the environment, as well as food 
safety (Dasgupta et al., 2007; Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 1998; Kabir & Rainis, 2014; Wilson & 
Tisdell, 2001). In particular, the overuse of chemical pesticides has led to pest resistance, 
resurgence and secondary outbreaks, which push farmers to use more new pesticides. To ease 
the negative issues associated with pesticide use, integrated pest management (IPM) technology 
is introduced and implemented in agricultural production in many developing countries. 
IPM refers to an ecologically based approach that makes the best use of all available 
technologies to manage pest problems sustainably. The primary objective of IPM technology 
is to minimize chemical pesticide use in relation to pest management, while maintaining or 
enhancing farm net returns with minimal environmental degradation. Previous studies have 
shown that IPM adoption significantly lowers pesticide use, saves production costs and 
maintains farm productivity for adopters (Carrión Yaguana et al., 2015; Dasgupta et al., 2007; 
Fernandez-cornejo, 1996). In view of the significant benefits associated with IPM technology, 
many government and FAO programs have been developed to spread the technology. One such 
effective approach is the introduction of Farmer Field School (FFS) (Kabir & Rainis, 2014; 
Sanglestsawai et al., 2015; Van Den Berg & Jiggins, 2007). However, IPM adoption rate 
remains low worldwide (Dasgupta et al., 2007; Kabir & Rainis, 2014). On the one hand, FFS 
is still not available in most regions (Kelly, 2005). On the other hand, due to low education 
levels, most small-scale farmers cannot understand the complex interrelationship between the 
pests/diseases existing in the cultivated crop and the knowledge-intensive IPM technology 
(Carrión Yaguana et al., 2015). Therefore, from a development policy perspective, it is 
particularly important to facilitate IPM adoption not only by FFS, but also through other 
institutional mechanisms. 
Among agricultural programs, agricultural cooperative, as an important institutional innovation 
that promotes the adoption of agricultural technologies among smallholder farmers, has been 
well developed in developing countries. The studies by Abebaw & Haile (2013) for Ethiopia 
and Verhofstadt & Maertens (2014) for Rwanda have reported that cooperative membership 
has a positive and significant impact on adoption of pesticides with respect to pest management. 
Moreover, the existing literature has also recorded that agricultural cooperatives improve food 
safety and quality among members due to technical assistance (Jin & Zhou, 2011; Moustier et 
al., 2010; Naziri et al., 2014). In their investigation of 60 farmer organizations in Vietnam, 
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Naziri et al. (2014) found that farmer organizations provide members with technical assistance 
and monitoring for pest management, which help improve members’ food safety performance. 
Nevertheless, agricultural cooperative may play a much larger role in managing pest problems, 
since its goal in influencing agricultural production differs across countries and regions due to 
differences in natural resources and economic development conditions. 
Given the importance of IPM adoption in minimizing pesticide use and the significant role of 
agricultural cooperatives in disseminating agricultural technologies and enhancing food safety 
practices, it is significant to understand whether cooperative organizations can promote IPM 
adoption. IPM is an information-intensive technology, and agricultural cooperatives may 
directly provide information to farmers through collective actions. However, there is lack of 
knowledge on how agricultural cooperatives affect the adoption of IPM technology by 
smallholder farmers. Moreover, IPM adoption may influence agricultural performance of farm 
households. For instance, adoption of IPM technology may increase farm profitability since it 
saves production costs. Understanding the issue is of great importance, since the effectiveness 
of agricultural policies that promote IPM adoption might be improved by taking into account 
the economic performance of farm households. However, much less is known about the farm-
level economic performance associated with IPM adoption. 
This study attempts to fill the research gap and contribute to the literature in threefold. First, we 
present a conceptual framework to show the link between agricultural cooperative membership 
and IPM adoption. Second, we employ an endogenous switching probit model to address the 
issue of selection bias in the process of choosing cooperative membership. The decision to join 
an agricultural cooperative is not a random event and depends on a number of observable factors 
(e.g., age, education and farm size) and unobservable factors (e.g., farmers’ innate abilities, and 
motivations to enhance food safety and improve environmental performance). Although 
previous studies have employed propensity score matching method to analyze the causal effect 
of cooperative membership on agricultural technology adoption, the approach addresses the 
self-selection issue accounting for only observable factors, and it fails to capture the factors that 
influence farmers’ decisions to adopt IPM (Abebaw & Haile, 2013; Verhofstadt & Maertens, 
2014). Third, we employ a treatment effects model to analyze the impact of IPM adoption on 
crop yields, net returns and agricultural income. The treatment effects model adjusts for 
heterogeneity of IPM adoption by taking into consideration covariates affecting selection bias 
(Cong & Drukker, 2000). Fernandez-cornejo (1996) has employed a standard Heckman two-
step model to analyze the impact of IPM adoption on pesticide use, tomato yields, and farm 
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profits. However, the standard Heckman model emphasizes modeling structures of selection 
bias rather than assuming mechanisms of randomization work to balance data between IPM 
adopters and non-adopters.  
The study utilizes a cross-section survey data of 481 households in three major apple producing 
provinces (Gansu, Shaanxi and Shandong) in China. Apple sector in China is an interesting 
example. Being the largest apple producer in the world, China produces almost half of the 
world’s total apple output. However, only 3% of apples produced in the country are exported 
due to pesticide residual issues (FAOSTAT). The total pesticide use has increased from 0.73 
million tons in 1990 to 1.81 million tons in 2012, and the total pesticide expenditure rose more 
than 11-fold between this period (CRSY, 2013). Particularly, fruit and vegetable production is 
intensive in pesticides, and apple has no exception. The rising use of chemical pesticides has 
increased farmers’ production costs and posed serious food safety, health and environmental 
problems. IPM technology is therefore being promoted intensively among apple producers to 
help reduce these adverse environmental impacts of conventional agriculture.  
This paper proceeds as follows. We present the theoretical model in section 3.2 and the 
empirical specification in section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents the data and descriptive statistics. 
The empirical results and discussion are presented in section 3.5, and the final section concludes.   
3.2 Theoretical Model 
To illustrate the relationship between cooperative membership and IPM adoption, the 
theoretical model presented in this section modifies the farm household model suggested by 
Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (2007). The model expands the farm household model developed by 
Huffman (1991) with several conditions to allow for IPM adoption. To begin with, we assume 
that an agricultural household maximizes utility over consumption of goods (𝐺) and leisure (𝐿): 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑈 = 𝑈(𝐺, 𝐿; 𝐻)        (3.1) 
where 𝑈  is the household utility function, which is assumed to be strictly concave and to 
possess continuous second partial derivatives; 𝐻 represents a vector of individual, household 
and location characteristics. Utility is maximized subject to time, technology and income 
constraints. The time constraint is: 
𝑇 = 𝐹(𝜏) + 𝑁 + 𝐿     (3.1a) 
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where 𝑇 denotes the total household time, which consists of the time allocated to farm work 
(𝐹), off-farm work (𝑁) and leisure (𝐿). 𝐹 is assumed to be a function of the intensity of IPM 
adoption, 𝜏. The household faces a technology constraint specified as: 
𝑄 = 𝑄[𝐼(𝜏), 𝐹(𝜏), 𝐻, 𝜏, 𝑅]   (3.1b) 
where 𝑄 is the output level; 𝐼 captures input use such as pesticides, which is a function of the 
intensity of IPM adoption, 𝜏; 𝐹 and 𝐻 are as defined above; 𝑅 is a vector of exogenous factors 
that shift the production function. 
Utility maximization is also subject to income constraint. Previous studies have generally 
revealed that agricultural cooperatives promote smallholder commercialization by overcoming 
entry barriers in accessing input and output markets and mitigating transaction costs associated 
with poor access to market information and transport (e.g., Deng et al. 2010; Holloway et al. 
2000; Vandeplas et al. 2013). Lowering transaction costs through agricultural cooperatives may 
increase farmers’ net incomes due to better market access. For instance, agricultural 
cooperatives may help members deliver the products to (or inputs from) the markets, which 
finally lower members’ transportation costs due to collective action. We therefore present the 
income constraint in the presence of transaction costs. Let 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝐼  and 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝑄
 represent 
proportional transaction costs per unit of input and output, respectively, with 𝜃 distinguishing 
the transaction costs for cooperative members (𝜃 = 1) and nonmembers (𝜃 = 0). In essence, 
the proportional transaction costs increase the real price of input 𝑃𝐼, and decrease the real price 
received for output 𝑃𝑄 (Key et al. 2000). The adjusted input price is then given as 𝑃𝐼
′ = 𝑃𝐼 +
𝑃𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝐼 , while that for output price is 𝑃𝑄
′ = 𝑃𝑄 − 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝑄
. Meanwhile, let 𝐹𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝐼  represent fixed 
transaction costs for input market participation and  𝐹𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝑄
 the costs for output market 
participation. Finally, the income constraint can be expressed as: 
𝑃𝑔𝐺 = (𝑃
𝑄 − 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝑄)𝑄 − (𝑃𝐼 + 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝐼 )𝐼 −  𝐹𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝑄 − 𝐹𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝐼 + 𝑊𝑁 + 𝐸   (3.1c)   
where 𝑃𝑔 and 𝐺 denote the prices and quantities of purchased goods; 𝑃
𝑄 is output price and 𝑃𝐼 
is price for input; 𝑄 is the output level and 𝐼 represents the level of input use; 𝑊 represents off-
farm wages paid to the farmer, and 𝑁 is the amount of time allocated to off-farm work; 𝐸 is the 
income from other sources such as rents, interest and dividends.  
Following Huffman (1991), the technology-constrained measure of household income is 
obtained by substituting equation (3.1b) into equation (3.1c). Then, the Lagrangian of the 
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household’s maximization problem is: 
ℒ = 𝑈(𝐺, 𝐿; 𝐻) + 𝜆{(𝑃𝑄 − 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝑄)𝑄[𝐼(𝜏), 𝐹(𝜏), 𝐻, 𝜏, 𝑅] − (𝑃𝐼 + 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝐼 )[𝐼(𝜏)] −  𝐹𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝑄 −
𝐹𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝐼 + 𝑊𝑁 + 𝐸 − 𝑃𝑔𝐺} + 𝜇[𝑇 − 𝐹(𝜏) − 𝑁 − 𝐿]           (3.2) 
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier for income constraint, and 𝜇 is the Lagrangian multiplier 
associated with the time constraint. The first-order conditions associated with maximizing 
utility subject to these constraints yield the following optimal choices of the household: 
𝜕ℒ/𝜕𝐼 = 𝜆(𝑃𝑄 − 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝑄)(𝜕𝑄/𝜕𝐼) − (𝑃𝐼 + 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝐼 ) = 0     (3.3a) 
𝜕ℒ/𝜕𝐹 = 𝜆(𝑃𝑄 − 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝑄)(𝜕𝑄/𝜕𝐹) − 𝜇 = 0     (3.3b) 
𝜕ℒ/𝜕𝜏 = 𝜆{(𝑃𝑄 − 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝑄)[(𝜕𝑄/𝜕𝐼)(𝑑𝐼/𝑑𝜏) + (𝜕𝑄/𝜕𝐹)(𝑑𝐹/𝑑𝜏) + 𝑑𝑄/𝑑𝜏] − (𝑃𝐼 +
𝑃𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝐼 )(𝑑𝐼/𝑑𝜏)} − 𝜇(𝑑𝐹/𝑑𝜏) = 0       (3.3c) 
𝜕ℒ/𝜕𝑁 = λW − μ ≤0, 𝑁 ≥ 0, 𝑁(λW − μ) = 0    (3.3d) 
∂ℒ/ ∂G = 𝑈𝐺 − 𝜆𝑃𝑔 = 0       (3.3e) 
∂ℒ/ ∂L = 𝑈𝐿 − 𝜇 = 0           (3.3f) 
where 𝑈𝐺 = 𝜕𝑈/𝜕𝐺 and 𝑈𝐿 = 𝜕𝑈/𝜕𝐿 are the partial derivatives of the function U.  
The optimal time allocation decisions for farm work, off-farm work and leisure can be obtained 
from the optimality conditions, equations (3.3b), (3.3d), (3.3e) and (3.3f):  
𝜇/𝜆 = (𝑃𝑄 − 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝑄)(𝜕𝑄/𝜕𝐹) ≥ 𝑊                   (3.4) 
where 𝜇/𝜆 is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption goods 
(from equations (3.3e) and (3.3f)); (𝑃𝑄 − 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝑄)(𝜕𝑄/𝜕𝐹) represents the value of the marginal 
product of farm labor. In equation (3.4), 𝜇/𝜆 = (𝑃𝑄 − 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝑄)(𝜕𝑄/𝜕𝐹)  > 𝑊 implies that the 
marginal value of an individual’s leisure or farm work exceeds his or her off-farm wage 
opportunities, and optimal time for off-farm work is zero. When 𝜇/𝜆 = (𝑃𝑄 − 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝑄)(𝜕𝑄/
𝜕𝐹) = 𝑊, then the marginal value of an individual’s leisure or farm work equals to his or her 
off-farm wage, and the optimal time that households allocated to off-farm work may be positive 
(Huffman 1991). When the interior solution for off-farm work occurs, equations (3.3a) and 
(3.3b) can be solved together to obtain the demand functions for on-farm labor. The derivation 
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of off-farm work can be employed to relate off-farm work to IPM adoption, since the off-farm 
wage determines the value of the household’s time (𝑊 = 𝜇/𝜆). In particular, earnings from 
off-farm work may relax farmers’ liquidity constraint and enable them to purchase IPM 
components (e.g., yellow sticky mobile, fixed traps, insect-trap light and trap band). The 
effectiveness of IPM adoption might be improved by taking into account the different demands 
on managerial time and the relative ability of the farm households to accommodate those 
demands (Fernandez-Cornejo et al. 2007).   
The optimal IPM adoption decision can be obtained from the optimality conditions, equations 
(3.3c), (3.3e) and (3.3f):  
(𝑃𝑄 − 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝑄)𝑑𝑄/𝑑𝜏 − (𝑃𝐼 + 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝐼 )(𝑑𝐼/𝑑𝜏) − 𝑃𝑔(𝑈𝐿/𝑈𝐺)(𝑑𝐹/𝑑𝜏) = 0     (3.5) 
where the total derivative of 𝑑𝑄/𝑑𝜏  is equal to (𝜕𝑄/𝜕𝐼)(𝑑𝐼/𝑑𝜏) + (𝜕𝑄/𝜕𝐹)(𝑑𝐹/𝑑𝜏) +
𝑑𝑄/𝑑𝜏; μ/λ = 𝑃𝑔(𝑈𝐿/𝑈𝐺), which represents the marginal rate of substitution between leisure 
and consumption goods, can be derived based on equations (3.3e) and (3.3f). In equation (3.5),  
(𝑃𝑄 − 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝑄
𝜃)𝑑𝑄/𝑑𝜏  may be interpreted as the marginal benefit of IPM adoption, (𝑃𝐼 +
𝑃𝑇𝐶𝜃
𝐼 )(𝑑𝐼/𝑑𝜏)  represents the marginal cost of production inputs from IPM adoption, and 
𝑃𝑔(𝑈𝐿/𝑈𝐺)(𝑑𝐹/𝑑𝜏) denotes the marginal cost of the farm work from IPM adoption and valued 
at the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption of goods. Equation (3.5) 
indicates that it is beneficial for farmers to adopt IPM technology when the marginal benefit of 
adoption is higher than the marginal cost of adoption, and the net benefit from IPM adoption is 
maximized when the marginal benefit of adoption is equal to the marginal cost of adoption.  
Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, one can use the implicit function theorem to derive 
the expression for IPM adoption that is a function of off-farm wages, prices, the choice of 
cooperative membership that determines the transaction costs, human capital, and other 
exogenous factors. These factors are replaced in reduced-form representations of IPM adoption 
by observable farm and household level characteristics.  
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As an illustration, we provide a graphical analysis for intuitive understanding on how 
agricultural cooperative membership influences farmers’ behavior in the IPM adoption process. 
Specifically, based on equation (3.5), we demonstrate in Figure 3.1 the curves that represent 
the marginal benefit (𝑀𝑅𝑁) and the marginal cost (𝑀𝐶𝑁) of IPM adoption for nonmembers 
(𝜃 = 0) (continuous lines), which determine the optimal level of IPM adoption for this group 
of farmers,  𝜏𝑁 . As indicated earlier, agricultural cooperatives help members reduce the 
transaction costs involved. If this is the case, the proportional transaction costs per unit of input 
and output for cooperative members (𝜃 = 1) presented in equation (3.5) are lower than that for 
nonmembers, i.e. 𝑃𝑇𝐶1
𝐼 < 𝑃𝑇𝐶0
𝐼  and  𝑃𝑇𝐶1
𝑄 < 𝑃𝑇𝐶0
𝑄
. Thus, due to lower 𝑃𝑇𝐶1
𝐼  and  𝑃𝑇𝐶1
𝑄
 
contributed by cooperative membership, the curves of 𝑀𝑅𝑁 and 𝑀𝐶𝑁 rotate clockwise. After 
rotation, the curves of 𝑀𝑅𝑀 and 𝑀𝐶𝑀 that represent the marginal benefit and the marginal cost 
of IPM adoption for members can be obtained (discontinuous lines), which determine the 
optimal level of IPM adoption for members, 𝜏𝑀. As evident in Figure 3.1, cooperative members 
tend to adopt higher levels of IPM technology 𝜏𝑀, compared to nonmembers 𝜏𝑁. 
IPM adopters and non-adopters may be systematically different since they themselves choose 
to adopt IPM technology (Fernandez-cornejo, 1996; Fernandez-Cornejo, 1998). For instance, 
𝜏 
𝜏𝑀 𝜏𝑁 
Figure 3.1 Determinants of the optimal level of IPM adoption for cooperative 
members and nonmembers 
€ 
members, (𝑃𝐼 + 𝑃𝑇𝐶1
𝐼)(𝑑𝐼/𝑑𝜏) + 𝑃𝑔(𝑈𝐿/𝑈𝐺)(𝑑𝐹/𝑑𝜏) 
nonmembers, (𝑃𝐼 + 𝑃𝑇𝐶0
𝐼)(𝑑𝐼/𝑑𝜏) + 𝑃𝑔(𝑈𝐿/𝑈𝐺)(𝑑𝐹/𝑑𝜏) 
members, (𝑃𝑄 − 𝑃𝑇𝐶1
𝑄)𝑑𝑄/𝑑𝜏 
nonmembers, (𝑃𝑄 − 𝑃𝑇𝐶0
𝑄)𝑑𝑄/𝑑𝜏 
 
𝑀𝐶𝑁 
𝑀𝐶𝑀 
𝑀𝑅𝑀 
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Chapter 3 Adoption of Intergraded Pest Management Technology and Farm Economic Performance 
74 
farmers with favorable characteristics (e.g., environmental and health perceptions associated 
with IPM technology) may be more likely to choose to adopt IPM technology. These 
differences may manifest IPM adopters and non-adopters in farm performance. Therefore, in 
addition to analyzing the impact of cooperative membership on IPM adoption, it is also 
significant to understand how IPM adoption affects economic performance of farm households, 
and the empirical part of this study provides the evidence. 
3.3 Empirical Specification 
3.3.1 Impact Evaluation Issues 
The theoretical model presented above indicates that it is profitable for farmers to adopt IPM 
technology if the net benefit of IPM adoption is positive. However, the expected net benefit 
from IPM adoption is not observable, since it is subjective. What is observed in the cross-
sectional data is the farmer’s decision to adopt IPM technology (𝑌𝑖 = 1) or not to adopt (𝑌𝑖 =
0). For the analytical setting, let 𝑌𝑖
∗  represent the net benefit acquired from adopting IPM 
technology, we observe 𝑌𝑖 , if the underlying latent variable 𝑌𝑖
∗  exceeds a certain threshold. 
Given our interest of exploring the impact of cooperative membership on IPM adoption, while 
controlling for other factors that may influence farmers’ decisions to adopt, we express farmers’ 
IPM adoption decisions as a latent variable function:  
𝑌𝑖
∗ = 𝛼𝑋𝑖 + 𝜂𝐶𝑖 + 𝜗𝑖  with   𝑌𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓  𝑌𝑖
∗ > 0                  (3.6)              
where 𝑌𝑖
∗  is a latent variable that represents the propensity to adopt IPM technology for 
household i, which gives the value of one, if the farmer adopted IPM technology, and zero 
otherwise; 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of observable characteristics (e.g., age, education, household size and 
off-farm work participation) that are assumed to influence IPM adoption; 𝐶𝑖  is an indicator 
representing the farmers’ binary choices of cooperative membership; 𝛼 and 𝜂 are parameters to 
be estimated; and 𝜗𝑖 is a random error term.  
Following the empirical literature that examines the impact of cooperative membership on 
technology adoption (e.g., Abebaw and Haile 2013; Ito et al. 2012), it is assumed that a farmer’s 
decision to choose to belong to a cooperative is based on a comparison between the utility 
derived from choosing cooperative membership (𝐶1𝑖
∗ ) and the utility derived from not choosing 
the membership (𝐶0𝑖
∗ ). The utility maximizing household is then assumed to join an agricultural 
cooperative if the utility difference is positive, i.e. 𝐶𝑖
∗ = 𝐶1𝑖
∗ − 𝐶0𝑖
∗ > 0. However,  𝐶𝑖
∗ cannot be 
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observed directly, but can be expressed by a latent variable function with observed 
characteristics (𝑍𝑖) that determine the choice of cooperative membership and an error term (𝜀𝑖): 
𝐶𝑖
∗ = 𝜓𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 > 0   with   𝐶𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓  𝐶𝑖
∗ > 0                     (3.7) 
where 𝐶𝑖  is a binary indicator variable that equals one if a farmer joined an agricultural 
cooperative, and zero otherwise, and 𝜓 is a vector of parameters to be estimated; The error term 
𝜀𝑖 is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean. 
Note that farmers themselves decide (self-selection) whether to join a cooperative, the decision 
is likely influenced by unobserved characteristics (e.g., farmers’ innate abilities, awareness of 
dangers of pesticides, and motivations to improve food safety and environmental performance) 
that may be correlated to the IPM adoption. In the regression framework, this is equivalent to 
saying that the error term 𝜗𝑖  in equation (3.6) and the error term 𝜀𝑖  in equation (3.7) are 
correlated. In this case, estimation of equation (3.6) using a probit or logit model that fails to 
account for this self-selection is likely to produce biased estimates of the impact of cooperative 
membership on IPM adoption. 
The standard approaches for dealing with the problem of self-selection are propensity score 
matching (PSM) model, recursive bivariate probit (RBP) model and endogenous switching 
probit (ESP) model. The ESP model has some advantages over other methods, and employed 
among them in this study (Lokshin and Sajaia 2011). First, the method addresses the issue of 
selection bias accounting for both observable and unobservable factors. PSM model addresses 
the issue of selection bias accounting for only observed heterogeneities, and fails to estimate 
the factors that influence IPM adoption (Abebaw and Haile 2013). Second, the ESP approach 
analyzes the determinants of IPM adoption separately for cooperative members and 
nonmembers. Although RBP model estimation that is inclusive of instrumental variables takes 
into account both observed and unobserved heterogeneities to address the selection bias issue, 
it only simultaneously estimates selection equation with one outcome equation, which fails to 
capture the factors that separately influence cooperative members and nonmembers’ decisions 
to adopt IPM technology. However, efforts at enhancing IPM adoption through cooperative 
organizations require understanding and identifying the constraints and incentives that 
influence cooperative members and nonmembers’ decisions separately. 
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3.3.2 Endogenous Switching Probit Model 
Modeling the impact of cooperative membership on IPM adoption under the ESP framework 
proceeds in two stages: the first stage is the decision to join agricultural cooperatives as 
represented by equation (3.7); in the second-stage, a probit model is used to examine the 
relationship between IPM adoption variable and a set of explanatory variables conditional on 
the choice of cooperative membership. The two outcome equations, conditional on the choice 
of cooperative membership, can be expressed as:  
𝑌1𝑖
∗ = 𝛽1𝑋1𝑖 + 𝜉1𝑖    with       𝑌1𝑖 = {
1    𝑖𝑓 𝑌1𝑖
∗ > 0
0     𝑖𝑓 𝑌1𝑖
∗ ≤ 0
   if 𝐶𝑖 = 1        (3.8a) 
𝑌0𝑖
∗ = 𝛽0𝑋0𝑖 + 𝜉0𝑖   with       𝑌0𝑖 = {
1    𝑖𝑓 𝑌0𝑖
∗ > 0
0     𝑖𝑓 𝑌0𝑖
∗ ≤ 0
   if 𝐶𝑖 = 0       (3.8b) 
where 𝑌1𝑖
∗  and 𝑌0𝑖
∗  are two latent IPM adoption variables for cooperative members and 
nonmembers, respectively; 𝑌1𝑖 and 𝑌0𝑖 are observed adoption choices, which take the value of 
one if cooperative members and nonmembers adopted the IPM technology, and zero otherwise; 
𝑋𝑖 is a vector of observable variables (e.g., age, education, household size and off-farm work) 
that determine IPM adoption; 𝛽1 and 𝛽0 are parameters to be estimated; 𝜉1𝑖  and 𝜉0𝑖  are two 
error terms that represent unobservable factors related to IPM adoption for members and 
nonmembers, respectively.  
Previous analysis shows that IPM adoption is influenced by off-farm work participation, since 
additional income acquired from off-farm work activities enables farmers to purchase more 
agricultural inputs used in the IPM (e.g., yellow sticky mobile, fixed traps, insect-trap light and 
trap band). However, it is also significantly noted that allocating household labor and capital to 
off-farm work may constraint sustainable IPM technology management, resulting in the lost-
labor effect as emphasized in the new economics of labor migration literature (Shi et al. 2011; 
Taylor et al. 2003). Given that the income effect of off-farm work participation is opposite to 
the lost-labor effect, the income effect may, or may not compensate for the lost-labor effect. 
The joint relationship between off-farm work participation and IPM adoption suggests potential 
endogeneity of off-farm work in IPM adoption equations, which should be addressed in 
estimating the IPM adoption specifications. Since off-farm work variable considered in this 
study is dichotomous, we employ a two-stage residual inclusive (2SRI) approach suggested by 
Rivers and Vuong (1988) to address its potential endogeneity. In the first-stage of 2SRI, the 
off-farm work variable is specified as a function of all other explanatory variables with inclusive 
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of one instrumental variable. In this study, a variable representing access to local nonfarm work 
is identified and employed as an instrument in the estimation, which is required to strongly 
influence the off-farm work variable, but not IPM adoption.
1  In the second-stage regression, the residual predicted from the first-stage estimation is 
included as an additional regressor in IPM adoption equations (3.8a) and (3.8b). 
We assume that 𝜀𝑖 in equation (3.7), and 𝜉1𝑖 and 𝜉0𝑖 in equations (3.8a) and (3.8b) are jointly 
normally distributed, with a mean-zero and correlation matrix: 
 Ω = [
1    𝜌0   𝜌1
    1    𝜌10
        1
]                                  (3.9) 
where 𝜌1 is the correlation between 𝜀𝑖 and 𝜉1𝑖;  𝜌0 is the correlation between 𝜀𝑖 and 𝜉0𝑖; 𝜌10 is 
the correlation between 𝜉1𝑖 and 𝜉0𝑖. Here, 𝜌10 cannot be estimated, since 𝑌1𝑖 and 𝑌0𝑖 are never 
observed simultaneously and the joint distribution of (𝜉1𝑖, 𝜉0𝑖 ) is not identified. The full 
information maximum likelihood (FIML) approach estimates the selection equation (3.7) and 
outcome equations (3.8a) and (3.8b) simultaneously (Lokshin and Sajaia 2011). In ESP 
estimation, 𝜌1  and 𝜌0  are automatically created and respectively included in IPM adoption 
equation (3.8a) for members and the equation (3.8b) for nonmembers to correct for selectivity 
bias arising from unobservable factors. Using ESP model, Gregory and Coleman-Jensen (2013) 
analyzed food security effects of low-income households participating in the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program in the United States and Ayuya et al. (2015) evaluated the effects 
of certified organic production on poverty in smallholder production systems in Kenya. 
3.3.3 Average Treatment Effects 
The  estimates of equations (3.7), (3.8a) and (3.8b) can provide understanding of the important 
factors that influence farmers’ decisions to choose cooperative membership and the 
determinants of IPM adoption separately for cooperative members and nonmembers. 
Importantly, the estimated coefficients can be used to calculate the average treatment effects of 
cooperative membership on IPM adoption, which account for selection bias issue arising from 
                                                          
1 The employed instrument is a dummy variable which takes the value of one, if the farmer self-reported that he/she 
has opportunity to engage in nonfarm work in the surrounding area, and the value zero, otherwise. We expect that 
farmers with local employment opportunities are more likely to participate in off-farm work. 
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both observed and unobserved heterogeneities. Following Lokshin and Sajaia (2011), we 
calculate the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) and average treatment effects on 
the untreated (ATU) in this study. In particular, ATT compares the IPM adoption probability 
of cooperative members with and without the choice of cooperative membership, while ATU 
is a comparison of IPM adoption probability of nonmembers with and without the choice of 
cooperative membership. In particular, the ATT and ATU can be calculated as follows:    
 ATT =
1
𝑁1
∑ [𝑃𝑟(𝑌1 = 1|𝐶 = 1, 𝑋 = 𝑥) − 𝑃𝑟(𝑌0 = 1|𝐶 = 1, 𝑋 = 𝑥)]
𝑁1
𝑖=1  
          =
1
𝑁1
∑ [
𝛷2(𝛽1𝑋1, 𝑍𝜓, 𝜌1) − 𝛷2(𝛽0𝑋0, 𝑍𝜓, 𝜌0)
𝐹(𝑍𝜓)
]
𝑁1
𝑖=1
                                                 (3.10a) 
ATU =
1
𝑁0
∑[𝑃𝑟(𝑌1 = 1|𝐶 = 0, 𝑋 = 𝑥) − 𝑃𝑟(𝑌0 = 1|𝐶 = 0, 𝑋 = 𝑥)]
𝑁0
𝑖=1
 
         =
1
𝑁0
∑ [
𝛷2(𝛽1𝑋1, −𝑍𝜓, −𝜌1) − 𝛷2(𝛽0𝑋0, −𝑍𝜓, −𝜌0)
𝐹(−𝑍𝜓)
]
𝑁0
𝑖=1
                                       (3.10b) 
where 𝑁1  and 𝑁0  represent the sample numbers of cooperative members and nonmembers, 
respectively; 𝑃𝑟(𝑌1 = 1|𝐶 = 1, 𝑋 = 𝑥) and 𝑃𝑟(𝑌0 = 1|𝐶 = 0, 𝑋 = 𝑥) predicted probabilities 
of  IPM adoption for cooperative members and nonmembers in an observed context, while 
𝑃𝑟(𝑌0 = 1|𝐶 = 1, 𝑋 = 𝑥)  and 𝑃𝑟(𝑌1 = 1|𝐶 = 0, 𝑋 = 𝑥)  are predicted IPM technology 
probabilities for those two groups of farmers in a counterfactual context; 𝛷2 is the cumulative 
function of a bivariate normal distribution; and 𝐹 is a cumulative function of the univariate 
normal distribution. 
3.3.4 Treatment Effects Model 
The relationship for examining the impact of IPM adoption on economic performance of farm 
households assumes a linear specification for farm performance indicator (e.g., crop yields, net 
returns or agricultural income) as a function of a vector of explanatory variables (𝑋𝑖) along with 
a dummy variable for IPM adoption (𝑌𝑖). The regression equation for farm performance (𝐻𝑖) 
can be specified as: 
𝐻𝑖 = ω𝑌𝑖 + 𝜈𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖           (3.11) 
where 𝐻𝑖 represents farm performance indicators such as crop yields, net returns or agricultural 
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income; 𝑌𝑖 is a 0 or 1 dummy variable for IPM adoption; 𝑋𝑖 summarizes observed individual 
and household characteristics (e.g., age, education, farm size, household size, and asset 
ownership) that may influence the farm performance indicators; ω and 𝜈 are parameters to be 
estimated; and 𝛿𝑖  is an error term. 
As indicated earlier, farmers choose to adopt IPM technology themselves. Farmers who choose 
to adopt IPM technology are therefore likely to have characteristics that could allow them to be 
more successful in using the technology than the average farmers. Therefore, due to self-
selection bias, it would be incorrect to employ OLS regression to directly estimate the impact 
of IPM adoption on economic performance indicators, as evidenced in equation (3.11). In this 
study, we employ a treatment effects model to analyze the impact of IPM adoption on farm 
performance indicators. This approach addresses the issue of selection bias accounting for both 
observable and unobservable factors, as well as estimates the direct impact of cooperative 
membership on crop yields, net returns and agricultural income (Cong & Drukker, 2000). 
By using treatment effects model, the selection mechanism for IPM adoption by the probit 
model can be explicitly specified as: 
𝑌𝑖
∗ = 𝜁𝑋𝑖 + 𝜅𝑇𝑖 + 𝜛𝑖  with   𝑌𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓  𝑌𝑖
∗ > 0                  (3.12)              
where 𝑌𝑖
∗ is a latent variable and 𝑌𝑖 is its proxy variable in an observed context, as defined in 
equation (3.6); 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of explanatory variables (e.g., age, education, household size and 
off-farm work participation); 𝑇𝑖  is a vector of instrumental variables that are expected to 
influence farmers’ decisions to adopt IPM technology, but do not directly have impacts on crop 
yields, net returns and agricultural income; 𝜁 and 𝜅 are parameters to be estimated; and 𝜛𝑖 is a 
random error term.  
In treatment effects model, the error term (𝜛𝑖) in IPM adoption equation (3.12) and the error 
term (𝛿𝑖 ) in farm performance equation (3.11) are assumed to have a correlation  𝜌𝛿𝜛 . In 
particular, if 𝜌𝛿𝜛  is statistically significant, there is the presence of selection bias and the 
coefficient estimate ω of using OLS regression is biased (Cong & Drukker, 2000). Positive 𝜌𝛿𝜛 
reveals a positive selection bias, suggesting that farmers with higher than average crop yields, 
net returns and agricultural income have higher probabilities to adopt IPM technology. Negative 
𝜌𝛿𝜛  suggests a negative selection bias. In treatment effects model estimation, the potential 
endogeneity of off-farm work in IPM adoption equation is also addressed using the approach 
proposed by Rivers & Vuong (1988), as it is discussed previously.   
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3.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data used in this paper come from a farm household survey of apple farmers conducted 
between September and December 2013 in Gansu, Shaanxi and Shandong provinces in China. 
We chose to collect data from those provinces since they are top three apple producing regions 
with respect to the orchard areas cultivated in the country. Out of a total of 481 surveyed farmers, 
the number of farmers having cooperative membership is 208 and of farmers without 
membership is 273. The members were randomly selected from a list of farmers provided by 
randomly selected agricultural cooperatives using the information provided by local 
agricultural bureau in each purposively selected provinces, while the nonmembers were 
randomly selected in the same region. Information from these households was gathered through 
pre-tested questionnaire interview. The questionnaire covered a range of topics including 
socioeconomic and farm level factors, IPM practices, yields, gross income and production costs 
associated with apple production, off-farm work, income from other on-farm activities , farmers’ 
environmental and health perceptions associated with continuous use of chemical pesticides, as 
well as asset ownership. 
In this study, the first objective aims to analyze the impact of cooperative membership on IPM 
adoption. However, as noted by Fernandez-cornejo (1996), the development of IPM programs 
is so different across pest class, crops and regions that it is difficult to provide a general 
operational definition of IPM. Our operational definition of IPM adoption follows the studies 
by Fernandez-cornejo (1996) and Dasgupta et al. (2007), who defined IPM adoption as a 
dichotomous decision. Specifically, a farmer is defined as a IPM adopter: (i) if the farmer 
reports having used both scouting for pests and economic thresholds in making pest treatment 
decisions; (ii) if the farmer reports adjusting application rates, time, and frequency of pesticide 
use; and (iii) if the farmer uses any of the following methods: yellow sticky mobile, fixed traps, 
insect-trap light, trap band, cardboard traps to target adult, purchasing beneficial insects that 
prey on insects damaging to the crop. IPM non-adopters refer to those farmers who only depend 
on pesticides for pest management.2 
The second objective of this study is to analyze the impact of IPM adoption on apple yields, net 
                                                          
2 Unlike the findings of lower adoption rates of pesticide reported by Abebaw & Haile (2013) on Ethiopian and 
Verhofstadt & Maertens (2014) on Rwanda, all apple farmers in our survey used different levels of pesticides 
(either chemical or biological pesticides, or both).   
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returns and agricultural income. In particular, apple yields refer to apple yields per mu (1 
mu=1/15 hectare). Net returns measure the difference between gross income of apple yields and 
variable investment costs (including fertilizers, pesticides, bags, irrigation, hired labors and 
agricultural films) per mu. Agricultural income measures per capita agricultural income. The 
total agricultural income includes the income from apple production and the income from other 
farm activities such as raising livestock and growing other crops such as corns, potatoes, pears, 
peaches, cherries, peanuts, corn, and apricot. 
The definitions and descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis are 
presented in Table 3.1. The independent variables were selected based on past studies on 
determinants of cooperative membership and IPM adoption (e.g., Abebaw & Haile, 2013; 
Carrión Yaguana et al., 2015; Dasgupta et al., 2007; Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014). The survey 
showed that the households with cooperative membership represented 43% of the total sample. 
The average apple yields and net returns are 2,220 kg/mu and 7540 yuan/mu, respectively. The 
mean value of agricultural income is 13,460 yuan per capita. Only 21% of households adopted 
IPM technology, showing a lower adoption rate. The average number of years of schooling of 
the household head is about 7.6 years. Around 15% of surveyed household heads participated 
in off-farm work, suggesting agricultural production is the primary profession for most of the 
farmers. The data also show that about two thirds of households are aware of the negative health 
effects of chemical pesticide use.  
Table 3.1 Definition of variables and descriptive statistics   
Variable  Definition Mean (S.D.) 
Dependent variables 
Membership  1 if farmer had agricultural cooperative membership, 0 
otherwise) 
0.43 (0.50) 
IPM adoption 1 if farmer adopted integrated pest management (IPM) 
technology, 0 otherwise 
0.21 (0.41) 
Apple yields Apple output (kg/1,000/mu)a 2.22 (8.20) 
Net returns Apple gross revenue minus variable investments costs 
(yuan/1,1000/mu)b 
7.54 (3.91) 
Agricultural 
income 
Per capita agricultural income (yuan/1000) 13.46 (7.50) 
Independent variables 
Age  Age of the household head (years) 48.63 (10.25) 
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Gender 1 if farmer is male, 0 otherwise 0.86 (0.35) 
Education  Formal education of farmer (years) 7.60 (2.87) 
Farm size  Total size of fruiting apple orchards (mu) 5.07 (3.24) 
Household size Number of people residing in household 4.33 (1.44) 
Off-farm work 1 if farmer participates in non-farm work, 0 otherwise 0.15 (0.36) 
Asset ownership 1 If farmer owns farming vehicle, 0 otherwise 0.92 (0.28) 
Warehouse 1 if farmer reports there is apple refrigerated warehouse 
in local areas, 0 otherwise 
0.54 (0.50) 
Price knowledge 1 if farmer perceives that food produced under food 
safety standards (i.e. organic food standard, green food 
standard or pollution-free food standard) may be sold at 
a higher price than conventional food, 0 otherwise 
0.43 (0.50) 
Environmental 
perception 
1 if farmer considers continuous use of chemical 
pesticides as a threat to environmental performance, 0 
otherwise 
0.47 (0.50) 
Health 
perception 
1 if farmer considers continuous use of chemical 
pesticides as a threat to human health, 0 otherwise 
0.55 (0.47) 
Gansu  1 if farmer is located in Gansu, 0 otherwise 0.17 (0.37) 
Shaanxi  1 if farmer is located in Shaanxi, 0 otherwise 0.40 (0.49) 
Shandong  1 if farmer is located in Shandong, 0 otherwise 0.43 (0.50) 
PCS perception 1 if farmer perceives that contemporary agricultural 
cooperative is more effective than people’s commune 
system (PCS), 0 otherwise  
0.42 (0.49) 
Information 
availability 
The availability of IPM information determines my 
decision to adopt IPM technology (1=Strongly disagree; 
2=general; 3=agree; 4=strongly agree) 
2.79 (0.96) 
 
Benefit 
availability 
My tuition tells me that I can benefit from the adoption 
of IPM technology (1=Strongly disagree; 2=general; 
3=agree; 4=strongly agree) 
1.95 (0.86) 
PCS perception 1 if farmer perceives that contemporary agricultural 
cooperative is more effective than people’s commune 
system (PCS), 0 otherwise  
0.42 (0.49) 
a 1 mu=1/15 hectare; b 1 $=6.14 yuan. 
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Table 3.2 presents differences in means in the characteristics of cooperative members and 
nonmembers. In particular, cooperative members are more educated than nonmembers. They 
have larger farm sizes, and are more likely to own assets such as farming vehicle. Compared 
with nonmembers, cooperative members are more likely to believe that food produced under 
organic food standard, green food standard or pollution-free food standard receives higher 
prices than conventional food.3 The mean comparisons in Table 3.2 also show that cooperative 
members and nonmembers are also distinguishable in terms of environmental perception and 
health perception. In particular, members are more likely to be aware of negative health and 
environmental effects associated with continuous use of chemical pesticides than nonmembers. 
With regards to the variable that represents IPM adoption, we find that cooperative members 
are more likely to adopt IPM technology than nonmembers. 
Table 3.2 Mean differences in characteristics between cooperative members and 
nonmembers 
Variables Members (N=208) Nonmembers (N=273) Diff. 
Age  48.45 (0.66) 48.78 (0.66) -0.326 
Gender 0.89 (0.02) 0.84 (0.02) 0.051 
Education  8.05 (0.17) 7.27 (0.19) 0.781*** 
Farm size  5.51 (0.24) 4.73 (0.18) 0.778*** 
Household size 4.57 (0.10) 4.14 (0.08) 0.433*** 
Off-farm work 0.14 (0.02) 0.16 (0.02) -0.013 
Asset ownership 0.96 (0.01) 0.88 (0.02) 0.079*** 
Warehouse 0.57 (0.03) 0.52 (0.03) 0.048 
Price knowledge 0.50 (0.03) 0.37 (0.03) 0.130*** 
Environmental perception 0.55 (0.03) 0.41 (0.03) 0.141*** 
Health perception 0.64 (0.03) 0.48 (0.03) 0.160*** 
PCS perception 0.60 (0.03) 0.29 (0.03) 0.312*** 
IPM adoption 0.32 (0.03) 0.13 (0.02) 0.190*** 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01. 
                                                          
3  In combination with the domestic agricultural practice and food safety situation, the Chinese government 
proposed three food safety standards that include organic food standard, green food standard and pollution-free 
food standard (or known as safe food in some literature). In comparison with the unified international standard of 
organic food, the latter two safer food standards are unique in China. The requirements of these three safer food 
standards can be found in Yu et al. (2014). 
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Table 3.3 presents the mean differences in characteristics between IPM adopters and non-
adopters. It shows that IPM adopters are younger than non-adopters. IPM adopters are better 
educated, and have larger farm size and household size, compared with non-adopters. The mean 
comparisons also indicate that IPM adopters and non-adopters are significantly different with 
respect to off-farm work participation, price knowledge, environmental perception, and health 
perception. In relation to outcomes of interest, Table 3.3 shows that apple yields for IPM 
adopters are significantly lower than that for non-adopters. There is, however, no significant 
difference in net returns between IPM adopters and non-adopters. With regard to agricultural 
income, the descriptive analysis in Table 3.3 shows that agricultural income obtained by IPM 
adopters are significantly higher than that received for non-adopters.  
Table 3.3 Mean differences in characteristics between IPM adopters and non-adopters 
Variables IPM adopters (N=108) Non-adopters (N=378) Diff. 
Age  44.10 (0.88) 49.87 (0.53) -5.771*** 
Gender 0.87 (0.03) 0.86 (0.02) 0.017 
Education  8.77 (0.27) 7.29 (0.15) 1.479*** 
Farm size  7.00 (0.34) 4.54 (0.15) 2.460*** 
Household size 5.05 (0.13) 4.13 (0.07) 0.919*** 
Off-farm work 0.29 (0.04) 0.11 (0.02) 0.178*** 
Asset ownership 0.95 (0.02) 0.91 (0.01) 0.044 
Warehouse 0.71 (0.04) 0.35 (0.02) 0.360*** 
Price knowledge 0.70 (0.05) 0.50 (0.03) 0.196*** 
Environmental perception 0.80 (0.04) 0.38 (0.02) 0.418*** 
Health perception 0.84 (0.04) 0.47 (0.03) 0.376*** 
Information availability 3.06 (0.08) 2.71 (0.05) 0.344*** 
Benefit availability 2.35 (0.09) 1.84 (0.04) 0.514*** 
Apple yields 1.93 (0.08) 2.24 (0.04) -0.306*** 
Net returns 7.15 (0.39) 7.65 (0.20) -0.494 
Agricultural income 15.38 (0.86) 12.94 (0.36) 2.441*** 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01. 
Overall, the descriptive statistics presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show that cooperative 
members and nonmembers, IPM adopters and non-adopters are systematically different in 
observed household and farm level characteristics. However, given that farmers choose to join 
agricultural cooperatives themselves, the differences in IPM adoption between cooperatives 
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members and nonmembers presented in Table 3.2 are inconclusive to understand the impact of 
IPM adoption on IPM adoption. Similarly, due to farmers self-select into IPM programs, the 
differences in apple yields, net returns and agricultural income between IPM adopters and non-
adopters presented in Table 3.3 are also not sufficient to help understand the impact of IPM 
adoption on farm outcomes of interest. Thus, rigorous impact evaluation methods including 
ESP model and a treatment effects model are respectively employed to estimate the true effect 
of cooperative membership on IPM adoption, as well as the effect of IPM adoption on apple 
yields, net returns and agricultural income. 
3.5 Results and Discussion 
3.5.1 Results of ESP Model Estimation 
The ESP estimation results for the IPM adoption equations of cooperative members and 
nonmembers are shown in the third and fourth columns of Table 3.4. The coefficient estimates 
for the cooperative member and nonmember regimes differ notably with respect to some of the 
variables, indicating that ESP model is preferred over a RBP model. The estimates of the 
residuals of the off-farm work variable, derived from the first-stage regression of off-farm work, 
are not significantly different from zero in IPM adoption specifications for cooperative 
members and nonmembers, suggesting that there is no simultaneity bias and the coefficients 
are consistently estimated (Wooldridge, 2002). The finding confirms the exogeneity of off-farm 
participation in IPM adoption equations. 
The results in Table 3.4 show that age is an important factor in explaining lower probability of 
adopting IPM technology among cooperative members. This is possibly because that older 
farmers are more used to traditional methods for pest management rather than learning the 
knowledge-intensive IPM technology. The negative and significant coefficient of gender 
variable for nonmembers suggests that male nonmembers are less likely to adopt IPM 
technology. The education variable shows a positive and statistically significant effect on the 
probabilities of IPM adoption for both cooperative members and nonmembers, suggesting that 
well-educated farmers are more likely to adopt IPM technology. Good knowledge makes 
farmers better able to understand the importance and benefits associated with IPM technology. 
The finding on education is consistent with other empirical studies on the effect of education 
on adoption of IPM strategies (e.g., Dasgupta et al., 2007; Fernandez-Cornejo, 1998). The 
estimates reveal that farm size has a positive and significant impact on the probability of 
adopting IPM technology for cooperative members, but a negative and insignificant effect on 
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IPM adoption for nonmembers. Larger farm size may help members obtain higher benefit from 
IPM adoption, contributing to a higher likelihood of IPM adoption. However, IPM adoption 
may involve risks such as productivity loss for nonmembers in the absence of technical 
assistance, resulting in decreasing adoption likelihood with increasing farm size for this group 
of farmers. The variable representing household size has a positive and significant effect on 
IPM adoption for members, suggesting that larger households with potentially more labor 
supply are more likely to adopt labor-intensive IPM technology under the cooperatives’ 
guidance. 
The coefficients of the variable representing off-farm work are positive for both cooperative 
members and nonmembers, but only statistically significant for nonmembers. The positive and 
significant impact is consistent with the income effect of off-farm work participation, since off-
farm earnings help farmers overcome credit and insurance market constraints by providing 
liquidity for the purchase of equipment such as fixed traps, insect-trap light, and yellow stick 
mobile for IPM technology. However, the finding contradicts with the result reported by Shi et 
al. (2011), who found that income effect of off-farm work participation cannot compensate for 
the lost-labor effect, contributing to a negative relationship between off-farm work participation 
and the levels of chemical input use in rice production in Jiangxi Province of China. Ownership 
of assets such as farming vehicle and the availability of apple refrigerated warehouse appears 
to increase the probability of IPM adoption for cooperative members. The positive and 
significant coefficients of price knowledge variable for cooperative members and nonmembers 
suggest that farmers who perceive that food produced under food safety standards obtains a 
higher price than conventional food are more likely to adopt IPM technology. To the extent that 
IPM adoption improves food safety due to the reduction of chemical pesticide use, the high 
quality product is expected to obtain favorable price  (Moustier et al., 2010; Naziri et al., 2014).  
The coefficients of environmental perception variable are positive and statistically significant, 
suggesting that farmers who are aware of pesticide pollution on the environment are more likely 
to adopt IPM technology. Cooperative members with health perception associated with 
chemical pesticide use tend to have a higher probability of adopting IPM technology. The 
finding supports the study by Dasgupta et al. (2007) who found that farmers who attribute their 
poor health to pesticide use may be more likely to adopt IPM, since IPM adoption may well 
improve health. The results in Table 3.4 also reveal that location fixed effects may be significant 
in explaining differences in IPM adoption. In particular, nonmembers located in Shaanxi are 
more likely to adopt IPM technology. The significance of location variable reflects variation in 
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cropping systems, temperature, humidity and regional pest populations in determining farmers’ 
decisions to adopt IPM technology.   
Table 3.4 Determinants of cooperative membership and determinants of  IPM adoption: 
ESP model estimation 
  IPM adoption 
Variable Selection Members Nonmembers 
Constant -2.903 (0.601)*** -7.998 (2.846)*** -4.187 (1.136)*** 
Age 0.003 (0.007) -0.042 (0.017)** 0.012 (0.015) 
Gender 0.150 (0.190) 0.624 (0.432) -0.914 (0.298)*** 
Education 0.053 (0.027)** 0.196 (0.074)*** 0.137 (0.056)** 
Farm size 0.063 (0.028)** 0.140 (0.051)*** -0.064 (0.041) 
Household size 0.173 (0.052)*** 0.291 (0.126)** -0.003 (0.106) 
Off-farm work -0.146 (0.180) 2.847 (2.076) 1.535 (0.667)** 
Asset ownership 0.683 (0.258)*** 1.280 (0.695)* 0.026 (0.318) 
Warehouse 0.150 (0.131) 0.679 (0.333)** 0.292 (0.243) 
Price knowledge 0.325 (0.143)** 0.884 (0.301)*** 0.547 (0.271)** 
Environmental perception 0.269 (0.136)** 0.914 (0.480)* 0.643 (0.251)** 
Health perception 0.226 (0.135)* 1.934 (0.666)*** 0.242 (0.211) 
Shaanxi -0.953 (0.238)*** 0.483 (0.777) 1.485 (0.522)*** 
Gansu -0.251 (0.256) 0.909 (0.711) 0.422 (0.538) 
Residual (off-farm work)  0.471 (0.690) -0.039 (0.197) 
PCS perception 0.736 (0.130)***   
𝜌1  -0.166 (0.518)  
𝜌0   -0.909 (0.107)*** 
Log pseudolikelihood         -382.374  
Wald test of indep. eqns. (𝜌1 = 𝜌0)            Chi2 (2)=7.36,  Prob>chi2=0.025 
Observations 481 481 481 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The results presented in the second column of Table 3.4 generally show that education, farm 
size, household size, asset ownership, price knowledge, environmental perception and health 
perception are important factors that influence farmers’ decisions to choose cooperative 
membership. Note that the primary objective of the selection equation in ESP model is not to 
perfectly explain the determinants of cooperative membership, but to account for unobserved 
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heterogeneity that could bias the treatment effects of cooperative membership on IPM adoption. 
For this purpose, the selection equation needs to include at least one valid instrument, which 
should be excluded in IPM adoption equations. As noted by Lokshin & Sajaia (2011),  missing 
instrumental variable in the selection equation may make the ESP model be identified by 
nonlinearities.  
In this study, a variable representing a farmer’s perception whether contemporary agricultural 
cooperative is more effective than people’s commune system (PCS) is used as the instrument. 
PCS was a collective farming regime that was practiced between 1958 and 1984, which resulted 
in stagnation of agricultural production. Ito et al. (2012) found that farmers who were perceived 
as having been influenced by an image of the PCS when making the participation decisions are 
significantly less likely to choose cooperative membership. Thus, the perception variable is 
expected to significantly influence farmers’ decisions to choose cooperative membership. 
Particularly, we expect that farmers who perceive the effectiveness of contemporary 
agricultural cooperatives are more likely to join cooperatives. To test the validity of the 
perception variable as an instrument, we run simple probit models for the cooperative 
membership choice equation and the IPM adoption equation with inclusive of the instrumental 
variable as a regressor. The results, which are not presented for the sake of brevity, show that 
the coefficient of the perception variable is positive and significant in the cooperative 
membership choice specification, but statistically insignificant in IPM adoption specification. 
Furthermore, Pearson correlation analysis also reveals that the perception variable is 
significantly correlated with the cooperative membership variable, but uncorrelated with IPM 
adoption variable. The findings confirm the validity of the perception variable as an instrument. 
In the lower part of Table 3.4, we present the estimates of correlation coefficients (𝜌0 and 𝜌1) 
of covariance terms between the error term in equation (3.7) and the error terms in the outcome 
equations (3.8a) and (3.8b). The significance of 𝜌0  confirms the presence of selection bias 
arising from unobservable factors, suggesting that addressing the self-selection bias issue by 
accounting for both observable and unobservable factors is a prerequisite for obtaining 
consistent and unbiased treatment effect of cooperative membership on IPM adoption. Of 
particular interest here is the negative coefficient of 𝜌1, which measures the correlation between 
the error terms of the selection equation and the outcome equation for the cooperative members. 
It clearly indicates negative selection bias, implying that farmers with lower probabilities of 
adopting IPM technology are more likely to join cooperatives (Ayuya et al., 2015; Gregory & 
Coleman-Jensen, 2013). Moreover, the results also show that the Wald test of the joint 
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significance of the correlation coefficient rejects the null hypothesis that there is no correlation 
between cooperative membership choice equation and IPM adoption equation, indicating that 
it is more efficient to use the ESP model than a simple probit model.   
Table 3.5 Average treatment effects of cooperative membership on IPM adoption 
Category ATT t-value a ATU t-value b 
Full sample 0.30 (0.02)*** 11.93 0.10 (0.01)*** 6.60 
Gansu 0.51 (0.05)*** 9.61 0.19 (0.05)*** 3.81 
Shaanxi 0.39 (0.04)*** 9.46 0.09 (0.02)*** 3.96 
Shandong  0.13 (0.03)*** 4.31 0.07 (0.02)*** 3.89 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01 
a and b: t-values are calculated based on the immediate form of the ttest command in Stata 13.1. 
We now use the estimated coefficients from the ESP model in combination with equations 
(3.10a) and (3.10b) to calculate the average treatment effects (ATT and ATU) of cooperative 
membership on IPM adoption. The results are presented in Table 3.5. Unlike the mean values 
predicted in Table 3.2, these ATT and ATU estimates account for selection bias arising from 
both observable and unobservable factors. Specifically, the ATT estimate shows that the causal 
effect of cooperative membership was to significantly increase the probability of adopting IPM 
technology by 30%. The ATU estimate in Table 3.5 is also statistically significant, which 
suggests that farmers without cooperative membership would be 10% more likely to adopt IPM 
technology if they were involved in cooperative organizations. 
To gain further understanding of the impact of cooperative membership on IPM adoption, we 
also present in Table 3.5 the ATT and ATU estimates based on surveyed regions. The results 
generally show that the causal effects of cooperative membership were to increase the 
probabilities of adopting IPM technology, and agricultural cooperative in Gansu plays the 
largest effect. In particular, cooperative members in Gansu are 51% more likely to adopt IPM 
technology. Overall, the findings of positive relationship between cooperative membership and 
IPM adoption in Table 3.5 are consistent with our theoretical model, suggesting that agricultural 
cooperative can be a transmission route in the efforts to spread IPM technology that may 
contribute to the improvements of food safety, health and environmental performance.  
3.5.2 Results of Treatment Effects Model Estimation  
The empirical results of the impact of IPM adoption on farm economic performance indicators 
such as apple yields, net returns and agricultural income are presented in Table 3.6. As indicated 
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previously, treatment effects model was employed to jointly estimate the IPM adoption 
equation and three farm performance equations, respectively.  
The lower parts of Table 3.6 show that the estimates of the correlation coefficients 𝜌𝛿𝜛  in 
Models 1-3 are significantly different from zero, suggesting the precence of selection bias due 
to unobservable factors. In particular, the negative correlation coefficients 𝜌𝛿𝜛  indicate 
negative selection bias. This would suggest that farmers having lower than average apple yields, 
net returns and agricultural income have higher probabilities of adopting IPM technology. In 
other words, farmers who expect that IPM adoption may improve the efficiency of pest 
management and save production costs are more likely to be IPM adopters, since the 
improvement of pest management efficiency may contribute to increased yields and the 
reduction of investment costs is closely associated with higher net returns and agricultural 
income. Thus, failing to account for such negative selection bias would lead to underestimated 
effects of IPM adoption on apple yields, net returns and agricultural income, and treatment 
effects model is preferred than other approaches such as propensity score matching or OLS 
regression. The results of the Wald tests for 𝜌𝛿𝜛 = 0 in Models 1-3 are significantly different 
from zero, suggesting that the null hypothesis that the IPM adoption variable is exogenous in 
three farm performance equations can be rejected.  
The results from the first-stage estimates of the treatment effects model, which show the 
determinants of farmers’ decisions to adopt IPM technology, are presented in the second, fourth 
and sixth columns in Table 3.6. Given that the primary objective of IPM adoption equation 
estimation is to account for unobserved heterogeneities that may bias the impact of IPM 
adoption on apple yields, net returns and agricultural income, detailed interpretation of the 
results are not provided here. The statistically insignificant coefficients of the off-farm work 
residual variables in Models 1 to 3 in Table 3.6 also confirm the exogeneity of off-farm 
participation in IPM adoption equations (Wooldridge, 2002).  
Chapter 3 Adoption of Intergraded Pest Management Technology and Farm Economic Performance 
91 
Table 3.6 Impact of IPM adoption on apple yields, net returns and agricultural income: Treatment effects model estimation  
 
Variable 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
IPM adoption Apple yields IPM adoption Net returns IPM adoption Agricultural 
income 
IPM adoption  0.154 (0.091)*  0.272 (0.104)***  0.222 (0.128)* 
Age 0.006 (0.013) -0.003 (0.002) 0.006 (0.012) -0.008 (0.003)*** 0.012 (0.013) -0.007 (0.002)*** 
Gender -0.207 (0.277) 0.086 (0.045)* -0.214 (0.276) 0.130 (0.067)* -0.204 (0.268) 0.129 (0.067)* 
Education 0.156 (0.048)*** -0.006 (0.006) 0.150 (0.047)*** -0.007 (0.010) 0.149 (0.048)*** -0.004 (0.009) 
Farm size 0.069 (0.032)** -0.055 (0.006)*** 0.066 (0.031)** -0.055 (0.010)*** 0.040 (0.036) 0.127 (0.008)*** 
Household size 0.089 (0.094) 0.032 (0.011)*** 0.102 (0.084) 0.019 (0.019) 0.110 (0.088) -0.187 (0.017)*** 
Off-farm work 1.803 (0.624)*** -0.165 (0.051)*** 1.952 (0.579)*** -0.293 (0.073)*** 1.931 (0.576)*** -0.116 (0.066)* 
Asset ownership 0.730 (0.319)** 0.055 (0.052) 0.721 (0.330)** 0.117 (0.082) 0.735 (0.326)** 0.052 (0.076) 
Warehouse 0.729 (0.188)*** 0.048 (0.035) 0.748 (0.179)*** 0.062 (0.055) 0.682 (0.188)*** 0.072 (0.048) 
Price knowledge 0.627 (0.180)*** 0.091 (0.031)*** 0.635 (0.179)*** 0.204 (0.049)*** 0.592 (0.177)*** 0.119 (0.045)*** 
Environmental perception 0.904 (0.219)*** -0.083 (0.035)** 0.903 (0.214)*** -0.083 (0.057) 0.957 (0.205)*** -0.064 (0.049) 
Health perception 0.677 (0.211)*** -0.012 (0.032) 0.675 (0.205)*** -0.017 (0.053) 0.685 (0.206)*** 0.075 (0.045)* 
Shaanxi 0.611 (0.419) -0.210 (0.054)*** 0.654 (0.403) -0.214 (0.094)** 0.818 (0.421)* -0.245 (0.070)*** 
Gansu 0.728 (0.398)* -0.290 (0.058)*** 0.770 (0.393)* 0.118 (0.094) 0.831 (0.385)** -0.100 (0.079) 
Residual (off-farm work) 0.087 (0.195)  0.034 (0.173)  0.057 (0.186)  
Information availability 0.284 (0.100)***  0.291 (0.0968)***  0.287 (0.095)***  
Benefit availability 0.238 (0.127)*  0.253 (0.116)**  0.208 (0.111)*  
Constant -7.574 (1.094)*** 7.942 (0.153)*** -7.690 (1.097)*** 9.175 (0.228)*** -7.795 (1.034)*** 9.721 (0.196)*** 
𝜌𝛿𝜛 -0.333 (0.173)* -0.455 (0.107)*** -0.511 (0.174)*** 
Ln(𝜎𝛿𝜛) -1.195 (0.034)*** -0.703 (0.037)*** -0.880 (0.047) 
Wald test (𝜌𝛿𝜛 = 0) chi2(1) =3.17, Prob > chi2 = 0.075 chi2(1) =13.15, Prob > chi2 = 0.000 chi2(1) =5.73, Prob > chi2 = 0.017 
Observations 481 481 481 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; The reference region is Shandong; 
The dependent variables in the second-stage estimation of treatment effects model include log form of apple yields measured in kg/mu in Model 1, log form of net returns from apple 
production measured in yuan/mu in Model 2, and log form of agricultural income measured in yuan/capita in Model 3. 
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Focusing on the variable of primary interest, IPM adoption, controlling for selection bias arising 
from observable and unobservable factors has positive and statistically significant impacts on 
apple yields, net returns and agricultural income. Such effects could not be observed when only 
comparing descriptive statistics between IPM adopters and non-adopters, due to the mentioned 
negative selection bias. The findings of positive impact of IPM adoption on apple yields and 
net returns are consistent with the finding by Fernandez-Cornejo (1998) who found that IPM 
adoption for diseases significantly increases yields and profits for grape growers in the United 
States. Dasgupta et al. (2007) also found that IPM rice farming is more profitable than 
conventional rice farming, while there is no significant productivity difference between IPM 
and conventional rice farming.  
Among other variables in Table 3.6, the coefficients of variables representing gender and price 
knowledge are positive and statistically significant in Models 1-3, suggesting that apple yields, 
net returns and agricultural income are higher for male farmers and the farmers who perceive 
that food produced under food safety standards obtain higher prices than conventional food, 
compared with their counterparts. The results also reveal that household size tends to increase 
apple yields, and farm size and health perception tend to increase agricultural income. The 
significance of location variables suggests that farmers located in Shaanxi and Gansu tend to 
have lower apple yields, while farmers located in Shaanxi have lower net returns. 
For model identification, treatment effects model requires the inclusion of valid instrumental 
variables. In this study, two variables including information availability and benefit availability 
are used in the analysis. The validity of the employed instrumental variables are tested using 
the approaches mentioned in ESP model. As shown in Table 3.6, information availability and 
benefit availability variables are significantly different from zero, suggesting that information 
acquisition and benefits associated with IPM technology play important roles in determining 
farmers’ decisions to adopt the technology.   
3.6 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Although IPM technology is promoted as a preferred approach for both sustainable 
intensification of crop production and pesticide risk reduction, its adoption rate remains low in 
China. There is still a need to facilitate the adoption of the technology. While recent studies 
have shown that agricultural cooperative is an efficient institutional innovation that enhances 
farmers’ adoption of agricultural technologies, there is hardly any work that has looked at the 
question whether agricultural cooperatives can promote IPM adoption. In this paper, we have 
Chapter 3 Adoption of Integrated Pest Management Technology and Farm Economic Performance 
93 
addressed the research gap by analyzing the impact of cooperative membership on IPM 
adoption. We employed an endogenous switching probit model that accounts for sample 
selection bias and structural differences between cooperative members and nonmembers to 
analyze the adoption behaviors of 481 apple farmers in China. To further understand how IPM 
adoption influences the economic performance of farm households, we also employed a 
treatment effects model to analyze the impact of IPM adoption on apple yields, net returns and 
agricultural income. 
The empirical results did suggest the presence of selection bias arising from unobserved 
heterogeneities. After controlling for this bias, the ATT estimate showed that the causal effect 
of cooperative membership was to increase the probability of IPM adoption by 30%. On the 
other hand, the positive and significant ATU suggested that farmers without cooperative 
membership would be 10% more likely to adopt IPM technology if joined cooperatives. The 
empirical finding is generally consistent with our theoretical finding that it is optimal for 
cooperative members to adopt IPM technology to maximize the expected profit. Overall, our 
results suggest that agricultural cooperative could be an important transmission route in the 
government’s efforts of spreading IPM technology.   
The ESP estimates also provide a better understanding of the factors that influence farmers’ 
decisions to join cooperatives and adopt IPM technology. In particular, the results showed that 
farmers’ cooperative membership choice decisions are driven primarily by farmers’ education, 
farm size, household size, asset ownership, price knowledge, environmental perception and 
health perception. With respect to IPM adoption, the results showed that cooperative members’ 
decisions to adopt IPM technology are influenced by education, farm size, household size, asset 
ownership, price knowledge, the establishment of refrigerated warehouse, environmental and 
health perceptions, while IPM adoption decisions of nonmembers are influenced by education, 
off-farm work, price knowledge and environmental perception.  
With respect to the relationship between IPM adoption and farm outcomes (apple yields, net 
returns and agricultural income), the simple mean value comparisons revealed apple yields of 
IPM adopters were significantly lower than that of non-adopters, and there was no significant 
difference in net returns between these two groups of farmers. However, econometric 
estimation with a treatment effects model revealed negative selection bias, implying that 
farmers with lower than average apple yields, net returns and agricultural income are more 
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likely to adopt IPM technology. Controlling for this bias resulted in positive and significant 
impacts of IPM adoption on apple yields, net returns and agricultural income.  
Generally, the empirical results presented in this paper support the notion that membership in 
agricultural cooperatives can play a positive role by serving as a catalyst for spreading IPM 
technology. The finding that price knowledge tends to influence farmers’ decisions to join 
cooperatives and adopt IPM technology suggests that the enhancement of farmers’ price 
knowledge about food produced under organic food standard, green food standard and 
pollution-free food standard and the establishment of food safety markets would step up the 
promotion of farmers’ decisions to join cooperatives and adopt IPM technology.  In particular, 
the Chinese government should continue to encourage the adoption of food safety and quality 
standards by agricultural cooperatives and enhance market mechanism of high price for high 
quality products. The positive and significant impacts of environmental perception on IPM 
adoption suggest that promoting effective measures to improve farmers’ understanding of 
negative environmental effects associated with continuous use of chemical pesticides would 
help increase farmers’ adoption of IPM technology. This could be achieved through 
cooperatives’ collective activities. Finally, the positive impact of IPM adoption on apple yields, 
net returns and agricultural income underscores the importance of efforts by policy makers to 
promote IPM adoption through agricultural cooperative. 
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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of cooperative membership on farm performance indicators 
such as apple yields, net returns and household income, using cross-sectional data from a survey 
of farmers in China. An endogenous switching regression model that accounts for selection bias 
is employed in the analysis. The empirical results reveal that cooperative membership exerts a 
positive and statistically significant impact on apple yields, farm net returns and household 
income. A disaggregated analysis also reveals that small-scale farms tend to benefit more from 
cooperatives than medium and large farms. 
Keywords: Agricultural cooperatives; Impact assessment; Apple farmers; China 
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4.1 Introduction  
The emergence of agricultural cooperatives is widely viewed as an important institutional 
arrangement that can help overcome the constraints that impede smallholders in developing 
countries from taking advantages of agricultural production and marketing opportunities 
(World Bank 2006). For instance, they can strengthen farmers’ negotiation abilities in the 
markets to gain more competitive prices for both inputs and outputs, reduce transaction costs 
and information asymmetry, and improve agro-food safety and quality standards (Hellin et al. 
2009; Holloway et al. 2000; Jia et al. 2012; Markelova et al. 2009; Moustier et al. 2010; Trebbin 
2014; Valentinov 2007). Given its significance in enhancing agricultural growth, the promotion 
of agricultural cooperatives has increasingly attracted attention of donors, governments and 
researchers in developing countries (Abebaw and Haile 2013; Deng et al. 2010).  
The Chinese government has made efforts to accelerate the systematic promotion of agricultural 
cooperatives through financial and policy support. One of such efforts in the promulgation of 
the Law of Farmers’ Professional Cooperatives in 2007, with the aim of developing sustainable 
cooperatives. Despite the efforts made by the government, the Ministry of Agriculture in China 
reported that only 25.2% of farm households were involved in agricultural cooperatives in the 
country in 2013. This is partly because of the high transaction costs involved in contracting 
with small-scale farmers in the villages, resulting in the absence of agricultural cooperatives in 
many villages (Deng et al. 2010; Francesconi and Wouterse 2015; Ito et al. 2012). 
Several studies have shown that agricultural cooperatives influence the adoption of improved 
agricultural technology by farmers and household welfare (e.g., Abebaw and Haile 2013; 
Fischer and Qaim 2012; Francesconi and Heerink 2011; Ito et al. 2012; Verhofstadt and 
Maertens 2014a, 2014b). In their study on Ethiopia, Abebaw and Haile (2013) find that 
cooperative membership exerts a positive and significant impact on fertilizer adoption, while a 
recent study by Verhofstadt and Maertens (2014a) on Rwanda finds a positive and significant 
effect of cooperative membership on the likelihood of using improved seeds, mineral fertilizer 
and pesticide. The study by Ito et al. (2012) shows that cooperative membership exerts a 
positive and significant effect on farm income of watermelon farmers in China. In examining 
the impact of cooperative membership, most of the studies have employed propensity score 
matching (hereinafter, PSM) technique to account for selection bias (Abebaw and Haile 2013; 
Bernard et al. 2008; Fischer and Qaim 2012; Ito et al. 2012; Verhofstadt and Maertens 2014a). 
For example, in the recent study on Rwanda, Verhofstadt and Maertens (2014b) employ the 
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PSM approach to examine the impact of cooperative membership on farmers’ welfare, 
measured by farm income and poverty incidence, and find that agricultural cooperatives are 
effective in improving rural incomes and reducing rural poverty. However, a well-known 
shortcoming of PSM method is its inability to account for unobservable factors such as innate 
skills and risk perception, which may result in biased estimates.  
This paper aims to contribute to the growing literature on the role of agricultural cooperatives 
by identifying the factors that influence farmers’ decisions to join cooperatives, as well as 
estimating the impact of cooperative membership on crop yields, net returns and household 
income. The study employs recent survey data of 481 apple farmers in Gansu, Shaanxi and 
Shandong provinces of China for empirical analysis.  
We model farmers’ choice of cooperative membership as a selection process, where the 
expected higher net returns to the cooperatives drive farmers’ decisions of choosing to belong 
to agricultural cooperatives. This study employs an endogenous switching regression approach 
to account for selection bias (Lokshin and Sajaia 2004). This approach allows us to analyze 
both the determinants of cooperative membership and the impact of membership on farm 
performance indicators such as apple yields, net returns, as well as household income, 
separately for members and nonmembers. 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows: The next section gives an overview of the 
apple sector and agricultural cooperatives in China. Section 4.3 presents the data and 
corresponding descriptive statistics. Section 4.4 outlines the empirical specifications employed 
in the analysis. The empirical results and discussions are presented in section 4.5. The final 
section provides conclusion and policy implications. 
4.2 Overview of Apple Sector and Agricultural Cooperatives in China 
China is the world’s largest apple producing country, recording a total of 38.49 million MT 
(49.67% of the world’s total) in 2012, followed by the United States and Turkey, who produced 
4.11 and 2.89 million MT, respectively (FAOSTAT). Apple production in China is mainly in 
its Bohai Gulf region (Shandong, Liaoning and Hebei provinces) and Northwest Loess Plateau 
region (Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan and Gansu provinces). In particular, Gansu, Shaanxi and 
Shandong provinces cover more than half of the country’s total apple orchards, accounting for 
54.17% of total production in 2012. These three provinces are characterized by hilly and 
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mountainous lands, and endowed with suitable soil and weather conditions for top quality apple 
production.  
Gansu, Shaanxi and Shandong have obvious differences in terms of agro-climates and agro-
food market environments, although they have better conditions for apple production over other 
areas in China. Shandong is a coastal province with favorable annual rainfall and well 
developed infrastructure for exports. Farmers in this province also produce other crops like 
pears, peaches, cherries, peanuts, corn, and apricot as cash sources, which they sell to 
international markets. In contrast, Gansu and Shaanxi are inland provinces that are 
characterized by low rainfall and poor infrastructure (e.g., road and telecommunication). As a 
result, the farmers there only grow corn and potatoes as extra income sources, or for household 
consumption, and apple output is mostly for domestic sales. 
Despite being the highest apple producing country, China faces constraints on the world 
markets, with only about 3% of apples produced finding their way into international markets 
(FAOSTAT). The primary reason is the difficulty in meeting food safety and quality standards, 
since farmers use large quantities of agro-chemicals in the production process. Moreover, 
farmers engaged in apple production and marketing are severely constrained by high transaction 
costs and information asymmetry, particularly those living in remote areas.  
Given the constraints facing apple production and marketing in China, the government has 
strived to facilitate the development of agricultural cooperatives in the apple sector. As a new 
institutional innovation, agricultural cooperatives are expected to enhance its members’ access 
to modern supply chains, promote the adoption of new technologies, help lower production and 
marketing costs, as well as raise farmers’ incomes (Zheng et al. 2012). The cooperative 
organizations take on responsibilities for providing production technologies and/or marketing 
information to its members. In exchange for their role in enhancing agricultural performance, 
these agricultural cooperatives receive support and subsidies from the government. The 
production technologies promoted by cooperatives include orchard management approaches 
(e.g., pruning, branch drawing), efficient use of inputs (e.g., fertilizer and pesticide), quality 
control, and pest management. In addition, cooperatives provide some services by collectively 
purchasing inputs for its members at reasonable prices. The typical marketing services include 
provision of information with respect to prices and access to marketing channels, aimed at 
enhancing smallholders’ output market participation. The service provision of agricultural 
cooperatives differs across regions. For instance, in Gansu and Shaanxi provinces, apple 
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cooperatives are mainly providing production services to its members, with limited services on 
farm produce distribution. In contrast, cooperatives in Shandong province provide both 
technical guidance and distribution services.  
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data used in the study come from a farm household survey that was conducted from 
September to December 2013 in China. A multistage sampling procedure was used for the 
selection of observation units. First, Gansu, Shaanxi and Shandong provinces were purposively 
selected based on the national intensity of apple production. In a second stage, four county-
level districts where apples are intensively produced at the provincial level were chosen. These 
include Jingning county in Gansu, Luochuan county in Shaanxi, and Qixia and Laiyang cities 
in Shanong.1 Third, six agricultural cooperatives were randomly selected from those districts, 
using information provided by the local agricultural bureau. Fourth, three villages affiliated to 
each cooperative in the selected district were randomly selected. 2  Finally, around 25-30 
households including both cooperative members and nonmembers in each village were 
randomly selected, resulting in a total of 481 households. The data collected include 
information on apple production and marketing (e.g., input use, costs, yields, and output price), 
household income, as well as household and farm-level characteristics (e.g., age, education, 
farm size, and asset ownership).  
Table 4.1 presents the definition and summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. 
The dependent variable used in the study is a dummy variable that takes the value of one, if the 
household belonged to an agricultural cooperative, and the value zero, if no cooperative 
membership was recorded. The outcome variables used in the study are apple yields, net returns, 
and household income. Net returns are measured as the difference between the value of apple 
yields and variable input costs per mu. The inputs included fertilizer, pesticide, hired labor, 
bags, irrigation and films for land moisture conservation and apple coloring. It can be observed 
from the Table 4.1 that about 43% of households in the sample belong to agricultural 
cooperatives. The average age of farmers is almost 49 years. The average farm size is 5.07 mu, 
                                                          
1 Qixia and Laiyang are county-level cities that belong to Yantai city, according to administrative division in China. 
2 In China, village is the basic administrative unit, and there are cooperatives who organize farmers in more than 
one village, especially those with certain scale and who are well operated.  
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showing that the majority of households are small-scale apple producers. The average 
household includes 4-5 household members. 
Table 4.1 Definition and summary statistics of selected variables 
Variable Description Mean S.D． 
Membership 1 If farmer belonged to a cooperative, 0 otherwise 0.43 0.50 
Apple yields Apple output (kg/mua) 2,218.46 820.29 
Net returns Apple gross revenue minus variable costs 
(yuanb/mu) 
7,540.34 3,911.82 
HH incomes Annual household income per capita (yuan) 15,884.81 8,566.27 
Age Age of household head (years) 48.63 10.25 
Education Farmer’s maximal education level (years) 7.60 2.87 
Household size Number of people residing in household 4.33 1.44 
Labor Labor use (labor days/mu) 101.26 42.95 
Farm size Total fruiting apple orchards (mu) 5.07 3.24 
Computer 1 If farmer owns computer, 0 otherwise 0.32 0.47 
Extension 
contact  
1 If farmer visited government extension service, 
0 otherwise 
0.38 0.49 
Access to credit 1 If farmer is not liquidity constrained, 0 
otherwise 
0.53 0.50 
Sandy soil 1 if orchard land has sandy soil, 0 otherwise 0.38 0.49 
Clay soil 1 if orchard land has clay soil, 0 otherwise 0.45 0.50 
Loam soil  1 if orchard land has loam soil, 0 otherwise 0.17 0.37 
Gansu 1 If farmer is located in Gansu province, 0 
otherwise 
0.17 0.37 
Shaanxi 1 If farmer is located in Shaanxi Province, 0 
otherwise 
0.40 0.49 
Shandong 1 If farmer is located in Shandong province, 0 
otherwise 
0.43 0.50 
Neighbor 
membership 
1 if any neighbor has cooperative membership, 0 
otherwise 
0.33 0.47 
a 1 mu=1/15 hectare; 
 b yuan is Chinese currency unit ($1=6.14 yuan).  
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The mean differences in the characteristics of cooperative members and nonmembers are 
presented in Table 4.2. Cooperative members tend to be better educated than nonmembers. 
They have larger household size and farm size. Particularly, members have larger probability 
to own computer, which represents wealth and convenience of access to production and 
marketing information. Cooperative members tend to have a stronger link with the government 
extension agents, compared to nonmembers. Other household and farm-level characteristics 
such as household’s age and access to credit hardly differ between members and nonmembers. 
Table 4.2 Mean differences in characteristics between cooperative members and 
nonmembers 
Variables Members Nonmembers Diff. 
Age 48.45 (0.66) 48.78 (0.66) -0.33 
Education 8.05 (0.17) 7.27 (0.19) 0.78*** 
Household size 4.57 (0.10) 4.14 (0.08) 0.43*** 
Farm size 5.51 (0.24) 4.73 (0.18) 0.78*** 
Computer 0.38 (0.03) 0.27 (0.03) 0.11** 
Extension contact 0.50 (0.03) 0.29 (0.03) 0.21*** 
Access to credit 0.57 (0.03) 0.51 (0.03) 0.07 
Sandy soil 0.44 (0.03) 0.34 (0.03) 0.09** 
Clay soil 0.37 (0.03) 0.51 (0.03) -0.14*** 
Loam soil 0.20 (0.02) 0.15 (0.03) 0.05 
Neighbor membership 0.56 (0.03) 0.16 (0.02) 0.40*** 
Labor (days/mu) 105.58 (3.05) 97.98 (2.54) 7.61* 
Apple yields (kg/mu) 2310.81 (64.07) 2148.10 (43.90) 162.71*** 
Net returns (yuan/mu) 8654.38 (301.88) 6691.55 (199.87) 1962.84*** 
Household income (yuan/capita) 17538.88 (620.79) 14624.57 (487.22) 2914.31*** 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Differences in apple yields, net returns from apple production and household income between 
members and nonmembers are presented in the lower part of Table 4.2. As evident from the 
Table, the average apple yield for members is 162.71 kg/mu higher than that of nonmembers, 
which is statistically significant in mean difference. Moreover, the average net returns per mu 
and per capita household income are both significantly higher for members. These descriptive 
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comparisons seem to suggest that agricultural cooperatives play a significant role in enhancing 
agricultural productivity and welfare of members, relative to nonmembers. However, the 
findings in Table 4.2 cannot be used to make inferences regarding the impact of cooperative 
membership on apple yields, net returns and household income, as the simple comparison of 
mean differences does not account for confounding factors such as observed household and 
farm-level characteristics (e.g., age, education, farm size, and asset ownership) and unobserved 
factors (e.g., farmers’ innate skills, risk perception and motivations of membership choice). 
4.4 Empirical Specifications 
4.4.1    The Choice of Cooperative Membership 
The conceptual framework employed here is based on the assumption that apple farmers choose 
to belong and not to belong to an agricultural cooperative. We assume here that farmers are risk 
neutral, and take into account the potential net returns (𝐷𝑀
∗ ) derived from apple production from 
belonging to an agricultural cooperative and the expected net returns (𝐷𝑁
∗ ) derived from not 
belonging. If we define the difference between the expected net returns from joining a 
cooperative and not joining as 𝐷𝑖
∗, that is 𝐷𝑖
∗ = 𝐷𝑀
∗ − 𝐷𝑁
∗ , then a farmer would choose to belong 
to a cooperative if 𝐷𝑖
∗ > 0. However, 𝐷𝑖
∗ cannot be observed, but can be expressed as a function 
of observable elements in the following latent variable model: 
𝐷𝑖
∗ = 𝑍𝑖𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖 ,     𝐷𝑖 = 1  𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑖
∗ > 0   (4.1) 
where 𝐷𝑖 is a binary indicator variable that equals 1 for household 𝑖, in case of membership in 
an agricultural cooperative and 0 otherwise; 𝑍𝑖  is a vector of household and farm-level 
characteristics such as age, education, farm size and household size; 𝛽 is a vector of parameters 
to be estimated; and 𝜇𝑖 is an error term assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean. The 
probability of being a member of an agricultural cooperative can be expressed as:  
Pr(𝐷𝑖 = 1) = Pr(𝐷𝑖
∗ > 0) = Pr(𝜇𝑖 > −𝑍𝑖𝛽) = 1 − 𝐹(−𝑍𝑖𝛽)  (4.2) 
where 𝐹 is the cumulative distribution function for 𝜇𝑖. 
To link the cooperative membership with the potential outcome, we assume that rational 
farmers maximize net returns (𝜋) from apple production. This can then be expressed as:  
𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑃𝑄(𝑅, 𝑍) − 𝑂𝑅  (4.3) 
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where P is apple price and Q is the total apple output; 𝑂 is a vector of input prices and R is a 
vector of input variables (e.g., fertilizer, pesticide, and labor); Z is a vector of explanatory 
variables as defined above. Output Q is described by a well-behaved production function in 
which ∂Q/ ∂R > 0 and 𝜕2Q/𝜕2R < 0. Net returns can be expressed as a function of inputs and 
outputs prices, the choice of cooperative membership D, and the household and farm-level 
characteristics as follows: 
𝜋 = 𝜋(𝑃, 𝑂, 𝐷, 𝑍)   (4.4) 
The first-order condition of the maximization problem of the net returns function (3) yields a 
reduced-form apple output supply function: 
𝑄 = 𝑄(𝑃, 𝑂, 𝐷, 𝑍)  (4.5) 
The specifications in equations (4.4) and (4.5) show that the net returns of apple production (𝜋) 
and apple yields (Q) are determined by the input and output prices, the choice of cooperative 
membership, as well as household and farm-level characteristics. 
4.4.2 Impact Assessment and Selection Bias 
The focus of this study is to analyze the impact of cooperative membership on apple yields, net 
returns and household income. Considering that the vector of outcome variables (apple yields, 
net returns or household income) is a linear function of a vector of explanatory variables 𝑋𝑖, we 
can specify an outcome equation as: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖𝛼 + 𝐷𝑖𝜂 + 𝜀𝑖  (4.6) 
where 𝑌𝑖 represents a vector of outcome variables; 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of explanatory variables such 
as household characteristics (e.g., age, education and household size), farm and location 
characteristics (e.g., farm size), and financial capital and institutional variables (e.g., extension 
contact and access to credit); 𝐷𝑖 is an indicator of cooperative membership dummy as defined 
above; α and η are parameters to be estimated, and 𝜀𝑖 is a random error term.  
In equation (4.6), the choice of cooperative membership is exogenously determined. However, 
farmers may self-select into cooperatives, depending on their inherent characteristics, rather 
than being randomly selected. Therefore, ordinary least square (OLS) method might generate 
biased estimates. Furthermore, unobservable factors may influence the error term 𝜇𝑖  in the 
Chapter 4 Does Cooperative Membership Improve Household Welfare? 
Evidence from Apple Farmers in China 
108 
selection equation (4.1) and the error term 𝜀𝑖 in the outcome equation (4.6) simultaneously, 
resulting in a correlation between the two error terms, i.e. corr(𝜇𝑖, 𝜀𝑖) ≠ 0. Failing to account 
for such selectivity bias may result in inconsistent estimates. For instance, if farmers, who have 
lower than average outcomes such as apple yields, net returns or household income, but higher 
motivations to improve apple quality and safety, are more likely to belong to cooperatives, this 
may result in negative selection bias and underestimated treatment effects. On the other hand, 
if farmers who have higher than average outcomes are more likely to belong to a cooperative 
and their choice of cooperative membership is influenced by the neighbors’ membership 
situation, it may result in positive selection bias and overestimated treatment effects.  
In non-experimental research work with survey data, the econometric approach such as PSM 
method has been widely applied to address the issue of selection bias. However, as indicated 
earlier, PSM method estimates the treatment effects of cooperative membership accounting for 
only observed heterogeneities. In this paper, we employ an endogenous switching regression 
(hereinafter, ESR) model to address the issue of selection bias by accounting for both observed 
and unobserved heterogeneities (Lokshin and Sajaia 2004; Narayanan 2014; Shiferaw et al. 
2014). This approach employs the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) method to 
estimate one selection and two outcome equations simultaneously.  
4.4.3 The ESR Model  
The ESR model consists of two stages. The first-stage is a selection equation based on a 
dichotomous criterion function for the choice of cooperative membership, as shown by equation 
(4.1). In the second stage, two regime equations for cooperative members and nonmembers can 
be specified for the outcomes of interest. The model is specified as:  
Regime 1: 𝑌𝑖𝑀 = 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽𝑖𝑀 + 𝜀𝑖𝑀     𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑖 = 1    (4.7a) 
Regime 2: 𝑌𝑖𝑁 = 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽𝑖𝑁 + 𝜀𝑖𝑁       𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑖 = 0  (4.7b) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑀  and 𝑌𝑖𝑁  are outcomes such as apple yields, net returns or household income for 
cooperative members and nonmembers, respectively; 𝑋𝑖
′  represents a vector of exogenous 
variables that may influence the outcomes employed; 𝜀𝑖 is random disturbance term associated 
with the outcome variables.  
While the variables 𝑍𝑖 in equation (4.1) and 𝑋𝑖
′ are allowed to overlap, proper identification 
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requires at least one variable in 𝑍𝑖 that does not appear in 𝑋𝑖
′.3 Therefore, the selection equation 
(4.1) is estimated based on all explanatory variables specified in the outcome equations plus 
one or more instruments. The valid instrument is required to influence farmer’s choice of 
cooperative membership but have no effect on outcomes. In this study, we employ neighbor’s 
membership variable as an identifying instrument, since previous studies have shown that 
farmers’ choice of cooperative membership is positively and significantly influenced by their 
neighbor’s membership (e.g., Ito et al. 2012). However, neighbor’s membership is not expected 
to affect agricultural productivity and incomes. For the validity check of this instrument, we 
have run simple probit model for selection equation and OLS regression for outcome equations 
separately and we have checked that this variable is, in effect, significant when included in the 
cooperative membership choice equation but not significant when included in the outcome 
equations. A further test of correlation analysis also reveals that the selected instrument is 
uncorrelated with apple yields, net returns and household income, respectively, suggesting the 
validity of the instrument. 
The variable 𝑋𝑖
′  in specifications (4.7a) and (4.7b) takes into account observable factors to 
address the issue of selection bias. However, unobservable factors could still create a correlation 
between the error terms in the selection and outcome equations. i.e. corr(𝜇𝑖, 𝜀𝑖) ≠ 0. The ESR 
model addresses the selection bias issue resulting from unobservable factors as a missing 
variable problem. In particular, after estimating the selection equation, the inverse Mills ratios 
𝜆𝑖𝑀  and 𝜆𝑖𝑁  and the covariance terms 𝜎𝜇𝑀 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣 (𝜇𝑖, 𝜀𝑖𝑀)  and 𝜎𝜇𝑁 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣 (𝜇𝑖, 𝜀𝑖𝑁)  are 
calculated and plugged into equations (4.7a) and (4.7b): 
𝑌𝑖𝑀 = 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽𝑖𝑀 + 𝜎𝜇𝑀𝜆𝑖𝑀 + 𝛾𝑖𝑀    𝑖𝑓  𝐷𝑖 = 1               (4.8a) 
𝑌𝑖𝑁 = 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽𝑖𝑁 + 𝜎𝜇𝑁𝜆𝑖𝑁 + 𝛾𝑖𝑁      𝑖𝑓  𝐷𝑖 = 0              (4.8b) 
where 𝜆𝑖𝑀  and 𝜆𝑖𝑁  control for selection bias resulting from unobservable factors; the error 
terms 𝛾𝑖𝑀 and 𝛾𝑖𝑁 have conditional zero means. The FIML method suggested by Lokshin and 
Sajaia (2004) is used to simultaneously estimate the selection and outcome equations. 
In ESR estimation, the correlation coefficients 𝜌𝜇𝑀(𝜎𝜇𝑀/𝜎𝜇𝜎𝑖𝑀) and 𝜌𝜇𝑁(𝜎𝜇𝑁/𝜎𝜇𝜎𝑖𝑁) of the 
                                                          
3 The variables 𝑋𝑖 and variables 𝑍𝑖 are usually expected to have similar variables, and the only difference is that 
there is at least one instrumental variable which is included in 𝑍𝑖 but excluded in 𝑋𝑖
′. 
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covariance terms between the error terms in selection equation (4.1) and outcome equations 
(4.7a) and (4.7b) have econometric interpretations. First, if 𝜌𝜇𝑀  or 𝜌𝜇𝑁  is statistically 
significant, this would indicate the presence of selection bias arising from unobservable factors. 
Hence, taking into account both observable and unobservable factors is a prerequisite to derive 
unbiased estimates of treatment effects. Second, if 𝜌𝜇𝑀 and 𝜌𝜇𝑁 have alternative signs, it means 
that farmers choose to belong to cooperatives on the basis of their comparative advantage, while 
the same sign implies “hierarchical sorting”, i.e., members have an above-average outcomes, 
compared to nonmembers, independent of the membership choice decision. Third, 𝜌𝜇𝑀 > 0 
implies negative selection bias, indicating farmers who have below than average outcomes are 
more likely to choose to belong to agricultural cooperatives. Conversely, if   𝜌𝜇𝑀 < 0, this 
would suggest positive selection bias.  
4.4.4 Estimating Treatment Effects 
Following Lokshin and Sajaia (2004), the coefficients from the ESR model can be employed to 
derive average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Specifically, the observed and unobserved 
counterfactual outcomes for cooperative members can be calculated as follows: 
Farmers with membership (observed): 
E[𝑌𝑖𝑀|𝐷 = 1] = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑖𝑀 + 𝜎𝜇𝑀𝜆𝑖𝑀  (4.9a) 
Farmers without membership (counterfactual): 
E[𝑌𝑖𝑁|𝐷 = 1] = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑖𝑁 + 𝜎𝜇𝑁𝜆𝑖𝑀                   (4.9b) 
Thus, the expected outcomes in equations (4.9a) and (4.9b) are used to derive unbiased 
treatment effects (ATT). 
ATT = E[𝑌𝑖𝑀|𝐷 = 1] − E[𝑌𝑖𝑁|𝐷 = 1] = 𝑋𝑖(𝛽𝑖𝑀 − 𝛽𝑖𝑁) + 𝜆𝑖𝑀(𝜎𝜇𝑀 − 𝜎𝜇𝑁)   (4.10) 
4.4.5 Method for Addressing Potential Endogeneity 
In estimating equation (4.1), some of the employed explanatory variables such as extension 
contact and access to credit are potentially endogenous. In particular, agricultural extension 
agents may disseminate new technologies to farmers, and also encourage them to join 
cooperative organizations. Some cooperatives normally help their members to obtain credit 
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from financial institutions, thus making access to credit a potentially endogenous variable. Thus, 
extension contact and access to credit variables may be jointly determined with the decision of 
choosing to belong to cooperatives.  
Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables, this study employs the approach 
suggested by Rivers and Vuong (1988) to address these potential endogeneity problems. The 
approach involves specifying the potential endogenous variables (extension contact, and access 
to credit) as functions of all other explanatory variables given in the cooperative membership 
choice equation, in addition to a set of instruments in the first stage regression, such as: 
𝐺𝑖 = 𝑍𝑖𝛽 + 𝑆𝑖𝜔 + 𝜉𝑖     (4.11) 
where 𝐺𝑖 is a vector of observed potential endogenous variables such as extension contact and 
access to credit, 𝑍𝑖 is as defined previously, and 𝑆𝑖 is a vector of instruments. It is worth noting 
here that the employed instruments should strongly influence the given potential endogenous 
variables, but not the choice of cooperative membership. Therefore, two instruments are 
excluded in estimating equation (4.1). The two variables include the perception of the 
usefulness of extension service and the distance to the farmer’s source of capital, which are not 
expected to influence the choice of cooperative membership. These variables are employed in 
the extension contact and access to credit equations, respectively.4 It is significant to note that 
the two instrumental variables are required not to be correlated with the variable (i.e. neighbor 
membership) used for ESR model identification. Finally, both the observed factors and the 
residuals predicted from equation (4.11) are used in the cooperative membership choice 
specification as follows: 
𝐷𝑖
∗ = 𝑍𝑖𝛿 + 𝐺𝑖𝜂 + 𝑅𝑖𝜅 + 𝜗𝑖     (4.12) 
where 𝑅𝑖 is a vector of the residual terms predicted from equation (4.11) for the endogenous 
variables (Wooldridge 2002). The endogenous variables become appropriately exogenous in a 
second-stage estimating equation by adding appropriate residuals since these residuals serve as 
the control functions. The approach leads to robust, regression-based Hausman test for 
endogeneity of the suspected variables (Wooldridge 2015) 
                                                          
4 The distance to the capital source variable measures the distance between farmer’s residence and available capital 
source (e.g., banks, friends and relatives). 
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4.5 Results and Discussion 
The estimates of the factors that influence a farmer’s decision to belong to an agricultural 
cooperative, and the impact of cooperative membership on apple yields, net returns and 
household income are presented in Tables 4.3 to 4.5. As indicated previously, the FIML 
approach estimates both the selection and outcome equations jointly. The selection equations 
that represent the determinants of choosing cooperative membership are given in the second 
columns of Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. The outcome equations that represent the impact of 
cooperative membership on apple yields, net returns and household income for both members 
and nonmembers are given in the third and fourth columns of Tables 4.3-4.5, respectively. 
Moreover, the estimates of the residuals derived from the first-stage regression for the potential 
endogenous variables that include extension contact and access to credit are also presented in 
the second columns of Tables 4.3-4.5. These residuals are not significantly different from zero, 
suggesting that the coefficients have been consistently estimated (Wooldridge 2002). In the 
next sections, we first discuss the determinants of cooperative membership based on selection 
equations in Tables 4.3-4.5 together. The impact of cooperative membership on apple yields, 
net returns and household income are then discussed. Finally, the estimates for the average 
treatment effects on the treated (ATT) are presented. 
4.5.1 Determinants of Cooperative Membership 
In the selection specifications of Tables 4.3-4.5, variables having the same name have 
statistically similar effects on the choice of cooperative membership. The farm size variable is 
positive and significantly different from zero, suggesting that farmers with larger farm sizes are 
more likely to belong to cooperatives, a finding that is consistent with the results reported by 
Bernard and Spielman (2009) and Ito et al. (2012). The variable for labor input is positive and 
significant, indicating that households devoting more labor inputs to apple production are more 
likely to have cooperative membership. Computer ownership seems to be an important 
determinant of cooperative membership, a finding that is in line with Fischer and Qaim (2012), 
who pointed out that efficient means of communication can facilitate the formation of farmer 
organizations. The coefficients of the variables representing soil types and regional variables 
are also significantly different from zero, indicating significant cluster effects and probably 
revealing agro-climate variance, and differences of environment resources, access to local 
agricultural institutional arrangements and infrastructure.  
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4.5.2 Yield Effects 
We now interpret the impact of cooperative membership on apple yields, using the estimates 
presented in Table 4.3. The variable representing labor input shows a significant and positive 
impact on apple yields for both members and nonmembers, suggesting that labor is a vital 
determinant of higher apple yields. Farm size variable tends to have negative and statistically 
significant impacts on apple yields for both cooperative members and nonmembers, suggesting 
that larger farms obtained significantly lower apple yields. The finding of the inverse 
relationship between farm size and productivity is consistent with the results obtained by 
Abdulai and Huffman (2014) and Kleemann et al. (2014). The ownership of computer tends to 
have a positive and significant impact on apple yields for members. Computer network may be 
crucial in reducing information search costs that are associated with input markets and 
uncertainties of new technologies recommended by agricultural cooperatives.  
Extension contact variable has a positive and significant impact on apple yields for members, 
reflecting the important role of government extension services in enhancing agricultural 
productivity. The variable representing access to credit exerts a positive and significant effect 
on apple yields for members, which is a finding that is in line with the notion that access to 
capital allows members to purchase productivity-enhancing inputs suggested by cooperatives. 
Soil types tend to have different impacts on apple yields for members and nonmembers. In 
particular, sandy soil tends to have a significantly positive effect on apple yields for members, 
while clay soil exerts a significantly negative impact on productivity for nonmembers. The 
significant influence of soil variables suggests that productivity estimates may be biased if 
environmental variables are omitted (Abdulai and Huffman, 2014). 
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Table 4.3 Determinants of cooperative membership and their impact on apple yields 
   Apple yields 
Variables Selection Members Nonmembers 
Constant -5.392 (1.518)*** 6.578 (0.604)*** 6.860 (0.405)*** 
Age 0.023 (0.050) -0.022 (0.016) 0.007 (0.013) 
Age squared -0.0002 (0.001) 0.0003 (0.0002)* -0.0001 (0.0001) 
Education 0.058 (0.027)** 0.013 (0.009) -0.015 (0.007)** 
Household size 0.071 (0.061) 0.030 (0.017)* 0.023 (0.016) 
Labor (log) 0.380 (0.183)** 0.192 (0.059)*** 0.187 (0.053)*** 
Farm size 0.130 (0.029)*** -0.029 (0.010)*** -0.052 (0.009)*** 
Computer 0.395 (0.169)** 0.184 (0.048)*** -0.067 (0.048) 
Extension contact 0.856 (0.404)** 0.137 (0.054)** 0.017 (0.050) 
Access to credit 0.148 (0.653) 0.268 (0.040)*** 0.008 (0.037) 
Sandy soil 1.419 (0.386)*** 0.272 (0.133)** 0.085 (0.089) 
Clay soil -0.427 (0.234)* -0.034 (0.065) -0.096 (0.056)* 
Gansu 1.444 (0.401)*** 0.018 (0.148) -0.136 (0.101) 
Shaanxi 0.226 (0.369) -0.230 (0.126)* 0.153 (0.088)* 
Neighbor membership 0.433 (0.137)***   
Res (Extension contact) -0.092 (0.166)   
Res (Access to credit) 0.018 (0.323)   
 𝐿𝑛𝜎𝜇𝑀  -1.229 (0.101)***  
𝜌𝜇𝑀  0.620 (0.188)**  
 𝐿𝑛𝜎𝜇𝑁   -1.145 (0.078)*** 
𝜌𝜇𝑁   -0.784 (0.106)*** 
LR test of indep. eqns. 9.14***   
Log likelihood  -301.229   
Observations 481 481 481 
Note: The dependent variable is log form of apple yields measured in kg/mu; 
The reference region is Shandong;  
The reference soil type is loam soil; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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4.5.3 Net Returns Effects 
Table 4.4 presents the estimates of the impact of cooperative membership on net returns. The 
coefficient of the age variable is negative and significant, suggesting that younger farmers 
obtain higher net returns from the products. The education variable appears to have differential 
impacts on net returns for members and nonmembers. The positive and significant coefficient 
for members indicates that better education may help members acquire sufficient market 
information and identify the appropriate marketing channels provided by cooperatives to sell 
their products at lower costs. The computer variable has a positive and significant impact on 
net returns for members, but no impact for nonmembers. To some extent, the convenient 
modern equipment such as computer can enhance interactive communication between members 
and agricultural cooperatives regarding market information, leading to lower input costs and 
higher output prices, and finally higher net returns from apple production. This result is 
consistent with the finding by Mishra et al. (2009), who concluded that computer is an important 
management tool in the production process. The variables representing extension contact and 
access to credit appear to have positive and statistically significant effects on net returns for 
both members and nonmembers. With regards to the location variables, the results show that 
both members and nonmembers located in Gansu tend to obtain higher net returns relative to 
their counterparts in Shandong. 
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Table 4.4 Determinants of cooperative membership and their impact on net returns 
   Net returns 
Variables Selection Members Nonmembers 
Constant -5.247 (1.507)*** 9.101 (0.878)*** 9.163 (0.678)*** 
Age 0.025 (0.051) -0.055 (0.026)** -0.009 (0.020) 
Age squared -0.0002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.0003)** -0.00002 (0.0002) 
Education 0.036 (0.028) 0.033 (0.014)** -0.017 (0.012) 
Household size 0.107 (0.062)* 0.009 (0.028) 0.019 (0.025) 
Labor (log) 0.445 (0.182)** -0.035 (0.093) 0.013 (0.090) 
Farm size 0.132 (0.031)*** -0.051 (0.015)*** -0.047 (0.019)** 
Computer 0.468 (0.174)*** 0.338 (0.075)*** -0.026 (0.084) 
Extension contact 0.793(0.463)* 0.159 (0.087)* 0.228 (0.096)** 
Access to credit -0.621 (0.739) 0.437 (0.066)*** 0.105 (0.058)* 
Sandy soil 1.387 (0.439)*** 0.492 (0.205)** 0.126 (0.148) 
Clay soil -0.492 (0.244)** -0.048 (0.104) -0.206 (0.092)** 
Gansu 1.429 (0.440)*** 0.691 (0.226)*** 0.346 (0.172)** 
Shaanxi 0.226 (0.402) 0.045 (0.205) 0.173 (0.135) 
Neighbor membership 0.514 (0.140)***   
Res (Extension contact) -0.063 (0.194)   
Res (Access to credit) 0.391 (0.365)   
 𝐿𝑛𝜎𝜇𝑀  -0.751 (0.088)***  
𝜌𝜇𝑀  0.596 (0.164)***  
 𝐿𝑛𝜎𝜇𝑁   -0.781 (0.063)*** 
𝜌𝜇𝑁   -0.239 (0.390) 
LR test of indep. eqns. 4.12**   
Log likelihood -548.694   
Observations 481 481 481 
Note: The dependent variable is log form of net returns of apple production measured in yuan/mu;  
The reference region is Shandong; 
The reference soil type is loam soil； 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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4.5.4 Household Income Effects 
To the extent that the sampled farmers are not exclusively engaged in apple production, but in 
other agricultural activities, we also examined the impact of cooperative membership on per 
capita household income. This is because cooperatives may bring benefits to other crops, which 
would not be captured by net returns from apple production. Table 4.5 presents the estimates 
of the impact of cooperative membership on per capita household income. The estimates reveal 
that farm size exerts positive and significant impacts on household income of members and 
nonmembers. The significance of the variable representing farm size suggests that apple 
production is lucrative for smallholder farmers. The coefficients of the household size variable 
are negative and significantly different from zero for both members and nonmembers, 
suggesting that larger household size may increase the farming labor supply, but reduce the per 
capita household income. Access to credit has a positive and significant effect on household 
income of cooperative members.  
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Table 4.5 Determinants of cooperative membership and their impact on household 
income 
   Household income 
Variables Selection Members Nonmembers 
Constant -6.109 (1.589)*** 8.183 (0.664)*** 8.754 (0.545)*** 
Age 0.041 (0.053) -0.024 (0.019) 0.035 (0.017)** 
Age squared -0.0004 (0.001) 0.0003 (0.0002) -0.001 (0.0002)*** 
Education 0.035 (0.029) 0.011 (0.011) -0.014 (0.010) 
Household size 0.089 (0.062) -0.167 (0.021)*** -0.202 (0.020)*** 
Labor (log) 0.441 (0.188)** 0.231 (0.073)*** 0.080 (0.069) 
Farm size 0.137 (0.030)*** 0.118 (0.011)*** 0.126 (0.0135)*** 
Computer 0.352 (0.180)* 0.287 (0.057)*** -0.025 (0.067) 
Extension contact 0.468 (0.486) 0.295 (0.066)*** 0.072 (0.066) 
Access to credit -0.261 (0.732) 0.211 (0.050)*** 0.017 (0.049) 
Sandy soil 1.289 (0.425)*** 0.583 (0.154)*** 0.175 (0.119) 
Clay soil -0.318 (0.248) -0.093 (0.079) -0.140 (0.075)* 
Gansu 1.104 (0.428)*** 0.577 (0.172)*** 0.180 (0.135) 
Shaanxi 0.376 (0.408) 0.223 (0.155) 0.202 (0.115)* 
Neighbor membership 0.848 (0.160)***   
Res (Extension contact) 0.136 (0.206)   
Res (Access to credit) 0.194 (0.366)   
 𝐿𝑛𝜎𝜇𝑀  -1.039 (0.079)***  
𝜌𝜇𝑀  0.547 (0.178)**  
 𝐿𝑛𝜎𝜇𝑁   -0.922 (0.058)*** 
𝜌𝜇𝑁   -0.354 (0.221) 
 LR test of indep. eqns. 4.95**   
 Log likelihood   -439.18   
Observations 481 481 481 
Note: The dependent variable is log form of household income measured in yuan/capita; 
The reference region is Shandong;  
The reference soil type is loam soil; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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The lower parts of Tables 4.3-4.5 present the estimated correlation coefficients (𝜌𝜇𝑀 and  𝜌𝜇𝑁) 
of covariance terms between the error term 𝜇𝑖 in the selection equation (4.1) and the error terms 
𝜀𝑖  in the outcome equations (4.7a) and (4.7b), and they have econometric interpretations 
(Abdulai and Huffman 2014; Michael Lokshin and Sajaia 2004). First, the results show that 
𝜌𝜇𝑀 or 𝜌𝜇𝑁 is statistically significant in Tables 4.3-4.5, indicating the presence of selection bias. 
The results confirm that both observable and unobservable factors influence the farmers’ 
decisions of choosing to belong to agricultural cooperatives and the outcomes, given the choice 
of cooperative membership. Thus, failing to correct for selectivity effects may give biased 
coefficients of the results. Second, 𝜌𝜇𝑀  and 𝜌𝜇𝑁  have the opposite signs, suggesting that 
farmers choose to belong to cooperatives based on their comparative advantage. Third, the signs 
of 𝜌𝜇𝑀  are all positive in Tables 4.3-4.5, suggesting negative selection bias. These results 
suggest that farmers with below than average apple yields, net returns and household income 
are more likely to choose to belong to agricultural cooperatives. It is significant to mention that 
the negative selection bias in our example is quite plausible, since cooperative organizations 
are expected to enhance agricultural performance and welfare of farm households. 
4.5.5 Estimating Treatment Effects (ATT) 
The estimates for the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT), which show the effects of 
cooperative membership on apple yields, net returns and household income, are presented in 
Table 4.6. Unlike the simple mean differences presented in Table 4.2, these ATT estimates 
account for selection bias resulting from both observable and unobservable characteristics. The 
results reveal that cooperative membership significantly increases apple yields by 5.36%. With 
respect to income gains, the results show that cooperative membership tends to increase net 
returns by 6.06% and household income by 4.66%. Consistent with the earlier studies by 
Bernard and Spielman (2009) for Ethiopia and Verhofstadt and Maertens (2014b) for Rwanda, 
the findings in Table 4.6 imply that contemporary cooperative organizations play an important 
role in enhancing agricultural performance and raising rural income. 
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Table 4.6 Impact of cooperative membership on apple yields, net returns and household 
income 
 Mean Outcomea    
 Members Nonmembers ATT t-value Change (%) 
Yields  7.66 (0.33) 7.27 (0.27) 0.39*** 22.25 5.36 
Net Returns  8.92 (0.39) 8.41 (0.28) 0.51*** 21.37 6.06 
Household Income 9.66 (0.36) 9.23 (0.42) 0.43*** 22.26 4.66 
Note: ATT, average treatment effect on the treated; 
a As the dependent variables in the ESR outcome equations are the logs of apple yields (kg/mu) , net returns 
(yuan/mu), household income (yuan/capita), the predictions are also given in log forms. Converting the means 
back to kg and yuan would lead to inaccuracies, due to the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means (AM-
GM inequality); 
*** p<0.01. 
To gain insight into the impact of cooperative membership on different groups of farmers, we 
also examined the impact of membership on apple yields, net returns and household income for 
different farm size categories. The results presented in Table 4.7 generally reveal that even 
within the different farm size groups, cooperative membership tends to positively and 
significantly affect farm productivity and household income. In particular, the estimates reveal 
that belonging to an agricultural cooperative increases apple yields by 6.29% when farm size is 
less than 6 mu. However, apple yields tend to increase by 4.81% and 4.66% for medium and 
large farm sizes, respectively, when they belong to cooperatives. The finding is consistent with 
the earlier observation of negative relationship between farm size and productivity. Moreover, 
the results in Table 4.7 also reveal that the effects of cooperative membership on net returns 
and household income tend to decrease with increasing farm size from small, medium to larger. 
Generally, the results in Table 4.7 suggest that small-scale farmers stand to benefit more from 
agricultural cooperatives, compared to medium and large-scale farmers. These findings are in 
line with the findings by Ito et al. (2012) for China and Fischer and Qaim (2012) for Kenya 
who show that cooperative membership is more rewarding for smaller farms, but contradict the 
findings by Verhofstadt and Maertens (2014b) for Rwanda, who found that mean income and 
poverty effects of cooperative membership are largest for larger farms.  
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Table 4.7 Impact of cooperative membership on apple yields, net returns and household 
income by farm sizes 
  Mean Outcomes    
Outcomes Category Members Nonmembers ATT t-value Change 
(%) 
 
Apple 
Yields 
Small (<=6 mu) 7.94 (0.20) 7.47 (0.15) 0.47*** 19.36 6.29 
Medium (6-10 mu) 7.64 (0.27) 7.27 (0.19) 0.37*** 12.06 4.81 
Large (>10 mu) 7.41 (0.26) 7.08 (0.27) 0.33*** 9.96 4.66 
 
Net 
Returns 
Small (<=6 mu) 9.18 (0.25) 8.49 (0.16) 0.69*** 20.96 8.13 
Medium (6-10 mu) 8.92 (0.33) 8.49 (0.30) 0.43*** 10.99 5.06 
Large (>10 mu) 8.68 (0.40) 8.27 (0.31) 0.41*** 9.58 4.96 
 
Household 
Income 
Small (<=6 mu) 9.59 (0.25) 9.07 (0.27) 0.52*** 16.97 5.73 
Medium (6-10 mu) 9.58 (0.35) 9.16 (0.37) 0.42*** 12.90 4.59 
Large (>10 mu) 9.80 (0.41) 9.44 (0.32) 0.36*** 10.29 3.81 
*** p<0.01. 
4.6 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This paper examined the factors that influence apple farmers’ decisions of choosing to belong 
to agricultural cooperatives, as well as the impact of cooperative membership on apple yields, 
net returns and household income in China. The study utilized cross-sectional farm household 
level data of apple farmers collected from Gansu, Shaanxi and Shandong provinces in 2013 
from a randomly selected sample of 481 households. Simple comparisons of average apple 
yields, net returns and household income between cooperative members and nonmembers 
revealed some significant differences. Given that these comparisons are merely descriptive, 
without accounting for confounding factors that affect the differences, we also employed an 
endogenous switching regression model that accounts for both observed and unobserved factors 
to address the issue of selection bias. The results did reveal that sample selection bias would 
result if the outcome specifications (apple yields, net returns and household income) were 
estimated without taking into consideration the membership decision. Specifically, we found a 
negative selection bias, implying that farmers with below than average apple yields, net returns 
and household income are more likely to choose to belong to an agricultural cooperative. 
The empirical results showed a positive and significant relationship between membership and 
apple yields, farm net returns and household income. In particular, belonging to a cooperative 
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tends to increase apple yields by 5.36%, net returns by 6.06% and household income by 4.66%. 
The estimates, differentiated by farm size, revealed that productivity and income gains of 
cooperative membership were higher for small-scale farmers, compared to medium and large-
scale farmers. This finding suggests that cooperatives can play a significant role in increasing 
the incomes of smallholders to reduce rural poverty in China. On the factors that influence 
farmers’ decision to belong to agricultural cooperatives, the results show that farm size, labor 
input and asset ownership such as computer exert positive and significant effects on the choice 
of cooperative membership. 
The findings from this study show that contemporary agricultural cooperatives can contribute 
to the enhancement of agricultural productivity as well as improvement in farm household 
income. Therefore, the government should continue supporting the development of 
contemporary cooperatives. Moreover, government could intensify support for cooperatives to 
improve their marketing strategies in a way that would ensure higher prices for their products. 
These measures could encourage other farmers to join these cooperatives to produce for the 
international markets, where food safety and quality standards are quite high. 
The finding that farmers’ access to computers tend to influence their decisions to join 
cooperatives suggests that government policy to improve rural internet routing infrastructure 
would go a long way to increase the number of farmers joining cooperatives, which could make 
the products more competitive on the world markets. The positive and significant impacts of 
extension contact and access to credit suggest that promoting effective measures to improve 
farmers’ access to extension service and credit would help improve farm household welfare. As 
pointed out by Deng et al. (2010), agricultural cooperatives provide very little help with respect 
to credit facilities to its members in China. The government could therefore put in place policy 
measures to support farmers in this area. 
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Abstract  
This paper examines the impact of agricultural cooperative membership on return on 
investment (ROI) utilizing a recent household survey data of 481 apple producers in China. We 
employ a treatment effects model to address the issue of selection bias, admitting that 
cooperative members and nonmembers are systematically different in terms of both observable 
and unobservable factors. The empirical results show that cooperative membership exerts a 
positive and significant impact on the ROI, whilst membership choice is found to be 
significantly influenced by education, farm size, asset ownership and social network. 
Keywords: Agricultural cooperatives; Return on investment; Selection bias; China 
JEL Classification: C35, D71, Q12, Q13 
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5.1 Introduction 
In most developing countries, the smallholder farmers face a systematically unfavorable 
situation regarding agricultural technology adoption, access to modern supply chain, input use 
efficiency and various other uncertainties (World Bank, 2008). These barriers make it difficult 
for smallholder farmers to benefit from agricultural production and marketing, and tend to 
widen the income gap between rural and urban residents. Available evidence suggests that 
average incomes of smallholder farmers in China are just about one third of their urban 
counterparts (Grain, 2012). Government programs have thus emerged to enhance smallholder 
farmers’ performance in modern agricultural production. Among others, agricultural 
cooperatives have been promoted based on their strong potential to improve smallholders’ farm 
performance (Chagwiza, Muradian, & Ruben, 2016; Hellin, Lundy, & Meijer, 2009; Liang, 
Hendrikse, Huang, & Xu, 2015). Generally, the development of cooperative organization in 
developing countries is expected to facilitate smallholder farmers’ market participation, 
increase farm incomes, enhance crop productivity, and lower production costs (Abebaw & Haile, 
2013; Hellin et al., 2009; Zheng, Wang, & Awokuse, 2012). Hence, from a development policy 
perspective, it is essential to empirically evaluate the impact of agricultural cooperative 
membership on the profitability of smallholder agricultural investments, aimed at finding 
evidence to design sustainable agri-environmental policies.  
A growing literature related to agricultural cooperatives has emerged recently. The first strand 
has focused on the impact of cooperative membership on technology adoption. For instance, 
the studies by Abebaw & Haile (2013) for Ethiopia and Verhofstadt & Maertens (2014) for 
Rwanda show that farmers with cooperative membership are more likely to adopt agricultural 
technologies such as fertilizer and pesticide than those without membership. The second strand 
of literature addresses the role of agricultural cooperatives in influencing smallholder farmers’ 
access to both input and output markets and prices obtained (e.g., Hellin et al., 2009; Piesse, 
Doyer, Thirtle, & Vink, 2005; Trebbin, 2014). Wollni & Zeller (2007) find that cooperative 
membership has positive impacts on prices and participation in specialty markets among coffee 
growers in Costa Rica, while Fischer & Qaim (2012) find a positive impact of membership on 
banana prices of farmers in Kenya. Agricultural cooperatives can enhance smallholder farmers’ 
access to advanced production factor markets and modern supply chains (e.g., supermarkets, 
restaurants, processors and international markets), contributing to lower input prices and higher 
output prices for members. 
The third strand of the literature has analyzed the impact of cooperative membership on farm 
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performance, employing indicators such as farm income or farm revenue (Bernard & Spielman, 
2009; Bernard & Taffesse, 2012; Ito, Bao, & Su, 2012; Yang & Liu, 2012; Zheng, Wang, & 
Song, 2011). The studies by Zheng et al. (2011), Yang & Liu (2012) and Ito et al. (2012) have 
found that cooperative members in China obtain higher agricultural income or farm income 
than nonmembers. In a recent study, Chagwiza et al. (2016) report a positive and significant 
impact of cooperative membership on dairy farmers’ income in Ethiopia.  
Most of the studies mentioned above have separately examined the impact of agricultural 
cooperative membership on technology adoption, output prices or farm income. However, using 
farm income as a farm performance measure may be incomplete, since there are also significant 
differences in terms of production investment costs, which need to be taken into account. 
Identifying the relationship between cooperative membership and the performance of a number 
of different investments can help stakeholders to understand how well their current investments 
are utilized and then enable them to adjust future investments. However, empirical evidence on 
the impact of agricultural cooperative membership on the profitability of different investments 
is currently lacking in the literature. 
The present study contributes to the literature by analyzing the impact of cooperative 
membership on return on investment. Return on investment is a preferred indicator than others 
such as farm income or farm revenue to proxy farm performance, since it not only concentrates 
on improving net returns from crop production, but also takes the profitability of agricultural 
investments into account (Kleemann et al., 2014). We use a treatment effects model to conduct 
the empirical analysis (Cong & Drukker, 2000). The approach addresses the selection bias issue 
that arises from the fact that cooperative members and nonmembers are systematically different 
in terms of both observable factors (e.g., age, education and farm size) and unobservable factors 
(e.g., farmer’s entrepreneurial ability, managerial ability or motivations), and also estimates 
direct marginal effect and average treatment effect of cooperative membership on return on 
investment.  
The study utilizes a recent farm household survey data of 481 apple farmers in Gansu, Shaanxi 
and Shandong provinces of China. In China, the agricultural sector is a key engine for economic 
development and rural income growth, contributing 10.08% of GDP and around 33.60% to total 
employment (CSA, 2013). In the surveyed regions, farmers including both cooperative 
members and nonmembers are primarily engaged in apple production and marketing for their 
livelihoods. The empirical findings have important implications for policy-makers in China and 
other countries in their efforts to promote sustainable agricultural development and increase 
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rural incomes in the apple sector through farm organizations.  
This paper proceeds as follows. In following section, we present the econometric approach. In 
section 5.3, data and descriptive analysis are presented. We give the empirical results in section 
5.4. Section 5.5 concludes. 
5.2 Econometric Approach 
5.2.1 Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework employed in this study is based on the assumption that farmers 
maximize net returns from apple production and marketing. For analytical convenience, let 𝑌𝑖 
denote the total apple output for household 𝑖, 𝑃𝑖 is the price of the output; 𝐼𝑖𝑘 refers to a vector 
of input variables, and 𝑅𝑖𝑘 refers to corresponding prices of used inputs, with 𝑘 indicating 𝑚 
types of considered inputs including fertilizers, pesticides, labor, agricultural films for apple 
coloring and land moisture conservation, irrigation, bags, plantlet costs and farm equipment 
costs that are required for apple production; 𝐿𝑖 refers to farm size used for apple production; 𝑋𝑖 
represents a vector of variables representing household and farm-level characteristics (e.g., age, 
education and farm size) that may influence net returns from apple production; 𝐷𝑖 represents 
the choice of agricultural cooperative membership. Under these assumptions, the net returns 
function can be expressed as: 
𝜋(𝑃, 𝑅, 𝐿; 𝑋, 𝐷) = 𝑃𝑖𝑌𝑖 − ∑ 𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑅𝑖𝑘
𝑘=𝑚
𝑘=1 ,     𝑘 = 1, 2, … , 𝑚     (5.1) 
Considering land endowment (𝐿𝑖) as a fixed input for farmers and using the homogeneity 
conditions, the restricted net returns function can be expressed as: 
𝜋(𝑃, 𝑅, 𝐿; 𝑋, 𝐷) = 𝐿𝑖 ∙ ?̃?(𝑃, 𝑅; 𝑋, 𝐷)  (5.2) 
where ?̃?(𝑃, 𝑅; 𝑋, 𝐷) denotes net returns per unit of land, defined as the difference between the 
value of apple yield and per unit costs of inputs. Thus, apple yield per unit of land and input 
use per unit of land can be expressed as ?̃?𝑖 = 𝑌𝑖/𝐿𝑖 and 𝐼𝑖 = 𝐼𝑖/𝐿𝑖, respectively, which can be 
obtained by direct application of Hotelling’s lemma to equation (5.2): 
?̃?𝑖 = 𝜕?̃?(𝑃, 𝑅; 𝑋, 𝐷)/𝜕𝑃𝑖  (5.3a) 
𝐼𝑖 = 𝜕?̃?(𝑃, 𝑅; 𝑋, 𝐷)/𝜕𝑅𝑖  (5.3b) 
The specifications in (5.2), (5.3a) and (5.3b) show that net returns from apple production, apple 
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yield per unit of land, input use per unit of land are influenced by input and output prices, farm 
and household level characteristics, as well as the choice of cooperative membership. In 
particular, the above analysis reveals that agricultural cooperative membership (𝐷) affects net 
returns (?̃?) from apple production through directly influencing apple yields (?̃?) and input use 
(𝐼) per unit of land. For instance, agricultural cooperatives may assist farmers in the efficient 
use of yield-enhancing technologies such as fertilizers and pesticides, contributing to higher 
apple yields obtained by members; they may purchase production inputs (e.g., fertilizers, 
pesticides and agricultural films) collectively for their members and/or rent out farm equipment 
(e.g., sprayers and rotary cultivators) to members at lower costs, contributing to a reduction in 
investment costs for their members (Abebaw & Haile, 2013; Liang et al., 2015; Verhofstadt & 
Maertens, 2014). Moreover, agricultural cooperatives may bargain with apple buyers on behalf 
of the members for a better price and provide members with timely marketing information, 
which tend to help increase farmers’ sales prices. Therefore, we expect that agricultural 
cooperative membership will tend to increase the net returns from apple production by 
improving farmers’ apple output, sales prices, while lowering investment costs. Given that the 
primary objective of this study is to analyze the impact of cooperative membership on return 
on investment, which is a relative profitability indicator, we will relate the return to investment 
in the empirical specification. 
5.2.2 Empirical Specification 
The present study aims to examine the impact of agricultural cooperative membership on return 
on investment (ROI). The ROI is a preferred indicator to measure farm performance, since it 
relates net returns from apple production to farmers’ investment costs and consequently 
indicates how well the available assets have been used (Asfaw, Mithöfer, & Waibel, 2009; 
Kleemann et al., 2014). The empirical investigation of the impact of agricultural cooperative 
membership on the ROI assumes a linear specification for the ROI as a function of a vector of 
individual and household characteristics (𝑋𝑖)  and a cooperative membership dummy 
variable (𝐷𝑖). The ROI (𝑉𝑖) regression can be expressed as: 
𝑉𝑖 = 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖   (5.4) 
where 𝛽  and 𝛿  are parameters to be estimated, 𝜀𝑖 is an error term. 𝑉𝑖 represents the ROI 
outcome. In particular, the ROI can be calculated as follows: 
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𝑅𝑂𝐼 =
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
 
        =
𝐿𝑖(𝑃𝑖?̃?𝑖) − 𝐿𝑖(∑ 𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑅𝑖𝑘
𝑘=𝑚
𝑘=1 )
𝐿𝑖(∑ 𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑅𝑖𝑘)
𝑘=𝑚
𝑘=1
=
𝑃𝑖?̃?𝑖 − ∑ 𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑅𝑖𝑘
𝑘=𝑚
𝑘=1
∑ 𝐼𝑖𝑘𝑅𝑖𝑘
𝑘=𝑚
𝑘=1
, 𝑘 = 1, 2, … , 𝑚                            (5.5) 
where Return refers to total gross revenue from apple production and marketing, which is 
determined by apple farm size (𝐿𝑖), apple price (𝑃𝑖) and apple yield per unit of land (?̃?𝑖) for 
household 𝑖; Total cost of investment refers to the costs incurred during apple production, which 
is determined by apple farm size (𝐿𝑖),  a vector of inputs (𝐼𝑖𝑘) per unit of land and the related 
input prices (𝑅𝑖𝑘), with 𝑘 representing a particular type of input from 𝑚 available choices, as 
indicated previously. ROI from apple production and marketing compares the magnitude of 
investment gains directly with the magnitude of investment costs for a specific time period. 
The empirical literature on impact assessment of cooperative membership shows that whether 
an individual chooses to join a cooperative or not is dependent on the individual and household 
characteristics (self-selection), rather than random assignment (e.g., Abebaw & Haile, 2013; 
Fischer & Qaim, 2012; Ito et al., 2012). Thus, we model individual decision to become a 
cooperative member in a random utility framework. Within this framework, a farmer chooses 
to join a cooperative if the expected utility gained from choosing membership (𝑈𝑖
𝑚) is larger 
than that obtained from not choosing (𝑈𝑖
𝑛), i.e. 𝐷𝑖
∗ = 𝑈𝑖
𝑚-𝑈𝑖
𝑛>0, with 𝐷𝑖
∗ denoting the utility 
difference between these two options. However, the actual utility level of 𝐷𝑖
∗ cannot be 
observed directly, but can be expressed by a latent variable function, such as:  
𝐷𝑖
∗ = 𝜆𝑍𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖,  𝐷𝑖 = {
1  𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑖
∗ > 0
0  𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑖
∗ ≤ 0
    (5.6) 
where 𝜆 is a vector of parameters to be estimated; 𝜇𝑖  is an error term, with zero mean and 
normal distribution; 𝑍𝑖  is a vector of explanatory variables that are assumed to influence the 
choice of cooperative membership, including age, education, dependency ratio, farm size, 
sprayer ownership, computer ownership, income specialization, marketing contract, labor 
availability, risk attitude, social networks and location variables. The choice of these 
explanatory variables is primarily based on previous studies on cooperative membership (e.g., 
Bernard & Spielman, 2009; Chagwiza et al., 2016; Fischer & Qaim, 2012; Ito et al., 2012; 
Zheng et al., 2011).  
Given that farmers choose to join agricultural cooperatives by themselves, the same 
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unobservable factors (e.g., farmers’ innate abilities and motivations) may simultaneously 
influence the choice of cooperative membership and the ROI. In this case, the error term (𝜀𝑖) in 
equation (5.4) and the error term ( 𝜇𝑖 ) in equation (5.6) may be correlated such 
that corr(𝜀𝑖, 𝜇𝑖) ≠ 0, leading to potential endogeneity of cooperative membership variable in 
the analysis. Thus, applying standard regression technique such as ordinary least square (OLS) 
to estimate equation (5.4) tends to produce biased estimates. Instead, propensity score matching 
(PSM) approach is widely used. However, the PSM technique fails to account for unobservable 
factors when serving to address the issue of selection bias (Chagwiza et al., 2016; Fischer & 
Qaim, 2012; Ito et al., 2012). In this study, we employ a treatment effects model to conduct the 
empirical analysis. 
5.2.3 Treatment Effects Model 
The treatment effects model estimates the cooperative membership choice equation (5.6) and 
the ROI equation (5.4) jointly (Cong & Drukker, 2000). The advantages of using treatment 
effects model over PSM approach include that (i) it removes the selection bias due to observed 
and unobserved covariates; (ii) conditional on the inverse Mills’ ratio, the exposure to treatment 
becomes random; and (iii) the factors determining the ROI are identified in the second stage.  
In the treatment effects model, the error term 𝜀𝑖 in equation (5.4) and the error term 𝜇𝑖  in 
equation (5.6) are assumed to have a bivariate normal distribution with mean zero, and a 
correlation such that 𝜌𝜀𝜇 = corr(𝜀𝑖, 𝜇𝑖). In particular, if 𝜌𝜀𝜇 is significantly different from zero, 
this would suggest the presence of selection bias arising from unobservable factors (Cong & 
Drukker, 2000). In particular, negative 𝜌𝜀𝜇 indicates negative selection bias, which implies that 
farmers with lower than average ROI are more likely to join agricultural cooperatives. In 
contrast, positive 𝜌𝜀𝜇 implies positive selection bias. In addition, the presence of positive or 
negative selection bias also implies that simple OLS regression may either overestimate or 
underestimate the impact of cooperative membership on the ROI.  
Using a formula for the joint density of bivariate normally distributed variables, the expected 
ROI for farmer 𝑖  conditional on the presence of the treatment (i.e. in a context of having 
cooperative membership ) is expressed as (Cong & Drukker, 2000): 
E(𝑉𝑖|𝐷 = 1) = 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿 + 𝐸(𝜀𝑖|𝐷 = 1) = 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿 + 𝜌𝜀𝜇𝜎𝜀𝜇
𝜙(𝜆𝑍𝑖)
Φ(𝜆𝑍𝑖)
                                (5.7a) 
where 𝜙(∙) is the standard normal density function, and 𝛷(∙) refers to the standard normal 
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cumulative distribution function; 𝜎𝜀𝜇  is the covariance term between the error term 𝜀𝑖  in 
equation (5.4) and the error term 𝜇𝑖 in equation (5.6); The ratio of 𝜙(∙) and Φ(∙) is termed as 
the inverse Mill’s ratio; 𝛽 and δ are parameters to be estimated and 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of explanatory 
variables as defined previously. The expected ROI for farmer 𝑖 conditional on the absence of 
the treatment (i.e. in a context of having no cooperative membership) is expressed as: 
E(𝑉𝑖|𝐷 = 0) = 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝐸(𝜀𝑖|𝐷 = 0) = 𝛽𝑋𝑖 − 𝜌𝜀𝜇𝜎𝜀𝜇
𝜙(𝜆𝑍𝑖)
1 − Φ(𝜆𝑍𝑖)
                                        (5.7b) 
Thus, the average treatment effect (ATE) of cooperative membership on the ROI for the sample 
size 𝑁 can be calculated by comparing the expected ROI in equation (5.7a) and that in equation 
(5.7b): 
ATE =
1
𝑁
∑[E(𝑉𝑖|𝐷 = 1) − E(𝑉𝑖|𝐷 = 0)]
𝑁
𝑖=1
                                                                                 (5.8) 
For proper model identification, the treatment effects model requires that there is at least one 
variable in 𝑍𝑖 of cooperative membership equation that does not appear in 𝑋𝑖 of ROI equation. 
The additional variable in cooperative membership equation serves as an instrumental variable 
to control for unobservable factors (e.g., farmers’ innate abilities) that may bias the impact of 
cooperative membership on the ROI, which is expected to affect the choice of cooperative 
membership but should not affect the ROI directly. In this study, a friend membership variable 
representing whether a farmer’s neighbors, friends or relatives have cooperative membership is 
used as an identifying instrument. Ito et al. (2012) found that farmers are more likely to be 
enrolled in the agricultural cooperatives if more neighbors are cooperative participants. To test 
the validity of the employed instrumental variable, we run a probit model for the cooperative 
membership equation and OLS model for the ROI equation including the friend membership 
variable in both regressions. The results, which are not presented for the sake of simplicity but 
are available on request, show that the friend membership variable has a statistically significant 
impact on the choice of cooperative membership, while it has no significant impact on the ROI. 
The findings confirm the validity and efficiency of the employed instrumental variable. 
5.3 Data and Descriptive Analysis 
The data were collected from a primary filed survey in the major apple growing areas (Gansu, 
Shaanxi and Shandong provinces) between September and December 2013 in China. The data 
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set comprises two types of apple farmers: those who are members of agricultural cooperatives 
and those who do not belong to any cooperative. We used a multistage sampling procedure for 
data collection. At first, three provinces were purposively selected, namely Gansu, Shaanxi and 
Shandong. These provinces cover more than half of the country’s total apple orchards (54.17%), 
with 283,900 hectares in Gansu, 645, 200 hectares in Shaanxi and 279, 600 hectares in 
Shandong, respectively (CRSY, 2013). In the second stage, the regions with intensive apple 
production in each province were purposively selected using the information from Statistical 
Yearbook at the provincial level. In particular, Jingning county in Gansu, Luochuan county in 
Shaanxi, and Laiyang and Qixia cities in Shandong were selected. In the third stage, six 
agricultural cooperatives that are specialized in apple production and marketing were randomly 
selected, using the information provided by the local agricultural bureau. In the fourth stage, 
three villages affiliated to each cooperative were randomly selected. In the last stage, 25-30 
households including both cooperative members and nonmembers were randomly selected in 
each village. A total of 481 households were finally selected as a sample for this study. Of these, 
208 were formal members of agricultural cooperatives. Face-to-face interviews were conducted 
by enumerators who spoke local languages and supervised by one of the authors, using a 
detailed structured questionnaire. The enumerators were hired from local universities. The 
survey gathered information on socioeconomic and farm level factors, apple production and 
marketing practices, asset ownership, as well as other structural characteristics.  
Table 5.1 presents definitions and descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. 
The survey showed that about 43% of households had membership in agricultural cooperatives. 
The average age of farmers was about 48.63 years, whereas the mean number of schooling 
years was about 7.60 years. The mean farm size of apple orchards was 5.07 mu (1 mu=1/15 
hectare). Apple incomes contributed around 75% of total household incomes, indicating apple 
production and marketing are the main source of household income in the surveyed regions. 
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Table 5.2 presents differences in means in the characteristics of cooperative members and 
nonmembers. In particular, members are more educated than nonmembers. They have larger 
farm size, and are more likely to own assets such as power sprayer and computer. On average, 
both members and nonmembers depend highly on apple production as income source, although 
Table 5.1 Definition of variables and descriptive statistics   
Variable  Definition Mean (S.D.) 
Membership  1 if farmer is a member of cooperative, 0 otherwise 0.43 (0.50) 
ROI Return on investment (%) 2.43 (1.54) 
Age  Age of HH in years 48.63 (10.25) 
Education  Schooling of HH in years) 7.60 (2.87) 
Dependency ratio  Proportion of household members under the age of 
15 and over the age of 64 
0.31 (0.19) 
Farm size  Total fruiting apple orchard area (mua) 5.07 (3.24) 
Sprayer ownership 1 If farmer owns power sprayer, 0 otherwise 0.86 (0.34) 
Computer ownership 1 If farmer owns computer, 0 otherwise 0.32 (0.47) 
Specialization  The value of total apple yields divided by the total 
household incomes (%) 
0.75 (0.21) 
Marketing contract 1 if famer uses formal written contract to sell 
produce, 0 otherwise 
0.41 (0.49) 
Labor availability  1 if labor is available during apple season, 0 
otherwise 
0.48 (0.50) 
Risk attitude Self-stated openness to innovation and risk: 1 if 
farmer is risk-loving; 0 otherwise 
0.52 (0.50) 
Social network 1 if farmer acquired input or output market 
information from neighbors, 0 otherwise 
0.60 (0.49) 
Gansu  1 if household is located in Gansu, 0 otherwise 0.17 (0.37) 
Shandong  1 if household is located in Shaanxi, 0 otherwise 0.40 (0.50) 
Shaanxi  1 if household is located in Shandong, 0 otherwise 0.43 (0.50) 
Friend membership 1 if farmer reports if he/she has neighbors, friends or 
relatives joining cooperatives, 0 otherwise 
0.69 (0.46) 
Information 
availability  
1 if farmer reports that he/she can acquire sufficient 
information to understand the functions of 
contemporary cooperatives, 0 otherwise 
0.49 (0.50) 
Note: a 1mu=1/15 hectare 
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the income specialization variable is not statistically different in means between these two 
groups. Members are more likely to have the issue of labor shortage, compared with 
nonmembers. In addition, the mean comparison in social network variable shows that 
cooperative members are more likely to acquire input or output market information from 
neighbors, relative to nonmembers.  
Differences in ROI components are presented in Table 5.3. It shows that average apple price 
for cooperative members is significantly higher than that for nonmembers. Members are more 
likely to have higher costs on labor, agricultural films, and irrigation, compared to nonmembers. 
With respect to farm equipment costs, the information presented in Table 5.3 reveals that 
cooperative members paid less for agricultural equipment than nonmembers, potentially 
suggesting the role of agricultural cooperatives in providing members with some farm 
equipment for free, or renting them to members at lower costs. Although total production costs 
for members are 12.77% higher than that for nonmembers, the net returns from apple production 
for members are 31.53% higher than that for nonmembers. The information presented in Tables 
Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics of selected variables by cooperative membership status 
Variables  Members (208) Nonmembers (273) Diff. in Mean 
Age  48.45 (0.66) 48.77 (0.66) -0.326 
Education  8.05 (0.17) 7.27 (0.19) 0.781*** 
Dependency ratio  0.31 (0.01) 0.30 (0.01) 0.011 
Farm size  5.51 (0.24) 4.73 (0.18) 0.778*** 
Sprayer ownership 0.93 (0.02) 0.81 (0.02) 0.123*** 
Computer ownership 0.38 (0.03) 0.27 (0.03) 0.109** 
Specialization  0.75 (0.01) 0.74 (0.01) 0.013 
Marketing contract 0.41 (0.03) 0.40 (0.03) 0.014 
Labor availability  0.41 (0.03) 0.53 (0.03) -0.126*** 
Risk attitude 0.55 (0.03) 0.51 (0.03) 0.043 
Social network 0.71 (0.03) 0.52 (0.03) 0.190*** 
Gansu  0.20 (0.03) 0.14 (0.02) 0.063* 
Shaanxi  0.35 (0.03) 0.45 (0.03) -0.104** 
Shandong  0.45 (0.03) 0.41 (0.03) 0.042 
Friend membership 0.75 (0.03) 0.65 (0.03) 0.093** 
Information availability  0.55 (0.03) 0.44 (0.03) 0.110** 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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5.2 and 5.3 generally shows that cooperative members and nonmembers are systematically 
different. Finally, the value of ROI is also higher for members compared to nonmembers, which 
is statistically significant at 1% level in mean difference. However, to the extent that this 
comparison is only descriptive, a potential selection bias should be accounted for to obtain true 
effect of cooperative membership on the ROI. 
Table 5.3 Mean difference of production costs and profits between members and 
nonmembers   
 
Variables 
Mean 
(481) 
Members 
(N=208) 
Nonmembers 
(N=273) 
 
Diff. in Mean 
ROI components  
Gross return (yuan/mu)a 10,536.52 11,895.97 9,500.76 2,395.208*** 
Quantity Sold (kg) 2,886.29 3,033.36 2774.24 259.129** 
Average price (yuan/kg) 3.73 3.99 3.54 0.454*** 
Fertilizer (yuan/mu) 1,510.18 1,562.76 1,470.11 92.658 
Pesticide (yuan/mu) 262.25 258.73 264.94 -6.212 
Labors (yuan/mu) 524.35 682.96 403.50 279.463*** 
Agricultural films (yuan/mu) 88.77 98.59 81.28 17.304** 
Irrigation (yuan/mu) 49.04 62.22 39.00 23.225*** 
Bags (yuan/mu) 524.31 534.97 516.19 18.772 
Plantlet costs (yuan/mu) 202.49 193.21 209.57 -16.361 
Farm equipment costs (yuan/mu) 194.34 165.74 216.14 -50.400** 
Total production costs (yuan/mu) 3,368.17 3,600.49 3,192.41 407.628*** 
Net return (yuan/mu) 7,168.44 8,295.88 6,309.42 1,987.577*** 
ROI 2.43 2.67 2.25 0.421*** 
a yuan is Chinese currency: 1 US $=6.21 yuan in 2013.  
5.4 Empirical Results 
The estimates for the impact of cooperative membership on the ROI using the treatment effects 
model are presented in Table 5.4. The maximum likelihood approach estimates both the 
cooperative membership choice equation (5.6) and the ROI equation (5.4) jointly. The empirical 
analysis was conducted using the Stata 13.0 statistical package.  
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5.4.1 ROI Effects of Cooperative Membership 
An interesting finding in Table 5.4 is the sign and significance of 𝜌𝜀𝜇. The results show that the 
coefficient of  𝜌𝜀𝜇  is significantly different from zero, indicating the presence of sample 
selection bias arising from unobservable factors (Cong & Drukker, 2000). The negative  𝜌𝜀𝜇 
implies negative selection bias, which suggests that farmers with lower than average ROI are 
more likely to join cooperatives. This is plausible, as agricultural cooperatives are expected to 
promote higher returns to members’ investments in comparison to nonmembers (Ito et al., 2012; 
Zheng et al., 2011). The negative  𝜌𝜀𝜇 also implies that OLS model would underestimate the 
impact of cooperative membership on the ROI, since OLS regression ignores the non-random 
nature of cooperative membership choice in the ROI equation. Moreover, the Wald test for 
 𝜌𝜀𝜇 = 0  is statistically significant, which suggests the rejection of the null hypothesis that 
there is no correlation between cooperative membership choice specification and the ROI 
specification (Cong & Drukker, 2000). That is, cooperative membership is an endogenous 
variable in equation (5.4). Generally, these findings suggest that accounting for selectivity 
effects is essential to obtain unbiased and consistent estimation of the impact of cooperative 
membership on the ROI.  
The results regarding the impact of cooperative membership on the ROI using treatment effects 
model are presented in the third column in Table 5.4, which is shown next to the estimates from 
OLS model for comparison. It shows that cooperative membership has a positive and significant 
impact on the ROI, with a marginal effect of 1.739. This translates into an increase of 71.56% 
in ROI, using the sample mean value as the reference. Such effects could not be observed when 
only comparing descriptive statistics of the ROI means between cooperative members and 
nonmembers, due to the previously mentioned negative selection bias. The marginal effect of 
cooperative membership on the ROI in the OLS model estimate (0.363) is much smaller than 
that in the treatment effects model, although the coefficient of membership variable in the OLS 
model is also positive and significant. The finding that OLS model underestimates the ROI 
effect of cooperative membership is due to the fact that OLS model treats cooperative 
membership as an exogenous variable in regression.  
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Table 5.4 Impact of cooperative membership on the ROI 
 Treatment effects model OLS 
Variable Selection ROI ROI 
Membership  1.739 (0.505)*** 0.363 (0.135)*** 
Age 0.002 (0.007) -0.018 (0.009)** -0.017 (0.008)** 
Education 0.043 (0.025)* -0.055 (0.028)** -0.035 (0.024) 
Dependency ratio 0.190 (0.322) -1.045 (0.367)*** -0.967 (0.333)*** 
Farm size 0.084 (0.026)*** -0.151 (0.032)*** -0.107 (0.028)*** 
Sprayer ownership  0.788 (0.193)*** -0.119 (0.227) 0.185 (0.178) 
Computer ownership 0.390 (0.148)*** 0.201 (0.170) 0.388 (0.142)*** 
Specialization 0.032 (0.325) 1.543 (0.353)*** 1.572 (0.320)*** 
Marketing contract 0.118 (0.172) 0.545 (0.185)*** 0.596 (0.166)*** 
Labor availability -0.426 (0.153)*** 0.741 (0.190)*** 0.545 (0.153)*** 
Risk attitude -0.073 (0.128) 0.329 (0.140)** 0.280 (0.127)** 
Social network 0.420 (0.129)*** -0.065 (0.154) 0.156 (0.128) 
Gansu 0.055 (0.237) 0.703 (0.267)*** 0.684 (0.253)*** 
Shaanxi -1.044 (0.238)*** -0.087 (0.285) -0.613 (0.218)*** 
Friend membership 0.319 (0.121)***   
Constant -1.803 (0.602)*** 2.169 (0.639)*** 2.144 (0.562)*** 
ath(𝜌𝜀𝜇) -0.655 (0.243)***  
𝜌𝜀𝜇 -0.575 (0.163)***  
Ln(σ) 0.381 (0.078)***  
R-squared   0.262 
Wald test (𝜌𝜀𝜇 = 0)                            7.27***, with Prob > chi2 = 0.007  
ATE (PSM)a 0.304 (0.162)*  
Sample size 481 481 
Note: In selection equation, dependent variable is a 1-0 dummy; Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
a ATE (PSM) refers to average treatment effects estimated by propensity score matching model, which is 
calculated using teffects psmatch command in Stata 13.0. 
Turning to the other factors that influence the ROI, the results show that the variable 
representing household head age tends to have a negative and significant impact on the ROI, a 
finding that suggests that elder farmers are unfavorable for apple production and marketing 
probably due to a number of factors such as poor health condition and outdated technology, 
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resulting in a lower ROI. Education has a negative and significant impact on the ROI. The 
possible reason for this may be that well-educated farmers have higher incentives to invest in 
organic fertilizers and green pesticides that are more expensive than chemical alternatives, with 
the aim of winning the markets by improving apple quality and safety. However, the increased 
fertilizer and pesticide costs cannot be compensated by increased prices due to lagged market 
for high-quality apples, finally leading to lower ROI.  
The variable representing dependency ratio is negative and statistically significant, suggesting 
that lower farm labor ratio in a household is associated with lower ROI. Higher dependency 
ratio requires a trade-off between taking care of family members and focusing on apple 
production and marketing. Allocating more labor to the household work results in insufficient 
labor being allocated to farms, which may result in production and marketing efficiency loss, 
and then lower ROI. The variable representing farm size appears to have a negative and 
significant coefficient, indicating that households with large farm size obtained significantly 
lower ROI than small farms. The finding is consistent with the finding by Chen et al. (2011) 
who also found a negative relationship between farm size and farm returns, but contradicts with 
the finding by Zheng et al. (2011), who found that larger farm size contributes to higher 
agricultural incomes. The coefficient of income specialization variable is positive and 
significantly different from zero, suggesting that specialized apple production is a lucrative 
profession. The finding is consistent with the results reported by Yang and Liu (2012), who 
also noted the positive relationship between agricultural specialization and rural income in their 
study on China. Farmers who depend on incomes from apple production and marketing as main 
income source may have higher incentives to identify markets in order to purchase inputs and 
sell their products at lower costs.  
The results show that marketing contract variable has a positive and significant impact on the 
ROI. Marketing contracts can help overcome imperfect markets and reduce transaction costs 
involved, contributing to a higher ROI. The finding is consistent with the finding by Escobal & 
Cavero (2012), who pointed out that marketing contracts tend to increase farm profits. The 
coefficient of labor availability variable is positive and significant, suggesting that sufficient 
labor tend to increase the ROI. Apple production is a labor-intensive profession, and sufficient 
labor can enhance the efficiency of farm input investment and output marketing, contributing 
to an increase in ROI. The coefficient of risk attitude variable is positive and significant, 
suggesting that risk-loving farmers obtained higher ROI. Among location dummies, the results 
in Table 5.4 show that farmers located in Gansu tend to have higher ROI, relative to farmers in 
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Shandong (reference region). The finding suggests the presence of location fixed effects in 
influencing the ROI. 
The results estimated from cooperative membership equation show that education, farm size, 
sprayer ownership, computer ownership and social network are main factors that drive farmers’ 
decisions to choose cooperative membership, which are generally consistent with the findings 
in previous studies (Bernard & Spielman, 2009; Fischer & Qaim, 2012; Ito et al., 2012; Yang 
& Liu, 2012; Zheng et al., 2012). It is worth mentioning that the primary objective of 
cooperative membership equation estimation is to control for unobserved factors that may bias 
the impact of cooperative membership on the ROI. Finally, the friend membership variable is 
significantly and positively associated with the choice of cooperative membership. We hereby 
do not expect the friend membership variable to be correlated with the ROI, hence it functions 
as an identifying instrumental variable in the treatment effects model as explained previously.  
5.4.2 Average Treatment Effects 
In addition to the marginal effect of cooperative membership on the ROI presented in Table 5.4, 
we are also interested in estimating the average treatment effects (ATE) of cooperative 
membership on the ROI. The ATE measures the difference in the predicted ROI for sampled 
households in the contexts with and without cooperative membership, which is calculated based 
on equation (5.8) (Cong & Drukker, 2000). This ATE estimate accounts for selection bias 
arising from both observable and unobservable factors. The results are presented in Table 5.5. 
As one can note, the ATE estimate reveals that the causal effect of cooperative membership 
was to increase the ROI by 14% on average.  
To gain further understanding of the ROI effects of cooperative membership, disaggregation of 
the ATE by regions and membership years are also presented in Table 5.5. The results show 
that cooperative membership has a larger effect on the ROI for farmers in Shaanxi, while it has 
a smaller effect on the ROI for farmers in Gansu. Specifically, for farmers living in Shaanxi, 
Shandong and Gansu provinces, cooperative membership appears to increase the ROI by 
16.37%, 14.43% and 9.87% on average, respectively. With respect to ROI effects of 
cooperative membership differentiated by membership years, the results in Table 5.5 show that 
the ROI effect of cooperative membership increases with increasing membership years. 
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Table 5.5 Average treatment effects of cooperative membership on the ROI 
  
Sample 
size 
Mean outcome  
ATE a 
 
t-value 
 
Change 
 (%) 
 Members Nonmembers 
ROI (Full sample)      481 2.605 2.285 0.320*** 63.56 14.00 
ROI effects by regions 
ROI (Gansu) 80 3.594 3.271 0.323*** 34.39 9.87 
ROI (Shaanxi) 195 2.118 1.820 0.298*** 29.11 16.37 
ROI (Shandong) 206 2.681 2.343 0.338*** 64.98 14.43 
ROI effects by membership status 
ROI (Nonmembers) 273 2.557 2.249 0.308*** 40.39 13.69 
ROI (Members) 208 2.668 2.333 0.335*** 58.02 14.36 
ROI effects by membership years b 
ROI (0<membership<=3) 85 2.617 2.320 0.297*** 30.30 12.80 
ROI (3<membership<=5) 87 2.687 2.329 0.358*** 47.28 15.37 
ROI (6<membership<=8) 36 2.743 2.373 0.370*** 39.97 15.59 
Note: *** p<0.01; 
a ATE refers to average treatment effects; 
b Among sampled 208 cooperative members, the average membership is 4.03 years, with minimum value of 1 
year and maximum value of 8 years. 
As comparison, the ATE estimate from PSM method is reported in the lower part of Table 5.4. 
The result reveals that the ATE value (0.304) estimated by PSM model is slightly lower than 
that estimated by treatment effects model (0.320), as shown in Table 5.5. This finding suggests 
that in our case, the omission of unobservable factors (e.g., farmers’ innate abilities) that 
influence both the decision of cooperative membership and the ROI results in negative selection 
bias, leading to underestimated ATE in PSM model estimation.  
For robustness check, we estimated the impact of cooperative membership on the ROI, using 
treatment effects model, and including an information availability variable representing 
whether a farmer can acquire sufficient information to understand the functions of 
contemporary cooperatives as an identifying instrumental variable. We used the same method 
to check the validity of friend membership variable to test the validity of information 
availability variable as an instrument. The results, which are presented in Table 5.6.A1 in the 
Appendix, show that the marginal effect of cooperative membership is 1.604, which is similar 
to that (1.739) presented in Table 5.4. Moreover, the ATE value of cooperative membership is 
0.318 in Table 5.6.A1 in the Appendix, which is quite similar to the ATE value (0.320) 
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presented in Table 5.5. These findings generally confirm the robust estimates for the impact of 
cooperative membership on the ROI. 
5.5 Conclusion  
The paper has examined the impact of cooperative membership on the ROI. A treatment effects 
model was applied to address the issue of selection bias and explore a survey data of 481 apple 
producing households in China. A negative selection bias was identified in our analysis, 
suggesting that farmers with lower than average ROI are more likely to choose cooperative 
membership. The implication is plausible, as cooperative organization is expected to benefit 
smallholder farmers that are in unfavorable conditions. Also, the presence of selection bias 
confirms the use of the treatment effects model to estimate the effect of cooperative membership 
on the ROI.  
The empirical results showed that the impact of cooperative membership was to increase the 
ROI by 14% on average. Moreover, farmers located in Shaanxi province obtained higher ROI 
than their counterparts in Shandong and Gansu. We also found that ROI effects of cooperative 
membership increased with increasing membership years. With respect to the factors that 
influence cooperative membership, the results revealed that education, farm size, asset 
ownership such as power sprayer and computer, and social network are vital determinants of 
cooperative membership. The higher ROI was found to be positively and significantly 
influenced by income specialization, marketing contract, labor availability and risk attitude.  
For development program designers, this analysis provides empirical evidence for a vital role 
of agricultural cooperative in enhancing the agricultural performance of smallholder farmers. 
As revealed by the results, smallholder farmers in unfavorable conditions are more likely to be 
included in the agricultural cooperatives. The development of cooperative organization is thus 
beneficial for smallholder farmers and promotes a more equitable and sustainable agricultural 
development in rural areas. The agricultural cooperatives deserve more public investment and 
guidance in the near future. In practice, the development of such organization could be 
promoted through spreading cooperative information to well-educated farmers and enhanced 
by the construction of rural internet infrastructure, as education, social network and the internet 
were found to facilitate smallholder farmers’ participation in agricultural cooperative. Finally, 
a development strategy of production specialization and marketing contract transaction could 
further improve the performance of smallholder farmers, by significantly increasing their return 
on investment. 
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Appendix 
Table 5.6.A1 Impact of cooperative membership on the ROI: Robustness check 
Variable Selection ROI 
Membership  1.604 (0.418)*** 
Age 0.005 (0.008) -0.018 (0.008)** 
Education 0.054 (0.026)** -0.053 (0.027)** 
Dependency ratio 0.103 (0.325) -1.037 (0.359)*** 
Farm size 0.089 (0.025)*** -0.147 (0.030)*** 
Sprayer ownership  0.738 (0.194)*** -0.089 (0.213) 
Computer ownership 0.339 (0.150)** 0.220 (0.164) 
Specialization 0.048 (0.337) 1.546 (0.347)*** 
Marketing contract 0.071 (0.170) 0.550 (0.181)*** 
Labor availability -0.429 (0.153)*** 0.721 (0.183)*** 
Risk attitude -0.078 (0.129) 0.324 (0.137)** 
Social network 0.418 (0.128)*** -0.044 (0.144) 
Gansu 0.209 (0.251) 0.701 (0.264)*** 
Shaanxi -0.946 (0.238)*** -0.139 (0.262) 
Information availability -0.356 (0.130)***  
Constant -1.615 (0.605)*** 2.167 (0.626)*** 
ath(𝜌𝜀𝜇
′ ) -0.590 (0.201)*** 
𝜌𝜀𝜇
′  -0.530 (0.145)*** 
Ln(σ) 0.364 (0.066)*** 
Wald test (𝜌𝜀𝜇
′ = 0)                            8.62***,  Prob > chi2 = 0.0033 
ATE (treatment effects model)a 0.318***, with t-value=63.56 
ATE (PSM)b 0.304 (0.162)* 
Sample size 481 
Note: In selection equation, dependent variable is a 1-0 dummy; Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
a ATE (treatment effects model) refers to average treatment effects estimated by treatment effects model; 
b ATE (PSM) refers to average treatment effects estimated by propensity score matching model, which is 
calculated using teffects psmatch command in Stata 13.0. 
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Abstract 
Purpose-The objective of this paper is to investigate the determinants of marketing contract 
choices including written contracts, oral contracts and no contracts, as well as to examine the 
impact of marketing contracts on net returns from apple production in China. 
Design/methodology/approach-A two-stage selection correction approach (BFG) for the 
multinomial logit model is employed to estimate the impact of marketing contracts on net 
returns from apple production. On the basis of the BFG estimation, we also use an endogenous 
switching regression model and a propensity score matching technique to estimate the causal 
effects of marketing contract choices on net returns from apple production. 
Findings-The results reveal significant selectivity correction terms in the choices of both 
written contracts and no contracts and insignificant selectivity correction terms in the choice of 
oral contract, indicating that accounting for selection bias is a prerequisite for unbiased and 
consistent estimation. The findings also indicate written contracts increase apple farmers’ net 
returns, while oral contracts exert the opposite effect.  
Originality/value-To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine the impact 
of marketing contract choices on net returns from apple production, accounting for selectivity 
effects. 
Keywords: Marketing Contracts; Multinomial Logit; Selectivity Correction; China  
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6.1 Introduction 
Marketing contracts are pre-harvest agreements between producers and contractors, in which 
only prices and quantities are agreed between the contracting parties (MacDonald et al. 2004; 
Wang et al. 2014). Agro-food marketing on a contractual basis is a common arrangement in 
agricultural sector all around the world. The coordination mechanisms through marketing 
contract arrangements play a vital role in linking smallholder farmers to advanced supply chains 
(e.g., supermarkets, restaurants, processors, and international markets), and contributing to rural 
income growth and poverty reduction (Islam 2009; Mangala and Chengappa 2008; Miyata et 
al. 2009). For small farmers living in remote rural areas in particular, agro-food marketing with 
marketing contracts is an option that may help overcome imperfect markets, improve access to 
credit, and reduce transaction costs and income risks (Goodwin and Schroeder 1994; Katchova 
and Miranda 2004; Musser et al. 1996). However, despite the benefits associated with 
marketing contracts, surveys have found that farmers use fewer marketing contracts in 
developing countries. For instance, in a survey of the fruit sector in 2005, Huang et al. (2008) 
found that only 22.86% and 4.76% of grapes are respectively sold with written and oral 
contracts in Shandong province in China. 
The significance of marketing contracts in promoting smallholders’ market participation and 
improving their welfare in developing countries has attracted considerable attention of policy 
analysts. In particular, several studies have examined farmer’s binary choice between 
participating in advanced agro-food supply chains such as supermarkets through the contractual 
arrangements and selling at spot markets (e.g., Blandon et al. 2009; Bourguignon et al. 2007; 
Escobal and Cavero 2012; Franken et al. 2014; Goodwin and Schroeder 1994; Miyata et al. 
2009; Paulson et al. 2010; Roe et al. 2004). Furthermore, an emerging body of research reveals 
that participation in high-value markets such as supermarkets through marketing contracts leads 
to higher net incomes (Escobal and Cavero 2012; Neven et al. 2009).  
A number of authors have also examined the nature and determinants of the choices of different 
types of marketing contracts (Abdulai and Birachi 2009; Guo and Jolly 2008; Jia et al. 2012; 
Katchova and Miranda 2004; Sartwelle et al. 2000). For instance, Katchova and Miranda (2004) 
investigated farmers’ choices of marketing contracts such as cash sales, forward contracts, and 
futures/options. Abdulai and Birachi (2009) noted that the choice of written contracts, verbal 
contracts and spot market contracts used in Kenyan fresh milk supply chain are determined by 
location, information source, travel time, gender and distance to markets. In addition to 
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examining the factors that influence farmers’ choices of different types of marketing contracts, 
understanding the linkages between marketing contract choices and farm outcomes can also 
provide significant information to agro-food producers and policy makers on whether a 
particular choice of marketing contract is an effective option for smallholder farmers who are 
gradually shifting from traditional spot markets to advanced supply chains. The issue is critical, 
given the increasing significance of contractual arrangements in linking smallholder farmers to 
modern supply chains in developing countries (Schipmann and Qaim 2011). However, to the 
best of our knowledge, the impact of marketing contract choices on farm performance has not 
been previously analyzed.  
The present study therefore contributes to the debate on contractual arrangements and net 
returns, by investigating the determinants of different types of marketing contract choices, as 
well as estimating the impact of marketing contract choices on net returns from crop production. 
In particular, net returns from crop production are employed to provide an indication of income 
effect as it rules out possible differences in the aspect of output level, prices and variable input 
costs. The study utilizes a cross-sectional survey data of 422 apple farmers collected in Gansu, 
Shaanxi and Shandong provinces of China between September and December 2013. In the 
survey regions, farmers are primarily engaged in apple production for their livelihoods, and 
they are involved in contractual arrangements including written contracts, oral contracts and no 
contracts for apple marketing.  
We model farmers’ choices of marketing contracts as a selection process, where the expected 
higher net returns from apple production (hereafter, also known as the “net returns” for brevity) 
drive their choices of particular types of marketing contracts from available alternatives. 
Specifically, we employ a selectivity based approach for the multinomial logit (MNL) model 
to examine the impact of the choice of written contracts, oral contracts, or no contracts on net 
returns. This approach was proposed by Bourguignon et al. (2007), which can identify the 
direction of the bias related to the choice of a given marketing contract, as well which type of 
marketing contract is the source of the bias. We also use an endogenous switching regression 
model and a propensity score matching technique to estimate the causal effects of marketing 
contract choices on net returns, as robustness checks.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 6.2 gives an overview of apple production 
and marketing in China. This is followed by the empirical specification and estimation 
technique used in the analysis. Section 6.4 presents a description of the data used, while the 
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estimated results are given in Section 6.5. Conclusions are discussed in the final section.  
6.2 Overview of Apple Production and Marketing in China 
China is the largest apple producer in the world. Apple output reached 37 million metric tons 
in 2012, accounting for nearly 48.44% of the world’s total apple output (FAOSTAT). Although 
apple is widely grown in China, the major producing areas are concentrated in Bohai Gulf 
region (Shandong, Hebei and Liaoning provinces) and Northwest Loess Plateau region (Gansu, 
Shaanxi, Shanxi and Henan provinces). In particular, around 54.17% of the country’s total apple 
orchards are located in Gansu, Shaanxi and Shandong provinces. The agro-food market in 
China is dominated by a large number of smallholder farmers, traders and wholesalers (Huang 
et al., 2007), and apple marketing is no exception. Apple farmers’ participation in domestic and 
international markets is severely constrained as a result of market imperfection, information 
asymmetry and high transaction costs, especially those producing apples in hilly and 
mountainous areas. For instance, farmers have better information about apple quality, while 
buyers have more information about the markets. However, the information asymmetry 
between farmers and buyers prevents the apple transactions from operating efficiently. 
Although the Chinese government has made efforts in the development of farm associations 
and agricultural cooperatives in order to facilitate vertical coordination with the agro-food 
market, farmers continue to make their own marketing decisions (Huang et al. 2009). 
As indicated previously, three main types of contractual arrangements are used in the fresh 
apple supply chain in China. These include written contracts, oral contracts and no contracts, 
or spot market contracts. Written contracts are formal agreements between farmers and buyers 
with regards to price, quantity, timing, and product attributes. They are normally signed by 
farmers and buyers from different marketing channels, after negotiation of the contract terms, 
which are backed by the law. Oral contracts are informal agreements, in which the transaction 
terms similar to written contracts are verbally agreed. Deposits may be given to farmers to seal 
the deal. Finally, no contract refers to spot market transactions, in which the transaction 
agreements are made on the market at prices fixed according to demand and price changes, 
without any advanced commitments. 
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6.3 Empirical Specification and Estimation Technique 
6.3.1 The Empirical Specification 
The framework used in the analysis is based on the assumption that farmers choose between 
mutually exclusive marketing contracts. For analytical convenience, it is assumed that farmers 
are risk neutral, and normally consider the net benefits from a marketing contract in their 
decision-making process.1 In the present setting, we refer to the net benefits as net returns from 
apple production, derived under transaction costs (TC). These marketing contract alternatives 
could be: (1) written contracts; (2) oral contracts; and (3) no contracts (i.e. spot market sales). 
In essence, the proportional transaction costs increase the real price of inputs (𝑂𝑖) and decrease 
the real price received for output (𝑃𝑞) (Iliopoulos 2013; Key et al. 2000). Let 𝑇𝐶𝑖
𝑝
 and 𝑇𝐶𝑞
𝑝
 
represent proportional transaction costs per unit of input (I) and output (Q), respectively. The 
adjusted input price is then given as 𝑂𝑖
′ = 𝑂𝑖 + 𝑇𝐶𝑖
𝑝
, while that for output price is 𝑃𝑞
′ = 𝑃𝑞 −
𝑇𝐶𝑞
𝑝
. Meanwhile, let 𝑇𝐶𝑖
𝑓  and 𝑇𝐶𝑞
𝑓
 denote fixed transaction costs for input and output market 
participation, respectively. Given these assumptions, farmers are assumed to maximize their 
net returns (𝜋∗) as: 
𝜋∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝑄(𝑃𝑞 − 𝑇𝐶𝑞
𝑃) − (𝑂𝑖 + 𝑇𝐶𝑖
𝑃)𝐼 − 𝑇𝐶𝑞
𝑓 − 𝑇𝐶𝑖
𝑓]           (6.1) 
From equation (6.1), a reduced-form of net returns function, in which the net returns from apple 
production are determined by the output and variable input prices, proportional transaction costs 
for input and output market participation, and household and farm level characteristics (Z), can 
be expressed as: 
𝜋 = 𝜋(𝑃𝑞 , O, 𝑇𝐶𝑖
𝑝, 𝑇𝐶𝑞
𝑝, 𝑍)   (6.2) 
As indicated previously, we assume that farmer i compares the expected net returns from 
choosing a specific marketing contract (𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑀) to that obtained from using no contract (𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑁), and 
the rational individual finally chooses to use the marketing contract, if 𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑀 − 𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑁 > 0. Although 
the preferences of the farmers are not known to the analysts, the farm and household-level 
characteristics of the individual farmers, as well as the attributes of the marketing contracts 
                                                          
1 This assumption is consistent with previous work on the determinants of marketing contracts by Katchova and 
Miranda (2004). 
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were observed during the survey. Based on the information available, we can represent the net 
returns from a marketing contract by a latent variable 𝐶𝑖𝑗
∗ , such that: 
𝐶𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝑍𝛾𝑖𝑗 + 𝜂𝑖 
𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1,   𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝑖𝑗
∗ > 0 
𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 0,   𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝑖𝑗
∗ ≤ 0          (6.3) 
where 𝐶𝑖𝑗  is a binary indicator variable that equals 1, if the individual uses the marketing 
contract, and 0 if the individual uses no contract, or sells at spot market; in particular, j=1 if the 
farmer chooses written contract, while j=2 if the individual chooses oral contract. Thus, the 
farmer only uses marketing contract if the perceived net returns are positive. 
6.3.2 The Issue of Impact Analysis 
In order to examine the impact of marketing contract choice on net returns, we assume that net 
returns from apple production is a linear function of a vector of explanatory variables (𝑋𝑖𝑗) and 
a marketing contract choice dummy (𝐶𝑖𝑗). Thus, the net returns function can be specified as: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿𝐶𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖      (6.4) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is net returns for choosing written contracts (j=1) and oral contracts (j=2); 𝛽 and 𝛿 
are parameters to be estimated; 𝜇𝑖  is an error term that satisfies  𝜇𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎). The issue of 
selection bias arises if unobservable characteristics affect both the error terms in equations (6.3) 
and (6.4), resulting in a correlation between the two error terms, i.e. corr(𝜂𝑖, 𝜇𝑖) ≠ 0.  
When selection is over a large number of mutually exclusive choices (e.g., selling apples using 
written contracts, oral contracts or no contracts), a two-step method is normally employed to 
address the issue of selection bias based on a multinomial logit model. Two traditional 
approaches are suggested by Lee (1983) and Dubin and McFadden (Hereinafter DMF, 1984). 
However, Lee’s method estimates a single selectivity effects for all choices together and DMF 
method establishes M-1 selection terms for the M choices, which cannot fully address the 
selection bias issue arising from multiple choices of marketing contracts. Therefore, this study 
employs a selectivity correction approach proposed by Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand 
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(Hereinafter BFG, 2007), which is more accurate in capturing selectivity effects generated by 
alternative choices (Khanal and Mishra 2014). 
6.3.3 BFG Method 
The BFG method is a two-step estimation model, accounting for selection bias and systematic 
differences across groups. The first-step applies an unordered multinomial logit (MNL) model 
aimed at studying farmers’ choices of different types of marketing contracts, as well as creating 
selectivity terms for unbiased estimation of net returns equations. Since three types of marketing 
contracts are identified in this study, there are three selectivity correction terms that can be 
derived. Given that the first type of marketing contract is chosen (j=1), the MNL model is given 
as: 
𝑃1(𝜀1 < 0|𝑍) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑍𝛾1)
∑ 𝑍𝛾𝑗
3
𝑗=1
 , 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3  (6.5) 
where 𝜀1 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗≠1(𝐶𝑗
∗ − 𝐶1
∗) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗≠1(𝑍𝛾𝑗 + 𝜂𝑗 − 𝑍𝛾1 − 𝜂1) ; 𝑃1  is the probability of 
choosing the first type of marketing contract; j is a categorical variable describing farmers’ 
choices of written contracts (j=1), oral contracts (j=2) and no contracts (j=3); 𝛾𝑗 are the 
consistent maximum likelihood estimates; Z is a set of explanatory variables for all marketing 
contract alternatives. In a non-linear model such as the MNL, the estimated coefficients are not 
interpreted directly, we thus calculate the marginal effects to provide a better understanding 
about the magnitudes of the coefficients (Greene 2003).  
The second-step of the BFG method involves the estimation of the net returns equations for the 
different types of marketing contracts, using ordinary least square (OLS) regression, where the 
selectivity correction terms estimated in the first-step are simultaneously included to obtain 
unbiased and consistent estimation. Given that the marketing contract option one is chosen (j=1), 
the outcome equation for net returns, 𝑦1 is specified as: 
𝑦1 = 𝑋𝛽1 + 𝜎1 [𝜌1
∗𝑚(𝑃1) + 𝜌2
∗𝑚(𝑃2)
𝑃2
𝑃2−1
+ 𝜌3
∗𝑚(𝑃3)
𝑃3
𝑃3−1
] + 𝑤1       (6.6) 
where 𝑚(𝑃1), 𝑚(𝑃2) and 𝑚(𝑃3) are the conditional expectations of 𝜂1
∗, 𝜂2
∗  and 𝜂3
∗ , which are 
used to correct for selectivity effects; 𝜌 represents correlation coefficients between 𝜇 and 𝜂; 𝜎 
is the standard deviation of the disturbance term from the net returns equation; and 𝑤1 is the 
error term. The net returns equations for choosing the other marketing contracts can be written 
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in a similar way. 
The selectivity correction terms in equation (6.6) have econometric interpretations. Specifically, 
if at least one of them is significant, this would suggest the presence of sample selectivity effects 
arising from unobservable factors. The estimated coefficients would be biased and inconsistent 
if these terms are not included in the related net returns equations. Moreover, for each net 
returns specification, a positive (negative) coefficient of the selectivity term indicates higher 
(lower) net returns for the farmers, relative to a randomly chosen producer. This is because 
farmers with better (worse) unobserved endowments are more likely to choose this given type 
of marketing contract rather than other alternatives (Bourguignon et al. 2007). Insignificant 
selectivity terms indicate the absence of selectivity effects. 
The BFG estimation investigates the factors that influence the choices of different types of 
marketing contracts and the impact of contractual choice on net returns. As robustness checks, 
we also employ two impact assessment methods that account for selectivity bias to complement 
the results from the BFG analysis. These methods are endogenous switching regression (ESR) 
model, which accounts for both observable and unobservable factors, and propensity score 
matching (PSM), which accounts only for observable factors (Dehejia and Wahba 2002; 
Lokshin and Sajaia 2004). In particular, if at least one of the selectivity correction terms is 
significant for the given type of marketing contract, this would suggest the presence of selection 
bias arising from unobservable factors, in which case the ESR model is appropriate in analyzing 
the causal effect of the given marketing contract choice. If none of the selectivity correction 
terms is significantly different from zero in the net return specification for the given type of 
marketing contract, this would indicate the absence of selection bias arising from unobservable 
factors. In such a case, we use PSM technique to assess the related casual effects. 
6.3.4 The ESR Model 
The ESR is a parametric approach that uses two different estimation equations for a given 
marketing contract option and other alternatives, while accounting for selection process by 
including an inverse Mills ratio that is calculated from the selection equation presented in 
equation (6.3) (Lokshin and Sajaia 2004). The outcome equations are then based on equation 
(6.4), separately for each regime, conditional on the marketing contract selection decision, 
which is estimated by a probit model.  
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Given the marketing contract choice and outcome equations specified in (6.3) and (6.4), 
respectively, the relationship between the choice of marketing contract and the two regimes can 
be specified as: 
𝐶1
∗ = 𝑍𝛾1 + 𝜂1     (6.7) 
𝑌1 = 𝑋𝛽1 + 𝜑1    𝑖𝑓  𝐶1 = 1        (6.7a) 
𝑌0 = 𝑋𝛽0 + 𝜑0    𝑖𝑓  𝐶0 = 0 (6.7b) 
where 𝑌1 represents net returns, if the first marketing contract option is chosen (j=1), and 𝑌0 is 
net returns derived from choosing other marketing contract options (𝑗 ≠ 1); X is a vector of 
exogenous variables that affect the net returns; 𝜑1 and 𝜑0 are error terms, with zero mean and 
normal distribution. The ESR model addresses the issue of selection bias resulting from 
unobservable factors as a missing variable problem. In particular, after estimating a probit 
model using the selection equation (6.7), the inverse Mills ratios 𝜆1 and 𝜆0 and the covariance 
terms, 𝜎𝜂1 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜂1, 𝜑1) and 𝜎𝜂0 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜂1, 𝜑0) can be calculated and plugged into equations 
(6.7a) and (6.7b):  
𝑌1 = 𝑋𝛽1 + 𝜎𝜂1𝜆1 + 𝜉1    𝑖𝑓  𝐶1 = 1   (6.8a) 
𝑌0 = 𝑋𝛽0 + 𝜎𝜂0𝜆0 + 𝜉0    𝑖𝑓  𝐶0 = 0            (6.8b) 
where 𝜆1 and 𝜆0 control for selection bias resulting from unobservable factors such as the local 
institutional environment for the produce market and farmers’ inherent ability; the error terms 
𝜉1  and 𝜉0  have conditional zero means. The full information maximum likelihood (FIML) 
method suggested by Lokshin and Sajaia (2004) is used to estimate the selection and outcome 
equations simultaneously. The approach overcomes the drawback of estimating the equations 
separately, which generates residuals that are heteroskedastic. 
The correlation coefficients, 𝜌𝜂1(𝜎𝜂1/𝜎𝜂𝜎1) and 𝜌𝜂0(𝜎𝜂0/𝜎𝜂𝜎0) of covariance terms between 
the error terms 𝜂1, 𝜑1 and 𝜑0 have econometric interpretations. If 𝜌𝜂1 or 𝜌𝜂0 is significant, this 
would indicate the presence of selection bias arising from unobservable factors. Moreover, 
𝜌𝜂1 > 0 implies negative selection bias, suggesting that farmers with below average net returns 
are more likely to choose the given marketing contract, while 𝜌𝜂1 < 0  implies positive 
selection bias (Lokshin and Sajaia 2004). The consistent estimation also requires that the 
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correlation coefficient 𝜌𝜂1 in ESR model and the coefficients of the significant selectivity bias 
terms 𝑚(𝑃𝑗) in BFG model for the given marketing contract option have opposite signs. The 
effect of marketing contract on net returns is examined by specifying expected values of the 
outcomes. The change in net returns due to a specific marketing contract relative to another 
contract is specified as the difference between the marketing contracts. These estimates are 
termed average treatment effects on the treated (ATT). 
The ATT 𝜏𝐴𝑇𝑇
𝐸𝑆𝑅 in this case is:  
𝜏𝐴𝑇𝑇
𝐸𝑆𝑅 = 𝐸[𝑌1|𝐶1 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐶1 = 1] = 𝑋(𝛽1 − 𝛽0) + 𝜆1(𝜎𝜂1 − 𝜎𝜂0)     (6.9) 
6.3.5 The PSM Technique 
PSM compares outcomes between a specific type of marketing contract users (“treated”) and 
those using other marketing contract alternatives (“controlled”) that are similar in terms of 
observable characteristics, thus reducing the bias that would otherwise occur when the two 
groups are systematically different (Dehejia and Wahba 2002). It involves two stages. First, we 
generate propensity score (i.e. the probability) of choosing the given marketing contract using 
a probit model. Second, we calculate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) based 
on the estimated propensity score. PSM can be expressed as: 
Pr(𝑋1) = Pr(𝐶1 = 1|𝑍1) = 𝐸(𝐶1|𝑍1)                  (6.10) 
where 𝐶1 = {0, 1} is an indicator for choosing the given type of marketing contract (j=1) and 
𝑍1 is a vector of pre-choice characteristics. 
After estimating the propensity scores, the ATT, 𝜏𝐴𝑇𝑇
𝑃𝑆𝑀 can then be estimated as: 
𝜏𝐴𝑇𝑇
𝑃𝑆𝑀 = 𝐸𝑃(𝑍1)|𝐷1=1{𝐸[(𝑌1|𝐷1 = 1, 𝑃(𝑍1)] − 𝐸[(𝑌0|𝐷1 = 1, 𝑃(𝑍1)]}             (6.11) 
Several techniques have been developed to match the given marketing contract users and non-
users of similar propensity score. In this study, we employ the most commonly used techniques 
including nearest neighbor matching (NNM), kernel-based matching (KBM) and radius 
matching methods to estimate the ATT. 
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6.4 Data and Description 
The data employed in the present study come from a farm household survey that was conducted 
between September and December 2013 in three main apple growing provinces (Gansu, 
Shaanxi and Shandong) in China. A multistage random sampling procedure with purposive 
selection of provinces and counties based on the intensity of apple production and random 
selection of villages and households was employed to select 422 farmers for the survey. Farmers 
were asked to provide detailed information on personal and farm level characteristics, asset 
ownership, financial situation, access to information, as well as marketing activities. Only 7.58% 
of the farmers who used marketing contracts choose different types of contracts. In these cases, 
we classify their contract type as the type of the contracts with larger proportion of production 
contracted in order to simplify the analysis. The final dataset of marketing contracts includes 
records for 179 written contract users, 71 oral contract users and 172 no contract users (i.e. spot 
market sellers).  
The dependent variables considered include written contracts, oral contracts and no contracts, 
which gives the value of 1 if a given marketing contract was chosen, and 0 otherwise. The 
outcomes refer to net returns from apple production, which are measured as the difference 
between the value of apple yields and variable input costs per mu 0F0F 2. The inputs included 
fertilizer, pesticide, hired labor, films for land moisture conservation and apple coloring, bags, 
and irrigation. The independent variables employed to explain the determinants of marketing 
contract choices are based on the existing literature (Katchova and Miranda 2004; Wang et al. 
2014). 
Table 6.1 presents descriptive statistics for the survey households. It can be observed that 42% 
and 17% of farmers choose written contracts and oral contracts, respectively. The rest opted for 
spot market contracts. Farmers in the sample are smallholders with an average orchard size of 
5.22 mu. Apple production and marketing contribute 75% of total household incomes averagely, 
and the average net returns per mu is 7110 yuan 1F1F3. In our sample, only 19% of farmers use 
cooperative organization as a primary marketing channel. 30% of households are observed to 
acquire output marketing information from their neighbors. More than half of the households 
                                                          
2 1 mu=1/15 hectare. 
3 yuan is Chinese currency unit (1$=6.14 yuan). 
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are not credit constrained in the survey year. These are households that did not require 
additional credit for the farming activities. 
 Table 6.1 The definitions of the variables used in the analysis 
Variables Description Mean (S.D.) 
Written contract 1 if farmer chose written contract for apple marketing, 0 
otherwise 
0.42 (0.49) 
Oral contract 1 if farmer chose oral contract for apple marketing, 0 
otherwise 
0.17 (0.37) 
No contract  1 if farmer sold apples with no contract, 0 otherwise 0.41 (0.49 
Net returns Gross revenue from apple production minus variable 
input costs (yuan/1000/mua) 
7.11 (3.69) 
Age  Age of respondent (years) 48.47 (10.46) 
Education No. of years of schooling  7.48 (2.95) 
Orchard size Total fruiting apple orchards (mu) 5.22 (3.27) 
Specialization The value of total apple yields divided by the total 
household incomes (%) 
0.75 (0.22) 
Farming vehicle 1 if farmer owns farming vehicle, 0 otherwise 0.91 (0.29) 
Computer 1 if farmer owns computer, 0 otherwise 0.29 (0.45) 
Cooperative 
sales 
1 if farmer sold apples mainly through agricultural 
cooperatives, 0 otherwise 
0.19 (0.39) 
Extension 
contact 
1 If farmer visited extension service, 0 otherwise 0.39 (0.49) 
Access to credit 1 If farmer is not liquidity constrained, 0 otherwise 0.52 (0.50) 
Timely payment 1 if farmer received timely payment, 0 otherwise 0.82 (0.38) 
Neighbors 1 if farmer acquired output marketing information from 
neighbors, 0 otherwise 
0.30 (0.46) 
Market 
perception 
Apple market demand situation last year (1=Bad; 
2=Fair; 3=Good) 
2.24 (0.85) 
Distance  Distance to markets (km) 0.72 (2.66) 
Quantity Quantity of total apple sold (kg/1000) 18.02 (10.67) 
Price Average apple selling price (yuan/kg) 3.72 (0.83) 
Shandong 1 if farmer is located in Shandong province, 0 otherwise 0.37 (0.48) 
Gansu 1 if farmer is located in Gansu province, 0 otherwise 0.19 (0.39) 
Shaanxi 1 if farmer is located in Shaanxi province, 0 otherwise 0.44 (0.50) 
a yuan is Chinese currency (1$=6.14 yuan); 1 mu=1/15 hectare. 
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Table 6.2 presents differences in the characteristics between written contract users, oral contract 
users and no contract users. In particular, both written and oral contract users are younger than 
no contract users. The orchard size of oral contract users is about 84% larger compared to no 
contract users. The orchard size of written contract users is much larger, which is more than 
double that of no contract users. Compared with no contract users, written contract users are 
31% less likely to be credit constrained, while oral contract users are 27% more likely to be 
capital constrained. Both written and oral contract users have lower market perception of apple 
demand, compared with no contract users. There are also marked differences in output price 
and supply quantity between marketing contract users and no contract users. In particular, both 
written and oral contract users tend to obtain higher prices and sell larger quantities of the 
produce. The lower part of Table 6.2 also reveals that the average net returns from apple 
production for written contract users is 2.71% lower than that for no contract users, while the 
average net returns for oral contract users is much lower than that for the counterpart by 14.38%. 
Overall, the results presented in Table 6.2 indicate that written contract users, oral contract users 
and no contract users are systematically different. 
Table 6.2 Difference in characteristics between the users of written contracts, oral 
contracts and no contracts 
 
Variables 
Written contract 
(N=179) 
Oral contract 
(N=71) 
No contract 
(N=172) 
Age 45.17 (10.31) 46.44 (8.51) 52.75 (9.88) 
Education 7.80 (2.66) 7.21 (3..32) 7.24 (3.05) 
Orchard size 6.97 (3.09) 5.82 (2.80) 3.17 (2.36) 
Specialization 0.84 (0.17) 0.70 (0.22) 0.68 (0.22) 
Farming vehicle 0.89 (0.31) 0.92 (0.28) 0.92 (0.27) 
Computer 0.41 (0.49) 0.31 (0.47) 0.15 (0.36) 
Cooperative sales 0.11 (0.31) 0.38 (0.49) 0.20 (0.40) 
Extension contact 0.55 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 0.19 (0.39) 
Access to credit 0.63 (0.49) 0.35 (0.48) 0.48 (0.50) 
Timely payment  0.80 (0.40) 0.73 (0.46) 0.89 (0.31) 
Neighbors 0.22 (0.41) 0.25 (0.44) 0.40 (0.49) 
Market perception 2.05 (0.85) 1.92 (0.92) 2.58 (0.68) 
Distance 0.58 (2.23) 0.97 (3.80) 1.26 (3.07) 
Quantity 23.51 (11.39) 17.54 (9.61) 12.52 (6.73) 
Price 3.83 (1.01) 3.86 (0.60) 3.55 (0.64) 
Net returns 7.17 (37.27) 6.31 (3.86) 7.37 (3.54) 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. 
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6.5 Empirical Results 
6.5.1 Determinants of Marketing Contract Choices: First-stage BFG Estimation 
The parameter estimates of the choices of marketing contracts used by apple farmers are 
presented in Table 6.3. Note that the base group for comparison is farmers selling with no 
contracts. The MNL regression was used to model the farmer’s choice of marketing contracts 
such as written contracts, oral contracts or no contracts. As indicated previously, the magnitudes 
of the coefficients from MNL model are difficult to interpret, we therefore use the marginal 
effects to interpret the determinants of farmer’s choices of marketing contracts. 
The marginal effect of cooperative sale variable is positive and statistically significant for oral 
contracts, indicating that trust mechanism developed between apple farmers and cooperative 
organizations contribute to the use of informal oral contracts. As indicated by Guo and Jolly 
(2008), oral contracts tend to be used by the cooperatives, as underwriting and enforcement 
may rely on the network and norms of smallholders. The cooperative variable has a negative 
and significant impact on no contracts, but no impact on written contracts. Farmers who are not 
liquidity constrained are more likely to choose written contracts and less likely to use oral 
contracts. The positive and significant marginal effect of the timely payment variable for written 
contracts indicates that farmers who prefer timely payment are more likely to choose written 
contracts, while the negative and significant effects for no contracts suggest that those who can 
accept delayed payment are more likely to use no contracts. This finding contrasts with the 
results reported by Abdulai and Birachi (2009) for fresh milk marketing in Nakuru district of 
Kenya. As noted by Schipmann and Qaim (2011) in their study on Thailand, delayed payment 
in contract schemes may deter smallholder farmers from using marketing contracts. In 
particular, timely payment can improve the situation of written contract users, especially 
resource-poor farmers, although delayed payment may be compensated by higher prices to 
some extent. Relative to their counterparts in Shandong province (reference division), apple 
farmers in Gansu and Shaanxi provinces appear to favor the use of written contracts, while they 
are less likely to use no contracts. The significance of location variables indicates the 
importance of spatial effects. The volumes of apple sold have a negative, but statistically 
insignificant effect on both oral and no contracts. However, a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient is observed for written contracts. The estimates also reveal that longer 
distance to reach buyers is positively and significantly associated with oral contracts, which is 
consistent with the finding by Abdulai and Birachi (2009). Finally, the variables such as age, 
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education, orchard size, ownership of farming vehicle and computer, extension contact, access 
to information through neighbor, and the transacted prices did not appear to influence apple 
farmers’ choice of marketing contracts. 
As indicated earlier, another purpose of the MNL selection estimates of marketing contract 
choices is to account for the unobserved heterogeneity that could bias the results of the 
coefficients in the net returns equations. Thus, the MNL selection equations need to include one 
or more valid instruments for model identification, which should strongly influence farmer’s 
choices of marketing contracts, but do not influence the net returns. In this study, we employed 
a variable representing farmer’s perception of apple market demand as an instrument. As 
evident from the Table 6.9.A1 in the Appendix, the employed instrument is uncorrelated with 
net returns. However, it is highly significant in MNL selection equations, suggesting that it is a 
valid instrument. Besides, the significant marginal effects of market perception variable also 
indicate that farmers with perception of higher market demand for produced apples are less 
likely to use both written and oral contracts, but more likely to use no contracts, suggesting that 
marketing contracts are more likely to be used to deal with sluggish markets.  
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Table 6.3 Determinants of marketing contract choices: First-stage BFG estimation 
 Written contract (N=179) Oral contract (N=71) No contract (N=172) 
Variable Marginal effects z-value Marginal effects z-value Marginal effects z-value 
Age -0.001 (0.004) -0.22 -0.004 (0.003) -1.04 0.004 (0.005) 0.88 
Education 0.021 (0.014) 1.53 -0.018 (0.011) -1.67* -0.003 (0.017) -0.18 
Orchard size -0.001 (0.017) -0.09 0.024 (0.015) 1.61 -0.023 (0.023) -0.97 
Specialization 0.052 (0.208) 0.25 -0.444 (0.167) -2.66*** 0.392 (0.264) 1.48 
Farming vehicle 0.014 (0.109) 0.13 0.058 (0.090) 0.64 -0.072 (0.141) -0.51 
Computer 0.001 (0.087) 0.00 -0.001 (0.074) -0.02 0.001 (0.117) 0.01 
Cooperative sales -0.010 (0.098) -0.10 0.404 (0.091) 4.43*** -0.394 (0.091) -4.31*** 
Extension contact 0.063 (0.073) 0.87 0.064 (0.062) 1.03 -0.127 (0.087) -1.46 
Access to credit 0.175 (0.072) 2.44** -0.135 (0.061) -2.20** -0.040 (0.090) -0.45 
Timely payment 0.171 (0.073) 2.36** 0.066 (0.073) 0.91 -0.237 (0.113) -2.10** 
Neighbor -0.079 (0.076) -1.03 -0.058 (0.061) -0.96 0.137 (0.096) 1.43 
Distance (log) -0.008 (0.010) -0.75 0.022 (0.009) 2.60*** -0.015 (0.013) -1.10 
Quantity (log) 0.194 (0.099) 1.96* -0.015 (0.082) -0.18 -0.179 (0.120) -1.49 
Price (log) 0.063 (0.179) 0.35 0.115 (0.154) 0.75 -0.178 (0.249) -0.71 
Market perception -0.155 (0.044) -3.55*** -0.087 (0.037) -2.37** 0.241 (0.054) 4.47*** 
Gansu 0.662 (0.107) 6.16*** -0.087 (0.085) -1.02 -0.575 (0.076) -7.55*** 
Shaanxi 0.774 (0.060) 13.01*** 0.073 (0.061) 1.21 -0.848 (0.050) -17.04*** 
Notes: Base group is no contract sellers; *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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6.5.2 Impact of Marketing Contract Choices on Net Returns: Second-stage BFG Estimation 
The estimates of the impact of marketing contract choices on net returns are presented in Table 
6.4. As indicated previously, the net returns equations are estimated using OLS, in which 
selection bias correction terms derived from the MNL model are automatically included. The 
three types of marketing contracts generate three selectivity correction terms, denoted in Mills 
1-3, which are used to control for selectivity effects arising from unobserved factors. The 
estimator variances are all bootstrapped with 100 replications to deal with heteroskedasticity 
(Huesca and Camberos 2010).  
The results reveal that the selectivity correction terms are significant in the choices of both 
written contracts and no contracts, indicating the presence of sample selectivity effects in these 
specifications. Hence, accounting for selectivity is essential to ensure unbiased and consistent 
estimates of the coefficients in the net returns equations. For the written contract specification, 
the estimated coefficient of the selectivity correction term related to no contracts is significantly 
negative, indicating lower than expected net returns (downward biased) for written contract 
users relative to a randomly chosen apple producer. Thus, for farmers who obtained net returns 
from using written contracts, switching from written contracts to no contracts leads to a negative 
and significant impact on their net returns. This finding also indicates that apple farmers with 
worse unobserved attributes are more likely to sell their products with written contracts rather 
than sell with no contracts. For instance, farmers who perceived lower competitiveness of their 
apple quality in spot markets may be more likely to choose written contracts in order to stabilize 
marketing channel and reduce marketing risks. In addition, the BFG estimation reveals that all 
selectivity correction terms are insignificant in the choice of oral contracts, indicating the 
absence of selectivity effects resulting from unobservable factors, and that OLS is appropriate 
for identifying factors influencing net returns in the oral contract specification. 
With regards to the factors influencing selection towards net returns, both the age and education 
variables tend to have a negative and statistically significant impact on net returns of written 
contract users. Orchard size appears to have negative and statistically significant impact on net 
returns of marketing contract users, indicating larger orchard size obtained significantly lower 
net returns than smaller farms. The finding is consistent with earlier studies by Chen et al. (2011) 
and Abdulai and Huffman (2014). Interestingly, we found that the variables representing selling 
apples primarily through cooperative organizations have positive and statistically significant 
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impacts on net returns of both written and no contract users, but positive and insignificant 
impact on that of oral contract users, indicating the growing importance of agricultural 
cooperatives in providing apple circulation service towards increasing net returns. Contact with 
extension agents tends to have a positive and significant effect on net returns for written contract 
users, but a negative and significant effect on net returns of no contract users. The extension 
contact variable has no significant impact on net returns for oral contract users. The finding 
indicates the important role of extension service in enhancing net returns for marketing contract 
users, especially written contract users. Transacted quantities and prices also seem to positively 
influence net returns through the choices of marketing contracts. In particular, a one percent 
increase in the quantity transacted entails a larger increase in net returns for oral contract users, 
while one percent increase in transacted price entails a larger increase in net returns for written 
contract users. 
The estimates for the first-stage BFG approach are presented in Table 6.3, while the second-
stage results are presented in Table 6.4. The results provide insights of the important factors 
that influence the choice of marketing contracts and the related net returns. However, in order 
to understand the change in net returns between a specific marketing contract and another 
contract type, some further estimations are required. In particular, given the evidence of 
significant selectivity correction term resulting from unobservable factors for written contract 
specification in Table 6.4, this study employs ESR model to estimate the related causal effects 
(Lokshin and Sajaia 2004). However, since we find no significant selectivity effects in the oral 
contract specification in Table 6.4, indicating the absence of selection bias arising from 
unobservable factors, we use PSM technique to estimate the related causal effects (Dehejia and 
Wahba 2002).  
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Table 6.4 Impact of marketing contract choices on net returns: Second-stage BFG estimation 
 Written contract (N=179) Oral contract (N=71) No contract (N=172) 
Variable Coefficients z-value Coefficients z-value Coefficients z-value 
Constant 2.286 (1.178) 1.94* 1.093 (1.868) 0.59 3.447 (1.106) 3.12*** 
Age -0.012 (0.004) -2.68*** -0.008 (0.013) -0.59 0.001 (0.005) 0.21 
Education -0.033 (0.016) -2.13** -0.045 (0.052) -0.86 -0.014 (0.013) -1.07 
Orchard size -0.102 (0.017) -5.86*** -0.167 (0.046) -3.67*** -0.174 (0.059) -2.94*** 
Specialization -0.026 (0.342) -0.07 -0.030 (0.757) -0.04 0.002 (0.190) 0.01 
Farming vehicle 0.021 (0.098) 0.21 -0.192 (0.356) -0.54 0.039 (0.107) 0.37 
Computer 0.107 (0.082) 1.29 0.184 (0.201) 0.92 0.054 (0.091) 0.59 
Cooperative sales 0.528 (0.211) 2.50** 0.677 (0.646) 1.05 0.503 (0.122) 4.12*** 
Extension contact 0.203 (0.0712) 2.84*** 0.047 (0.186) 0.25 -0.192 (0.126) -1.52 
Access to credit -0.157(0.123) -1.27 -0.052 (0.367) -0.14 -0.135 (0.086) -1.57 
Timely payment -0.098 (0.097) -1.01 -0.250 (0.200) -1.25 -0.041 (0.124) -0.33 
Neighbor -0.052 (0.092) -0.57 -0.076 (0.175) -0.43 0.016 (0.064) 0.25 
Distance (log) 0.009 (0.014) 0.68 0.018 (0.035) 0.52 0.371 (0.138) 2.69*** 
Quantity (log) 0.762 (0.100) 7.63*** 0.952 (0.261) 3.65*** 0.021 (0.009) 2.25** 
Price (log) 0.793 (0.127) 6.24*** 0.353 (0.577) 0.61 0.612 (0.120) 5.11*** 
Mills 1 -0.368 (0.262) -1.40 0.493 (1.186) 0.42 0.551 (0.211) 2.61*** 
Mills 2 0.979 (0.668) 1.47 0.682 (0.610) 1.12 -0.380 (0.560) -0.68 
Mills 3 -0.797 (0.402) -1.99** 0.541 (0.688) 0.79 1.201 (0.424) 2.83*** 
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively;  
The dependent variables is the logarithm of net returns of apple production; 
Location fixed effects includes in the estimation, but not reported here. 
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6.5.3 Impact of Written Contract Choice on Net Returns: ESR Estimation 
The estimates of the impact of written contract choice (treatment group) on net returns are 
presented in Tables 6.5 and 6.6, where the control groups are no contract users and oral contract 
users, respectively. As indicated previously, the FIML approach estimates both the selection 
and the outcome equations jointly. Considering the primary purpose of ESR estimation in this 
study is to estimate the causal effect of written contract choice on net returns, the interpretation 
of detailed results in Tables 6.5 and 6.6 is not put forward. It is worthy to note here that the 
coefficients of variables in the written contract choice equations in Tables 6.5 and 6.6 usually 
have the similar sign and significance with the variables estimated from MNL model in Table 
6.3. 
An interesting finding in Tables 6.5 and 6.6 is the sign and significance of the correlation 
coefficients (𝜌𝜂1 and 𝜌𝜂0) of covariance terms between the error terms in the selection and 
outcome equations. In particular, the results show that the correlation coefficients (𝜌𝜂1) for the 
written contract users in both Tables 6.5 and 6.6 are statistically significant, indicating the 
presence of selection bias resulting from unobservable factors. Hence, taking into account both 
observable and unobservable factors is essential to obtain unbiased treatment effects (ATT). 
Moreover, the positive sign for 𝜌𝜇1 indicates a negative selection bias, suggesting that farmers 
with lower than average net returns have a higher probability to choose written contracts. The 
negative selection bias here is consistent with the interpretation of negative and significant 
selectivity term in the net return equation for written contract specification in Table 6.4, 
confirming that BFG selectivity model proposed by Bourguignon et al. (2007) is appropriate 
for the analysis of different types of marketing contract choices 
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Table 6.5 The impact of written contract choice on net returns (relative to no contract 
users): ESR estimation  
  Net returns 
Variable Selection Written contract users 
(N=179)  
No contract users 
(N=172) 
Constant -8.912 (3.114)*** -0.057 (0.800) 2.484 (0.750)*** 
Age 0.005 (0.014) -0.007 (0.003)*** 0.004 (0.004) 
Education 0.073 (0.045) -0.005 (0.010) 0.004 (0.011) 
Orchard size -0.085 (0.073) -0.136 (0.012)*** -0.157 (0.017)*** 
Specialization -0.337 (0.716) 0.354 (0.153)** 0.252 (0.127)** 
Farming Vehicle 0.260 (0.341) -0.017 (0.084) -0.020 (0.104) 
Computer 0.146 (0.278) 0.118 (0.055)** 0.094 (0.081) 
Cooperative sales 0.373 (0.420) 0.212 (0.087)** 0.302 (0.072)*** 
Extension contact 0.112 (0.236) 0.145 (0.052)*** -0.181 (0.074)** 
Access to credit 0.660 (0.261)** 0.060 (0.051) 0.037 (0.063) 
Timely payment 0.387 (0.276) -0.016 (0.066) 0.056 (0.106) 
Neighbor -0.228 (0.286) -0.026 (0.063) 0.008 (0.059) 
Distance (log) -0.005 (0.034) -0.008 (0.008) 0.004 (0.007) 
Quantity (log) 0.706 (0.353)** 0.878 (0.079)*** 0.642 (0.070)*** 
Price (log) 0.119 (0.569) 0.766 (0.109)*** 0.592 (0.167)*** 
Gansu 2.733 (0.493)*** 0.634 (0.236)*** 0.493 (0.210)** 
Shaanxi 3.718 (0.508)*** 0.402 (0.243)* 0.367 (0.373) 
Market perception -0.409 (0.141)***   
𝐿𝑛𝜎1   -1.140 (0.069)***  
 𝜌𝜂1  0.704 (0.348)**  
𝐿𝑛𝜎0    -1.108 (0.071)*** 
 𝜌𝜂0   0.368 (0.775) 
Log likelihood -172.70   
Likelihood ratio test for independent equations 𝑥2(1)    2.79* 
Observations 351 351 351 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log form of apple net returns measured in yuan/mu (1$=6.14 yuan);  
In selection equation, it takes the value of one if farmers used written contract, 0 otherwise; 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6.6 The impact of written contract choice on net returns (relative to oral contract 
users): ESR estimation  
  Net returns 
Variable Selection Written contract users 
(N=179) 
Oral contract users 
(N=71) 
Constant -3.379 (2.926) 0.371 (0.733) 0.590 (1.024) 
Age -0.003 (0.011) -0.007 (0.002)*** -0.002 (0.005) 
Education 0.036 (0.040) -0.007(0.010) -0.0221 (0.015) 
Orchard size -0.006 (0.05) -0.133 (0.012)*** -0.178 (0.020)*** 
Specialization 1.095 (0.610)* 0.436 (0.154)*** 0.246 (0.244) 
Farming Vehicle -0.229 (0.351) -0.032 (0.084) -0.116 (0.157) 
Computer 0.061 (0.244) 0.105 (0.054)* 0.155 (0.110) 
Cooperative sales -0.526 (0.316)* 0.144 (0.090) 0.299 (0.136)** 
Extension contact 0.033 (0.210) 0.143 (0.051)*** 0.0236 (0.077) 
Access to credit 0.691 (0.212)*** 0.0704(0.052) 0.096 (0.108) 
Timely payment 0.341 (0.254) -0.024 (0.066) -0.183 (0.104)* 
Neighbor 0.117 (0.239) 0.008 (0.060) -0.077 (0.092) 
Distance (log) -0.074 (0.030)** -0.011 (0.008) 0.002 (0.013) 
Quantity (log) 0.291 (0.328) 0.852 (0.076)*** 0.977 (0.122)*** 
Price (log) 0.368 (0.520) 0.750 (0.108)*** 0.229 (0.275) 
Gansu 0.611 (0.563) 0.436 (0.213)** 0.281 (0.183) 
Shaanxi 1.025 (0.507)** 0.152 (0.206) -0.069 (0.170) 
Market perception -0.677 (0.158)***   
𝐿𝑛𝜎1   -1.152 (0.066)***  
 𝜌𝜂1  0.523 (0.273)*  
𝐿𝑛𝜎0    -1.220 (0.118)*** 
 𝜌𝜂0   -0.401 (0.410) 
Log likelihood -154.99   
Likelihood ratio test for independent equations 𝑥2(1)    3.65* 
Observations 250 250 250 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log form of apple net returns measured in yuan/mu (1$=6.14 yuan);  
In selection equation, it takes the value of one if farmers used written contract, 0 otherwise; 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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The estimates for the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT), which shows the causal 
effects of written contract choice on net returns, are presented in Table 6.7. The ATT estimates 
account for selection bias arising from both observable and unobservable factors. The results 
reveal that the choice of written contracts tends to significantly increase net returns by 2.46%, 
when no contract users are treated as the control group. Moreover, the causal effect of written 
contract choice on net returns is much higher when it is against the use of oral contracts, with a 
5.43% increase in net returns. These findings suggest that promoting the use of written contracts 
in fresh apply supply chain can be beneficial to farmers’ welfare by contributing to higher net 
returns. 
 Table 6.7 Average treatment effects of written contract choice on net returns: ESR 
estimation 
 Mean Outcome a    
 Written contract 
 Users (N=179) 
No contract  
Users (N=172) 
ATT t-value Change (%) 
Net Returns 8.74 (0.44) 8.53 (0.40) 0.21*** 8.91 2.46 
 Mean Outcome a    
 Written contract 
 Users (N=179) 
Oral contract  
Users (N=71) 
ATT t-value Change (%) 
Net Returns 8.74 (0.44) 8.29 (0.48) 0.45*** 25.71 5.43 
a As the dependent variable in the ESR outcome equation is the log form of net returns measured in yuan/mu, 
the predictions are also given in log forms; 
*** denotes significance at 1% level. 
6.5.4 Impact of Oral Contract Choice on Net Returns: PSM Estimation 
Given the absence of selection bias resulting from unobservable factors for oral contract 
specification in BFG estimation in Table 6.4, we employ the PSM technique to assess the causal 
effect of oral contract choice on net returns. PSM includes two steps. In the first step, a probit 
model has been employed to predict propensity score (i.e. the probability) of choosing oral 
contracts. The estimated propensity score is given in Table 6.10.A2 in the Appendix, which 
shows that 83.65% of the sample observations are correctly predicted. The propensity score 
only serves as a device to balance the observable distribution of covariates across the oral 
contract users and non-users (Dehejia and Wahba 2002). 
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Table 6.8 presents the results estimated for the causal effects of oral contract choice (treatment 
group) on net returns, where the control groups are no contract users and written contract users, 
respectively. As indicated previously, the ATT is estimated with the nearest neighbor matching 
(NNM), Kernal-based matching (KBM) and Radius matching methods. The results generally 
indicate that the choice of oral contracts exerts a negative and statistically significant impact on 
net returns. The finding is surprising, because the use of oral contract is also expected to 
increase net returns. This is possibly due to the fact that oral contracts enable farmers to receive 
advance payments (i.e. deposit), which can help them overcome short-term capital constraints. 
However, advance payments normally result in lower product prices, resulting in lower net 
returns. Moreover, the choice of oral contracts also appears to negatively and significantly 
decrease net returns by 1.94-2.50% as well, when the control group is the written contract users. 
The result is in line with the finding by Munjaiton et al. (2014) for Thailand, who also used 
PSM method to control for selectivity bias and found that oral contract users received lower 
profitability than written contract users. 
Table 6.8 Average treatment effects of oral contract choice on net returns: PSM 
estimation 
 Mean Outcome a    
Matching algorithm Oral contract 
users (N=71) 
No contract 
users (N=172) 
ATT t-value Change 
(%) 
NNM 8.59 8.79 -0.20* -1.72 -2.28 
KBM (Bandwidth=0.4) 8.59 8.78 -0.19* -1.78 -2.16 
Radius (caliper=0.3) 8.59 8.79 -0.20* -1.87 -2.28 
 Mean Outcome    
Matching algorithm Oral contract 
users (N=71) 
written contract 
users (N=179) 
ATT t-value Change 
(%) 
NNM 8.59 8.81 -0.22** -2.0 -2.50 
KBM (Bandwidth=0.4) 8.59 8.76 -0.17* -1.71 -1.94 
Radius (caliper=0.3) 8.59 8.77 -0.18* -1.78 -2.05 
a As the outcomes used are the log form of net returns measured in yuan/mu, the predictions are also given in 
log forms; 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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6.6 Conclusions 
This study examined the determinants of farmers’ choices of marketing contracts, 
disaggregated by written contracts, oral contracts and no contracts, as well as the related impact 
on net returns, using data collected from apple farmers in Gansu, Shaanxi and Shandong 
provinces between September and December 2013 in China. Given the nature of multiple 
discrete choices of marketing contracts, a two-step BFG model based on the multinomial logit 
model was employed to address sample selectivity effects. The results did suggest the presence 
of selection bias, indicating that accounting for selection bias is a prerequisite for unbiased and 
consistent estimation. 
The empirical findings of the multinomial logit model on determinants of marketing contract 
choices revealed that the choice of written contracts was positively and significantly influenced 
by access to credit, timely payment, and the transacted quantities. The choice of oral contract 
was positively associated with cooperative sales and distance to markets. With regards to the 
factors that influence selection towards net returns, we observed that written contracts were 
positively affected by cooperative sales, extension contact, as well as transacted quantities and 
prices, while oral contracts were positively influenced by the transacted quantity.  
The results of BFG estimation showed significant and negative selectivity correction term in 
net return specification for written contract choice, suggesting that the expected net returns for 
written contract users was downward biased. This is because farmers who are better suited with 
written contracts switched from written contracts to no contracts, leading to a significant 
negative impact on their net returns. The result clearly suggests that unbiased and consistent 
evaluation of net returns due to certain marketing contract choices must take selectivity effects 
into account, which confirm the appropriateness of the BFG approach for the analysis.  
On the basis of BFG estimation, we employed an endogenous switching regression model to 
estimate the causal effects of written contract choice on net returns, as well as a propensity 
score matching technique to assess the causal effects of oral contract choice on net returns. The 
results generally showed that the choice of written contracts was to increase net returns by about 
2.46% and 5.43%, respectively, when the no contract users and oral contract users are treated 
as the control groups. However, the choice of oral contract tends to decrease net returns, no 
matter the control group is no contract users or written contract users. In particular, the causal 
effect of oral contract choice was to decrease net returns by 2.16-2.28% and 1.94-2.50%, 
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respectively compared with no contract users and written contract users. Overall, the results 
indicate that marketing contracts functioned to enhance net returns increases only if written 
contract was chosen, and oral contract users tended to benefit more than no contract users from 
the use of marketing contracts. 
Our results suggest that written contracts can be clearly welfare enhancing for its users. 
Therefore, its use should be further promoted in fresh apple supply chain in China. In particular, 
policies that enhance farmers’ access to credit and encourage timely payment from buyers 
would facilitate the use of written contracts. Given that cooperative sales and extension contact 
contribute to higher net returns for the written contract users, policy makers could promote 
effective measures to improve farmers’ access to extension agents, and continue to facilitate 
apple marketing through cooperative organizations.  
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Appendix  
Table 6.9.A1 Correlation between instrument variable and outcome 
Outcome Instrumental variable Correlation p-value 
Net returns Market perception 0.0630 0.1967 
 
Table 6.10.A2 Probit estimates of propensity score for the choice of oral contracts 
Variable Coefficient Standard error z-value 
Constant 1.195 2.094 0.57 
Age -0.015 0.010 -1.55 
Education -0.067 (0.031 -2.18** 
Orchard size 0.054 0.040 1.34 
Specialization -1.350 0.461 -2.93*** 
Farming vehicle 0.113 0.295 0.38 
Computer -0.016 0.207 -0.08 
Cooperative sales 1.172 0.215 5.44*** 
Extension contact 0.169 0.173 0.98 
Access to credit -0.622 0.174 -3.58*** 
Timely payment -0.039 (0.220 -0.17 
Neighbor -0.158 0.188 -0.84 
Distance to markets (log) 0.057 0.023 2.49** 
Quantity (log) -0.111 0.228 -0.49 
Price (log) 0.295 0.425 0.69 
Gansu 0.707 0.333 2.12** 
Shaanxi 0.745 0.303 2.46** 
Pseudo-R2  0.181   
Log likelihood -156.658   
Correctly classified 83.65%   
Observations  422  
Note: *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Chapter 7      General Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The analyses conducted in this dissertation aimed at examining the impact of agricultural 
cooperatives on the adoption of technologies and farm performance of apple farmers in China, 
using the data collected between September and December 2013 from Gansu, Shaanxi and 
Shandong provinces of China. Given that agricultural cooperative membership is not randomly 
distributed among smallholder apple farmers, but farmers choose to join the cooperatives 
themselves, analyzing the true effects of membership in agricultural cooperatives on technology 
adoption and farm performance should address the issue of selection bias. Therefore, this study 
employed different econometric approaches to conduct the empirical analyses.  
In sections below, the review of empirical analysis methods used in the dissertation is firstly 
presented. Next, the main results from the dissertation are summarized. Finally, policy 
recommendations to enhance apple production system and improve rural household income are 
suggested based on the main findings.  
7.1 Review of Empirical Analysis Methods 
The econometric methods used in this study include recursive bivariate probit (RBP) model, 
endogenous switching probit (ESP) model, endogenous switching regression (ESR) model, 
treatment effects model, BFG model, propensity score matching (PSM) model, and Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) regression. Among them, RBP model, ESP model, ESR model, BFG model 
and treatment effects model address the issue of selection bias accounting for both observable 
and unobservable factors with inclusion of valid instrumental variables in application, while 
PSM method addresses the issue of selection bias accounting for only observable factors. In 
analyzing the impact of cooperative membership on the outcomes of interest by using OLS 
regression, cooperative membership was treated as an exogenous variable.  
The RBP model was employed in chapter 2 to estimate the impact of cooperative membership 
on investment in organic fertilizer, farmyard manure, and chemical fertilizer. The RBP is 
appropriate to estimate the effect of a binary endogenous treatment variable (i.e. cooperative 
membership choice) on a binary outcome (i.e. whether or not to invest in organic fertilizer, 
farmyard manure and chemical fertilizer). The RBP model not only allowed us to analyze the 
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marginal effects and average treatment effects of cooperative membership on investment in soil 
measures, but also estimated the marginal effects of other controlling factors on farmers’ 
investment decisions. 
In chapter 3, the ESP model was employed to examine the impact of cooperative membership 
on adoption of IPM technology. The model is also appropriate to examine the effect of a binary 
endogenous treatment variable on a binary outcome (i.e. whether or not to adopt IPM 
technology). Unlike RBP model that simultaneously estimated cooperative membership 
equation with one outcome equation, the ESP model analyzed the determinants of IPM adoption 
separately for cooperative members and nonmembers. Based on the estimated coefficients of 
variables in ESP model, the average treatment effects (ATT and ATU) of cooperative 
membership on adoption of IPM technology can be calculated. These ATT and ATU 
calculations accounted for the selection bias arising from both observable and unobservable 
factors, which reflected the true effects of cooperative membership on IPM adoption. Moreover, 
a treatment effects mode was employed in this chapter to examine the impact of IPM adoption 
on apple yields, net returns and agricultural income. Similar to ESR model, the treatment effect 
model is appropriate to estimate the impact of a binary endogenous treatment variable on a 
continuous outcome variable. However, treatment effects model estimates IPM adoption 
equation with one outcome equation simultaneously. 
The study in chapter 4 employed the ESR model to analyze the impacts of cooperative 
membership on apple yields, net returns and household income. Unlike ESP model that aims at 
binary outcome variables, the ESR model is appropriate to estimate the impact of a binary 
endogenous treatment variable on a continuous outcome variable. The ESR model enabled us 
to understand the factors that influence apple yields, net returns and household income for 
cooperative members and nonmembers separately, and estimate average treatment effects of 
cooperative membership on apple yields, net returns and household income accounting for both 
observable and unobservable characteristics.  
To evaluate the profitability of a number of different investments, the study in chapter 5 
therefore employed a treatment effects model to analyze the impact of cooperative membership 
on return on investment (ROI). ROI was employed as a farm performance indicator since it not 
only concentrates on improving net returns from apple production, but also takes the 
profitability of different investments into account. A treatment effects mode was used to 
estimate the marginal effect and average treatment effect of cooperative membership on The 
ROI. Moreover, the effects of cooperative membership on the ROI estimated from the treatment 
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effects model were respectively compared with the effects estimated from an OLS regression 
and a PSM method.  
In chapter 6, a two-stage BFG method was employed to investigate the determinants of 
marketing contract choices including written contracts, oral contracts and no contracts, as well 
as to examine the impacts of marketing contracts on net returns from apple production in China. 
The model is appropriate to estimate the impacts of a large number of mutually exclusive 
choices (at least three) on a continuous outcome variable. The first-stage of BFG method 
applied an unordered multinomial logit (MNL) model to examine the factors that influence 
farmers’ decisions to choose different types of marketing contracts, as well as creating 
selectivity terms for unbiased estimation of net returns equations. In the second stage, the net 
returns equations were estimated with inclusion of three selectivity correction terms. Given the 
finding of the presence of selection bias that arisen from unobserved factors for written contract 
specification in BFG estimation, the study in chapter 6 employed an ESR model to analyze the 
causal effect of written contract choice on net returns from apple production. Moreover, given 
the absence of selection bias resulting from unobservable factors for oral contract specification 
in BFG estimation, a PSM technique was used to assess the causal effect of oral contract choice 
on net returns. 
7.2 Summary of Results 
The results in chapter 2 showed that a number of factors tended to drive farmers’ decisions to 
join contemporary agricultural cooperatives, including education, household size, farm size, 
asset ownership, and road condition. With respect to the investment decisions, the findings 
showed that cooperative membership had a positive and statistically significant impacts on 
investment in organic fertilizer and farmyard manure, but it had no statistically significant 
impact on investment in chemical fertilizer. Furthermore, the ownership of assets such as 
farming vehicle and rotary cultivator, access to credit were found to significantly increase the 
propensity to invest in soil quality measures such as organic fertilizer and farmyard manure. 
The estimations in chapter 3 showed that cooperative members’ decisions to adopt IPM 
technology were primarily influenced by education, farm size, household size, asset ownership, 
price knowledge, the establishment of refrigerated warehouse, and environmental and health 
perceptions, while IPM adoption decisions of nonmembers were influenced by education, off-
farm work, price knowledge and environmental perception. With respect to the average 
treatment effects of cooperative membership, the results showed that the causal effect of 
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cooperative membership was to increase the probability of IPM adoption by 30%, and farmers 
without cooperative membership would be 10% more likely to adopt IPM technology if joined 
cooperatives. Moreover, IPM adoption significantly increases apple yields, net returns and 
agricultural income. 
The findings in chapter 4 showed cooperative membership positively increased apple yields by 
5.36%, net returns by 6.06% and household income by 4.66%, and small-scale farms benefited 
more from cooperatives than medium and large farms. In this chapter, computer ownership was 
found to be an important factor that influenced farmers’ decisions to join agricultural 
cooperatives and enhances household welfare. Extension contact and access to credit improved 
the welfare of cooperative members. 
The results in chapter 5 showed that agricultural cooperative membership had a positive and 
statistically significant impact on the ROI. In particular, the causal effect of cooperative 
membership was to increase ROI by 14% on average for the population as a whole. The ROI 
was found to be positively and significantly influenced by income specialization, marketing 
contract and labor availability. The further estimations showed that OLS model underestimated 
the marginal effect of cooperative membership on the ROI, while PSM method underestimated 
the average treatment effect of cooperative membership, which was consistent with the finding 
of negative selection bias in treatment effects model estimation.  
The empirical analysis in chapter 6 revealed that the choice of written contracts was positively 
and significantly influenced by access to credit, timely payment, and the transacted quantities, 
and the choice of oral contracts was positively associated with cooperative sales and distance 
to markets. With regards to the factors that influenced selection towards net returns, the results 
showed that cooperative sales, extension contact, as well as transacted quantities and prices 
were primary factors that influenced the net returns from choosing written contracts, and 
transacted quantity was a vital determinant of higher net returns from choosing oral contracts. 
The further estimations from ESR model and PSM model showed that the causal effect of 
written contract was to increase net returns by about 2.46% and 5.43%, respectively, when the 
no contract users and oral contract users were treated as control groups. However, the causal 
effect of oral contract choice was to decrease net returns by 2.16-2.28% and 1.94-2.50%, 
respectively compared with no contract users and written contract users. 
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7.3 Policy Implications 
The findings from this study showed that contemporary agricultural cooperatives can facilitate 
the adoption of soil-improving measures such as organic fertilizer and farmyard manure and 
environmentally-friendly pest management technology such as IPM, as well as increase apple 
yields, net returns, household income and return on investment. Thus, the government in China 
should step up its efforts to encourage smallholder farmers to join agricultural cooperatives.  
Since the access to credit and irrigation facilities appeared to be important factors facilitating 
farmers’ investment in soil quality measure, policies focusing on improving farmers’ access to 
credit and accelerating the development of rural infrastructure such as irrigation system would 
enhance investment in soil-improving measures. The finding of the positive relationship 
between agricultural cooperative membership and IPM adoption suggests that agricultural 
cooperatives can be a transmission route in the efforts to facilitate IPM technology. Given that 
price knowledge and environmental perception positively influence farmers’ decisions to adopt 
IPM technology, enhancing farmers’ knowledge with respect to organic food, green food and 
pollution-free food production standards, and negative environmental effects of continuous use 
of chemical pesticides, would help increase farmers’ adoption of IPM technology. This could 
be achieved through cooperatives’ collective activities.  
Access to computers appeared to positively influence farmers’ decisions to join agricultural 
cooperatives and affected household welfare. Thus, government policy should help improve 
rural internet routing infrastructure. The positive and significant impacts of extension contact 
and access to credit suggest that promoting effective measures to improve farmers’ access to 
extension service and credit would help improve farm household welfare. The positive and 
significant impacts of written contract on net returns and ROI of apple production suggest that 
government should take effective measures to promote the use of marketing contracts in fresh 
apple supply chain. Given that cooperative sales and extension contact contribute to higher net 
returns for the written contract users, policy makers could promote effective measures to 
improve farmers’ access to extension agents, and continue to facilitate apple marketing through 
cooperative organizations.  
  
Appendix A: Questionnaire                    
  
Number: 
 
  
Date:              
 
 
 
Survey Questionnaire for Apple Production and Marketing in China 
（2012-2013） 
 
 
Enumerator:                       
                                 
 
Province: 
  
 
City: 
  
 
County 
  
 
Town 
  
 
Village: 
  
 
Reviewer: 
  
 
Instructions： 
 Before interview, please say to the respondent: “Thank you very much for your 
cooperation. The information that is going to collect is only used for academic purpose 
and will be kept strictly confidential”. 
 During interview, please emphasize to the respondent that we are collecting apple 
production information in 2012 as well as apple marketing information for the produce. 
Besides, please also repeat to the respondent when it is necessary that targeted 
information is for apple variety of Fuji. 
 During interview, please specify units clearly whenever you write quantities and prices 
and try to complete as accurately as possible   
 Please write the right answer(s) on corresponding place or use “√” to cross the correct 
answer. For some questions with multiple choices, if there is no prepared answers, 
please choose the answer “Others” and specify. 
 After finishing the interview, please check the questionnaire again before say to the 
respondent: “Thank you again for your collaboration about this survey”. 
 The partner reviewer should examine the questionnaire in order to ensure the written 
information clear and easily identified. 
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1. General Information 
1-1 Age (years)        ; 1-2 Gender        (1=male; 0=female); 1-3 Education (years)        ; 
1-4 Village cadre or not        (1=Yes; 0=No); 1-5 Farming experiences (years)        ;   
1-6 Household size        ; 1-7 Do you have family members above 60 years     (1=Yes; 0=No); 
1-7-1 Family members above 64 years (numbers)        ; 
1-8 Labors for apple production (numbers)        ; 1-9 Children in school (numbers)        ; 
1-9-1 Family members below 15 years (numbers)        ; 
1-10 Off-farm work participants of household members (numbers)    ;  
1-11 Total land areas cultivated (mu)        ; 1-12 Land rented-in (mu)        ;  
1-13 Land rented out (mu)        ; 1-14 Total land plots (numbers)        ; 
1-15 Irrigated land areas (mu)        ; 1-16 Hillside land (mu)        ;  
1-17 What is your total family living expenditures (yuan/month)            ；     
1-18 Did you grow any other commercial crops except apples?          (1=Yes; 0=No) 
If yes: 1-18-1 Please specify which crop(s)                 ;             
1-19 Did you raise livestock?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
If yes: 1-19-1 Please specify which livestock(s)                           ;             
1-20 What is your total family income in 2012? (yuan)                          ;    
1-21 what is your total income from agriculture in 2012? (yuan)              ;     
1-22 Did you participate in off-farm work (local or outside) in 2012?          (1=Yes; 0=No) 
If yes: 
 1-22-1 How many months in all?          ;     
 1-22-2 What is the salary (yuan/month)?          ;    
1-23 Is the off-farm work available in the surrounding areas of your village?         (1=Yes; 0=No)   
1-24 How do you think the role of income diversification through off-farm work in agricultural 
production?        (1=less important; 2=neutral attitudes; 3=very important) 
1-25 In addition to apples, what is the income from other crop(s) on a commercial 
basis?(yuan)            ;     
1-26 Do you have a computer?        (1=Yes; 0=No);  
1-27 Do you have a rotary cultivator?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
1-28 Do you own a farming vehicle?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
1-29 Do you have hand sprayers?        (1=Yes; 0=No); If yes: 1-29-1 How many hand sprayers 
do you have?        ;     
1-30 Do you have power sprayer?        (1=Yes; 0=No); If yes: 1-30-1 How many power sprayers 
do you have?        ;     
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2. Agricultural Cooperatives 
2-1 Is there an agricultural cooperative in your residing village?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
2-2-1 Does any of your neighbors have cooperative membership?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
2-2.2 Does any of your friends have cooperative membership?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
2-2-3 Does any of your relatives have cooperative membership?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
2-3 Are you a member in an agricultural cooperative?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
If yes: 
 2-3-1 Where is the cooperative?        (1=In the local or neighboring village; 0=In other 
place (e.g., the county or township)) 
 2-3-2 How many years have you been a cooperative member? (years)        ; 
 2-3-3 How much do you have to pay for the annual membership fee? (yuan/year)        ; 
 2-3-4 Does the cooperative have a brand that is used to promote the products?       (1=Yes; 
0=No); If yes: 2-3-4-1 What is the brand name?                            ;       
 2-3-5 In which aspect do you think that the cooperative can play the most important 
role to your benefits in apple production and marketing      (1=Technical guidance; 
2=Providing marketing information; 3=Providing services for produce circulation and 
transportation; 4=Divvying up returns; 5=Other             ) 
 2-3-7 Does the cooperative provide you with production inputs?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
 2-3-8 Does the cooperative control your production behaviors?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
 2-3-9 Does the cooperative collectively purchase the inputs for the members?            ;     
(1=Yes; 0=No） 
If no: 
 2-3-10 What is the reason for not choosing the cooperative membership?        (1=Local 
cooperative is not available; 2=The expected profit is not optimistic; 3=Self-farming 
condition is lower than requirement of farmer organization; 4=I am used to the 
traditional farming; 5=Others                  ) 
2-4 Do you think that the services provided by agricultural cooperatives are useful?         ;     
(1=Yes; 0=No) 
2-5 Do you think that contemporary agricultural cooperative is more effective than people’s 
commune system (PCS)?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
2-6 Can you acquire sufficient information to understand the functions of contemporary 
cooperatives?         (1=Yes; 0=No) 
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3. Apple Orchard Information 
Information of Sapling Orchards 
 3-1-1 3-1-2 3-1-3 3-1-4 3-1-5 
Variety Size 
(mu) 
Plot 
(Number) 
Land rented-in 
(mu) 
Rental fee 
(yuan/year/mu) 
Irrigated Land  
(mu) 
Fuji1      
Information of Fruiting Orchards 
 3-2-1 3-2-2 3-2-3 3-2-4 3-2-5 
Variety Size 
(mu) 
Plot 
(Number) 
Land rented-in 
(mu) 
Rental fee 
(yuan/year/mu) 
Irrigated Land 
(mu) 
Fuji      
3-3 Growing density (trees/mu)        ;  
3-3-1 Average tree costs (yuan/sapling)        ;  
3-3-2 The oldest fruiting apple tree age (years)        ;  
3-3-3 The youngest fruiting apple tree age (years)        ; 3-3-4 Average tree age (years)        ;  
3-4 When you plant apple trees, how do you decide space between trees?                                                ;     
3-5 Apple growing experience (years)        ;     
3-6 Soil type        (1=Loan; 2=Sand; 3=Clay) 
3-7 Where did you primarily purchase saplings?        (1=Fellow farmers; 2=Market dealers (or 
nursery garden); 3= Government; 4=Village community; 5=Agricultural cooperatives; 
6=other                )  
3-8 What are the reasons for you to choose to grow Fuji variety?        (1=Higher yield; 2=Higher 
price; 3=Easy to store; 4=Good quality; 5=It is grown widely by other farmers; 
6=Recommended by village community; 7=Recommended by government; 8=Pest 
resistant; 9=High market demand; 10=other                        ) 
3-9 Except the Fuji variety, what other apple varieties do you grow?        (1=Gala; 2=Jonagold; 
3=Sparking; 4=Red Delicious; 5= Golden Delicious; 6= Qinguan delicious；7=Other           ) 
3-9-1 How much land are you used for other apple varieties (mu)?        ;     
3-10 What is the distance from orchard to closest sales markets? (km)         ; 3.10.1 How long 
does it take for transportation? (Minutes)          (Note: use 0 if sales at orchard gate) 
                                                          
1 After preliminary test for the questionnaire, we learnt that Fuji variety is the main variable grown by each apple 
producing household. 
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4. Apple Production Information 
4-14 How do you evaluate your apple yields in 2012, compared to the yields in previous 
year?        ;(1=lower; 2=average; 3=higher) 
4-15 Did you make records for input use during apple production?       (1=Yes; 0=No) 
4-16 What is the distance from your dwelling to the furthest apple orchard? (kms)        ; 1-20 
How long does it take by walking? (Minutes)        ;  
4-17 Do you have sufficient capital for apple production?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
If no: 
 4-17-1 Did you borrow money?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
 4-17-2 Is it easier for you to get money (e.g., from friends, relatives, and banks), when 
you have to borrow money for apple production        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
4-18 The distance between your home and available capital sources (e.g., banks, friends or 
relatives) (km)        ;     
4-19 From which source do you usually acquire apple production information?                         ; 
4-20 Did you receive pesticide residue test?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
 4-20-1 From which department do you get the service?        ; 
(1=Government；2=Produce dealer；3=Cooperatives；4=Others                   ) 
 4-20-2 Do you have to pay?      (1=Yes; 0=No); 4-20-3 If yes, how much did you 
pay?(yuan/time)        ;     
4-21 How do you evaluate the average level of natural disasters (e.g., drought, frost damage, 
hail or pest damage) happened in 2012?        (1=severe; 2=moderate; 3=mild) 
4-22 Did you buy the crop insurance for apple production in 2012?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
If yes: 
 4-22-1 What kind of insurance?    (1=Policy-based insurance; 2=Commercial insurance) 
 4-22-2 What is the insurance rate? (%)        ;     
 4-22-3 What is the total insurance premium?(yuan/mu)        ; 4-22-4 How much is paid 
by you ?(yuan)              , and 4-22-5 how much is paid by the government?(yuan)             ; 
If no:  
 4-22-6 Are you willing to buy the insurance in the future?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
4-23 Is the road condition from orchards to village/market good?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
4-24 Have you established apple storage?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
4-25 Is there any apple refrigerated warehouse in local areas?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
If yes:  
 4-25-1 What is the distance from your home to the warehouse?(minutes)     
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4-26 Did you use anti-hail net for the fruiting apple orchards?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
If yes:  
 4-26-1 Who built it?    1=Self-construction (      yuan); 2=By fruit center for free; 3=By 
fruit company for free; 4=Other                     ) 
 4-26-2 Do you have to pay?        (1=Yes; 0=No): If yes, 4-26-3 How much do you have to 
pay? (yuan)          ;     
4-27 Do you have sugar meter?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
4-28 Did you adopt soil and water conservation measures?        (1=Yes; 0=No);  
If yes:  
 4-28-1 What kind of measures?        (1=Growing grass or legumes; 2=Put sand; 3=Put 
crop straw; 4=use agricultural mulch; 5=Others                  ) 
4-29 Where do you usually buy agricultural materials (e.g., fertilizer and pesticide)?           ;     
(1=dealers in home village; 2=dealers in other village; 3=agricultural cooperatives; 
4=dealers in township; 5=fruit service center; 6=fruit company; 7=other                 ) 
4-30 How do you usually pay for the purchased production materials?       (1=By cash; 2=On 
credit; 3=Part of cash and part of credit) 
4.31 How far is it from your home to input shops? (km)        ; 4.31.1 How long does it 
take?(minutes)    ; 4.31.2 Which kind of transports do you use?       (1=Motor vehicles; 
2=Non-motor vehicles） 
4-32 Which way did you use for picking?       (1=According to apple maturity; 2=Picking all at 
one time) 
4-33 Labor use (days/mu)        ;     
4-34 Did you attend any extension service programs provided by the government?        (1=Yes; 
0=No) 
If yes: 
 4-34-1 How many times have you attended?        ;     
 4-34-2 Which contents are included in the extension service?        (1=pruning branches; 
2=fertilizer use; 3=pesticide use; 4=irrigation technology; 5= pesticide residue control; 
6=other                ) 
If no: 
 4-34-3 What is the main reason for non-participation?       (1=No time; 2=No use; 3=No 
such service; 4=Other                 ) 
4-35 Do you think that the extension service provided by the government is useful?        ;     
(1=Yes; 0=No) 
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4-36 Did you get subsidy for apple production?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
If yes: 
 4-36-1 If subsidized in cash:        yuan/mu； 
 4-36-2 if subsidized in material, including:          ; 4-36-3 Evaluated in             yuan 
4-37 Where do you usually acquire information associated with apple production 
technology?                                   ;  
4-38 Did you use soil testing and fertilizer recommendation technology in 2012?      ; 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 
If yes: 
 4-38-1 Service provider        (1=Agricultural extension department;  
2=Farmer organization; 3=The village committee; 4=Other(s)          ) 
 4-38-2 How much do you have to pay each time? (yuan)        (0 if no payment) 
If no: 
 4-38-3 What is the main reason?                                                                            ;                       
5. Fertilizer Use 
5.1 Organic Fertilizer Use 
5-1 Did you apply organic fertilizer?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
If yes: 
 5-1-1 Total bags used      ; 5-1-2 Price (yuan/bag)      ; 5-1-3 Application frequency 
(times/year)        ; 5-1-4 Applied areas (mu)        ; 5-1-5 Total expenditures (yuan)            ;       
5-2 What did you consider in mind when you buy organic fertilizer?      (1=the price; 2=apple 
quality improving effect; 3=yield-enhancing effect; 4= environment effect; 
5=others                ) 
5.2 Farmyard Manure Use 
5-2 Did you apply farmyard manure?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
If yes: 
 5-2-1 Where did you get it?       (1=From family yard; 2=Purchased from livestock 
raising farms; 3=from 1 and 2; 4=others        ) 
 5-2-2 Which kind of manure it is?                          ;         
 5-2-3 If you purchased it, how much does it cost?                  ;        
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5.3 Chemical Fertilizer Use 
5-3 Did you apply chemical fertilizer?    (1=Yes; 0=No) 
If yes: 
 If you applied Pure Nitrogen (N):  
5-3-1 Total bags used        ; 5-3-2 Weight (kg/bag)        ; 5-3-3 Price (yuan/bag)        ;  
5-3-4 Application frequency (times/year)         ; 5-3-5 Applied areas (mu)         ;  
 If you applied Pure Phosphate (P): 
5-3-6 Total bags used       ; 5-3-7 Weight (kg/bag)        ; 5-3-8 Price (yuan/bag)        ;  
5-3-9 Application frequency (times/year)        ; 5-3-10 Applied areas (mu)        ; 
 If you applied Pure Potash(K): 
5-3-11 Total bags used        ; 5-3-12 Weight (kg/bag)       ; 5-3-13 Price (yuan/bag)        ;  
5-3-14 Application frequency (times/year)        ; 5-3-15 Applied areas (mu)        ; 
 If you applied compound fertilizer (NPK):  
5-3-16 Total bags used        ; 5-3-17 Weight (kg/bag)        ; 5-3-18 Price (yuan/bag)        ; 
5-3-19 Application frequency (times/year)        ; 5-3-20 Applied areas (mu)        ; 
5-4 The total expenditures of all kinds of chemical fertilizers (yuan)             ;      
5.4 Fertilizer Use Behaviors 
5-4-1 How do you decide the amounts of fertilizer use?        (1=following packing instructions; 
2=following suggestions of technical persons; 3=following previous experiences; 
4=others           ) 
5-4-2 Do you thank that continuous use of chemical pesticides is a threat to environmental 
performance?          (1=Yes; 0=No)  
5-4-3 Do you think that continuous use of chemical pesticides is a threat to human 
health?         ;(1=Yes; 0=No) 
5-4-4 Previously, agricultural pollution is a serious problem because of excessive fertilization, 
which has caused negative environment impacts (e.g., reducing quality of soil, water and 
air, increasing cost of fertilizer use, food safety issues). Therefore, are you willing to reduce 
the amounts of fertilizer use on the base of original level in the future?           (1=Yes; 0=No) 
If yes: 
 5-4-4-1 What is the main reason?        (1=Reduce fertilizer cost; 2=Improve soil quality; 
3=Protect environment; 4=Improve apple quality；5=Other                ) 
 5-4-4-2 How much do you want to reduce on the original base? (%/tree)        ;    
If no: 
 5-4-4-3 What is the main reason?                                                                  ; 
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5-4-5 Compared with fertilizer use amounts recommended by specifications or technical person, 
how do you usually decide the amount of fertilizer use?       (1=higher than the 
recommended level; 2=the same as the recommended level; 3=Lower than the 
recommended level) 
 5-4-5-1 If you used higher than recommended level, what is the main reason?                        ;     
 5-4-5-2 If you used lower than recommended level, what is the main reason?                         ; 
6. Pesticide Use and Pest Management 
6.1 Chemical Pesticide Use 
6-1 Did you use chemical pesticides in apple production?       (1=Yes; 0=No) 
If yes: 
 6-1-1 Did you apply herbicide?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
If yes: 6-1-2 Application frequency (times/year)        ; 6-1-3 Total costs (yuan)        ;  
      6-1-4 Applied areas (mu)        ; 
 6-1-5 Did you apply insecticide?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
If yes: 6-1-6 Application frequency (times/year)    ; 6-1-7 Total costs (yuan)        ; 
      6-1-8 Applied areas (mu)       ; 
 6-1-9 Did you apply fungicide?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
If yes: 6-1-10 Application frequency (times/year)        ; 6-1-11 Total costs (yuan)        ;    
      6-1-12 Applied areas (mu)        ; 
6.2 Biological/Green Pesticide Use 
6-2 Did you use biological/green pesticides in apple production?         (1=Yes; 0=No) 
If yes: 
 6-2-1 Application frequency (times/year)                ; 6-2-2 Total costs (yuan)                  ;  
      6-2-3 Applied areas (mu)            ;  
If no: 
 Are you willing to use biological pesticide within five years?        (1=Yes; 0= No) 
6-2-4 Have you ever used fake pesticides?        (1=Yes; 0= No) 
6.3 Pesticide Use Behaviors 
6-3-1 How did you decide the quantity of pesticide use?        (1=following packing instructions; 
2=suggested by technical persons; 3=following previous experiences; 4=others                      ) 
6-3-2 What do you care mostly when you purchase pesticide?        (1=price; 2=effects; 
3=pesticide residue level; 4=environment impact; 5=human and livestock impact; 
6=other             ) 
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6-3-3 Do you use self-protection measure (such as mask) when you spray the chemical 
pesticides?            ;(1=Never; 2=Sometimes; 3=Always) 
6-3-4 How many interval days does it take between your last pesticide spraying and apple 
harvest? (days)            ; 
6-3-5 Do you know the chemical safety interval period for apple production?        ; 
(1=Yes; 0= No) 
6-3-6 Compared with pesticide use quantity suggested by technical persons or instruction books, 
how do you usually decide the amount of pesticide use?        (1=higher than the 
recommended level; 2=the same as the recommended level; 3=Lower than the 
recommended level) 
 6-3-6-1 If you used higher than recommended level, what is the main reason?                        ;     
 6-3-6-2 If you used lower than recommended level, what is the main reason?                         ; 
6-3-7 At present, pesticide residue is the main factor that influences food safety and 
environmental performance, which not only causes a series poisoning incidents and 
influences food export, but damages the eco-environment. Therefore, are you willing to 
reduce level of pesticide use?        (1=Yes; 0=No). 
If yes: 
 6-3-7-1 What is the main purpose?                                                                                    ;     
 6-3-7-2 How much would you like to reduce per tree? (%)            ;     
If no: 
 6-3-7-3 What is the reason?                                                                                         ; 
6-3-8 Are you willing to replace chemical pesticide with bio-pesticide in the future?        ;     
(1=Yes; 0= No) 
6-3-9 Do you consider the environmental effect associated with pesticides when you purchase 
pesticides?         (1=Yes; 0= No) 
6-3-10 Do you consider the health effect associated with pesticides when you purchase 
pesticides?         (1=Yes; 0= No) 
6.4 Integrated Pest Management Technology 
6-4-1 Did you use both scouting for pests and economic thresholds in making pest treatment 
decisions?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
6-4-2 Did you adjust application rates, time, and frequency of pesticide use?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
6-4-3 Did you use yellow sticky mobile, fixed traps, insect-trap light, trap band, cardboard traps 
for pest management?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
If yes: 
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 6-4-3-1 Where did you get those stuff?       (1=Self-purchasing (    Yuan); 2=Free 
distribution from government fruit office; 3=Free distribution from agricultural 
cooperatives; 4=Other                   ) 
 6-4-3-2 In addition to the methods mentioned above, what other methods have you used 
for pest management?         (1=Yes; 0=No)   
6-4-4 Did you purchase beneficial insects that prey on insects damaging to the crop for pest 
management?          (1=Yes; 0=No)  
7. Labor Use and Other Production Costs 
Bagging 7-1-1 Hired labors (persons)          ; 7-1-2 Working days          ； 
Bagging off 7-1-3 Hired labors (persons)          ; 7-1-4 Working days         ； 
Picking 7-1-5 Hired labors (persons)          ; 7-1-6 Working days          ； 
Others (e.g. fertilizer 
application) 
7-1-7 Hired labors (persons)          ; 7-1-8 Working days          ； 
7-1-9 average wage for hired labors (yuan/day)          ;     
7-2 Do you usually have sufficient labors during apple production and marketing period?          ;     
(1=Yes; 0=No) 
If no: 
 7-2-1 Is it easier for you to hire labors?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
7-3 How many bags did you buy for apple bagging?           ; 7-3-1 Price (yuan/bag)           ; 
7-4 The total labor days used for apple production (days)          ;      
Other production costs 
7-5-1 Rope for branch pulling (yuan)         ;     
7-5-2 Input and output transportation (yuan)          ;     
7-5-3 The costs for repairing production tools (e.g., tractor and sprayer)          ; 
7-5-4 Reflection film for apple coloring (yuan)          ; 
7-5-5 Film for water and soil conservation (yuan)           ;     
8. Irrigation 
8-1 What is the main water source for your orchard irrigation?      ; 
(1=Canals; 2=Own well; 3=Commercial well; 4=Rain) 
 8-1-1 If you used canals, what are the total costs?(yuan)                ; 
 8-1-2 If you used commercial well, what are the total costs? (yuan)                ； 
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8-2 During the apple production season in 2012, is there scarcity of water?          (1=Yes; 0=No) 
If yes: 
 8-2-1 How do you manage water scarcity?    (1=Ignore it; 2= transporting water for 
irrigation; 3=Purchasing from commercial well) 
 8-2-2 What percentage yield is lost due to water scarcity? (%)        ;     
8-3 Are the local irrigation facilities available?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
8-4 In your opinion, does water quality (e.g., alkalinity or acidity) affect apple quality?        ;     
(1=Yes; 0=No) 
9. Apple Marketing Information 
9-1 Did you sell apples primarily through agricultural cooperatives?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
9-2 How do you evaluate apple market demand situation?        (1=Bad; 2=Fair; 3=Good) 
9-3 How do you evaluate the apple market fluctuation?          ; 
(1=No fluctuation; 2=Average; 3=Big fluctuation) 
9-4 Can you get the timely payment after sales?        (1=Yes; 0=No)  
If no: 
 9-4-1 How many days do you have to wait?           ;     
9-5 How often do you care about apple price information?        ; 
(1=Seldom; 2=Sometimes; 3=Always) 
9-6 How do you evaluate apple price fluctuation weekly in the sales season?         ;           
(1=Smaller; 2=Average; 3=Bigger) 
9-7 As a whole, how do you evaluate the average sales price of apples?          ; 
(1=Lower; 2=Acceptable; 3=Higher) 
Sales Information by Apple Size 
 
Big size 
(>=80 mm) 
9-8-1 Quantity   
Small size 
(<=65 mm) 
9-8-7 Quantity  
9-8-2 Price  9-8-8 Price  
9-8-3 Income  9-8-9 Income  
Medium size 
(75-70 mm) 
9-8-4 Quantity   
Inferior 
products 
9-8-10 Quantity  
9-8-5 Price  9-8-11 Price  
9-8-6 Income  9-8-12 Income  
Note: Unit of measurement: Quantity: kg; Price: yuan/kg; Income: yuan; 
Sales Information by Marketing Channels 
 
Cooperatives 
9-9-1 Quantity   
Fruit 
market 
10-9-10 Quantity  
9-9-2 Price  10-9-11 Price  
9-9-3 Income  10-9-12 Income  
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Agro-enterprises 
9-9-4 Quantity   
Others 
10-9-13 Quantity  
10-9-5 Price  10-9-14 Price  
10-9-6 Income  10-9-15 Income  
Rural purchaser 10-9-7 Quantity  Quantity: kg;  
Price: yuan/kg; 
Income: yuan; 
10-9-8 Price  
10-9-9 Income  
10-11 Which aspects are paid more attention by apple vendors?    (1=Acidity level; 
2=Rigidity level; 3=Color; 4=Sugar content level; 5=Shape; 6=Fruit diameter; 7=Surface 
defects; 8=Pesticide residue; 9= other      )     
10-12 To whom do you usually sell the apples?        ; 
(1=Local traders; 2=Traders from other provinces; 3=Exporters） 
10-13 From which channel do you acquire market transaction information (such as sales 
price)?         ;(1=government; 2=internet; 3=neighbor or friends; 4=dealers; 5=media such 
as TV and magazines; 6=Others                     ) 
10-14 How do you evaluate apple sales in last harvest year?        ； 
(1=Dull of sale; 2=Average; 3=Sell well) 
10-15 Did you acquire apple marketing information from neighbors?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
10-16 Did you use production contract2?        (1=Yes, 0=No)  
10-17 Which kind of marketing contract did you use for apple sales?        ； 
(1=written contract; 2=oral contract; 3=no contract) 
If you used written contract or oral contract: 
 10-17-1 what was the purpose(s) for you to use written or oral contract?                            ; 
 10-17-2 What provisions or terms are included in the contract?        (1=Quantity; 
2=Quality required; 3=Price; 4=Delivery date; 5=Package requirements; 6=Delivery 
place; 7=Fertilization; 8=Pesticide application; 9=Irrigation; 10=Bagging; 11=New 
technology adoption; 12=Harvest time; 13=Agro-inputs supply; 14=Other      ) 
 10-17-3 Will the contracted price change?         (1=Yes, 0=No); If yes: 10-17-3-1 What 
is the reason?    (1=Fluctuating along with market changes; 2=Other      ) 
 10-17-4 How does the buyer give you the payment?         (1=Cash on delivery; 2=Deposit 
first, then rest money on delivery; 3=Delivery first, then wait    days for final payments) 
 10-17-5 Have you ever experienced contract breach in your side?        (1=Yes, 0=No); 
                                                          
2 Production contract involves the provision of production inputs, and farmers’ production behaviors are partly or 
fully controlled by the contractors. Marketing contract refers to the contract made after apple production. 
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If yes: 10-17-6 What is the main reason?            (1=Contract price is lower than market 
price; 2=Un-satisfaction with produce grading; 3= Payment in arrears; 4=Other      )   
 10-17-7 Have you ever experienced contract breach in buyer side?        (1=Yes; 0=No); 
If yes: 10-17-7-1 what is the reason?    (1=Contract price is higher than market price; 
2=Bad sales; 3=Other           )     
If you did not use written or oral contract: 
10-17-8 What is the main reason?                                                     ; 
Transaction information with marketing contracts 
 
Written contract 
10-18-1 Transacted quantity (kg)  
10-18-2 Average price (yuan/kg)  
10-18-3 Total income (yuan)  
 
Oral contract 
10-18-4 Transacted quantity (kg)  
10-18-5 Average price (yuan/kg)  
10-18-6 Total income (yuan)  
 
No contract 
10-18-7 Transacted quantity (kg)  
10-18-8 Average price (yuan/kg)  
10-18-9 Total income (yuan)  
10. Organic Farming 
10-1 Are you aware of food safety issues associated with conventional agricultural 
production?        ;(1=Yes; 0=No) 
10-2 Are you aware of environmental issues associated with conventional agricultural 
production?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
My understanding of the organic farming: 
10-3-1 Organic farming is environmentally friendly      (1=Yes; 2=No; 3=I don't know) 
10-3-2 Organic farming produces safer food that sells 
at premium prices     
(1=Yes; 2=No; 3=I don't know) 
10-3-3 Organic farming  avoids the use of artificial 
fertilizers and pesticides     
(1=Yes; 2=No; 3=I don't know) 
10-3-4 Organic farming requires a two or three year 
conversion period     
(1=Yes; 2=No; 3=I don't know) 
10-3-5 Organic farming enhances soil fertility with 
sustainable means     
(1=Yes; 2=No; 3=I don't know) 
10-3-6 Organic farming wins the market via improved 
product quality and safety     
(1=Yes; 2=No; 3=I don't know) 
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10-4 Did you acquire information to understand the essence of organic farming?        ; 
(1=Yes; 0=No) 
10-5 Do you think that sufficient channels (e.g., newspapers, television and radio, internet, 
farmer organizations such as agricultural cooperatives, neighbors and friends, and 
agricultural extension agents) are available for you, if you want to acquire specific 
information about organic farming?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
Perceptions of organic apple production: 
10-6-1 Compared with conventional apple production, how do you think the costs of 
organic apple production?        (1=Lower,      %; 2=Almost the same; 3=Higher,    %) 
10-6-2 Compared with conventional apple production, how do you think the market price 
of organic apple?       (1=Lower,      %; 2=Almost the same; 3=Higher,      %) 
10-6-3 Compared with conventional apple production, how do you think the revenue of 
organic apple?      (1=Lower,      %; 2=Almost the same; 3=Higher,      %) 
10-6-4 Compared with conventional apple production, how do you think the yields of 
organic apple?        (1=Lower,      %; 2=Almost the same; 3=Higher,      %) 
10-7 Are you willing to adopt organic farming in the future?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
If yes: 
 10-7-1 What benefits do you think that the organic farming may bring?       (1=Higher 
price/profitable; 2=Improving food quality and safety; 3=Access to international 
markets; 4=Environment-friendly practice; 5=Other            ) 
If no: 
 10-7-2 What is the main reason?    (1=Lower yields; 2=No guarantee of sales price; 
3=No obvious advantage in sales; 4=technology scarcity; 5=Other      ) 
11. Food Safety Awareness  
11-1 Among three types of safer foods (pollution-free food; green food and organic food) 
produced under food safety standards proposed by the Chinese government, which one do 
you think has the highest safety standards?    (1=No idea; 2=Pollution-free food; 3=Green 
food; 4=Organic food); and 11-1-2 Which one do you think may obtain the highest market 
price?    (1=No idea; 2=Pollution-free food; 3=Green food; 4=Organic food) 
11-2 Do you think that the price of food produced under food safety standards (i.e. organic food 
standard, green food standard or pollution-free food standard) and the price of 
conventionally produced food?       (1=Food produced under food safety standards may be 
sold at a higher price than conventional food; 0=others) 
11-3 Have you been encouraged by the government to produce apples under food safety 
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standards?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
11-4 In order to produce apples under food safety standards, in which aspects do you think the 
government should provide help?                                                     ; 
11-5 Do you think that the current pesticide residue level in apple will affect consumer’ 
health?        ;(1=Yes; 0=No)  
11-6 Is there any food safety inspection center in the local area?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
11-7 Whether agricultural cooperatives you participated can provide food safety inspection 
service?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
11-8 Whether the government carried out the test or inspection activities in apple production 
season?        (1=Yes; 0=No) 
 
The End 
 
Many Thanks for Your Cooperation 
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